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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
One of the early (and more cynical) explanations of the
predictive powers of the Delphic Oracle had it that a vapor
issuing from a cleft in the floor in the cave probably
intoxicated the Pythian priestess. Later investigation
discovered that there was neither cleft nor gas, so ruled instead
in favor of trance. The interpreter of the complexities of
Soviet foreign policy well might yearn for either method--
intoxication or convulsion--as a short-cut to deciphering the acts
of the Kremlin's occupants.
When it comes to mastering the relative forces that shape
United States foreign policy, the scholarly detective work
involved, though demanding and even mysterious in its own ways,
benefits inestimably from the fact that after a decent interval
sometimes one can interview the significant participants. They
can be asked what they intended, which elements in the government
favored which policies, and how it all came out in the process of
decision-making.
The student of Soviet arms control and disarmament policy
has none of these aids available to him. Typically, he makes
educated guesses based on his deep immersion in the history and
literature of Soviet affairs. If he wishes to be "scientific,"
he faces a massive and generally discouraging task of detection,
the purpose of which is to reconstruct reality as best he can from
fragments of circumstantial evidence. In doing so he runs
multiple dangers: he may choose the wrong data; he may assume
erroneous relationships among the data; he may interpret the data
incorrectly; and it may turn out that he posed the wrong questions
initially. Also he faces four special hazards. First, the field
has already been extensively mined; second, the historical
perspective we work with is short indeed; third, the data is by
its nature all derivative and the evidence circumstantial; and
fourth, if the most treacherous of all ventures in political
analysis is to assess motivations, surely the second most
treacherous is to make guesses, however educated, about the future.
No wonder that, without being able to interview the participants,
and not quite daring to substitute intoxication or trance for
genuine research, he is more than usually tentative about his
findings.
Against the background of that general cautionary note, our
venture here is aimed at learning more than we now know about the
interest of the contemporary Soviet Union in various forms of arms
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control and disarmament measures. (Those two quite different
things are generally lumped together in the report under the loose
phrase "arms control." But when we refer to disarmament we mean
measures that significantly lower the levels of arms; when we
speak precisely of arms control measures we mean steps aimed at
reducing the risk of accidental, inadvertent, or miscalculated war,
or at reducing the frightfulness of nuclear war if it should break
out.) At a minimum we wish to understand better why the Soviet
Union behaved as it did over the past ten or so years in dealing
with this range of issues. At a maximum we would like to see if
it is possible to put ourselves in a better position to make
predictions about the forces that tend to favor or inhibit a
serious Soviet approach to measures of arms control or disarmament.
Our approach in its essence is to identify the chief factors,
both internal and external, that we believe go into the formulation
of Soviet arms control policy; to study those factors as they have
interacted from 1954 to 1964 with periods of high and low apparent
Soviet interest in arms control; and thus to see if it is possible to
discern in more general terms the configurations of factors related
to Soviet interest in certain forms of limitations on the arms
race.
This approach involves making a basic assumption that ought
to be made explicit at the outset. It is that Soviet arms control
and disarmament policy, as overtly expressed in diplomatic forums
and in propaganda organs, represents only the surface manifesta-
tions of the truth; in an admittedly Freudian vein we have
labeled these overt expressions "manifest" policy. In the same
metaphor, we see these only as clues to understanding the latent
policies beneath.. For Soviet interests in steps aimed at directly
affecting the arms competition with the West can no more be
deciphered only from the speeches made by Russian diplomats than
the shape of an elephant can be deduced by grasping its trunk.
As the fabled blind man guessed he was dealing with a snake, so
the analyst of arms control needs to adduce far more than the
sometimes misleading cast of Soviet manifest and overt diplomacy
and propaganda in order to deduce the reality of Soviet interests.
Thus we see Soviet attitudes toward arms control and disarmament
as a function of the perceptions, action plans, and expectations
of Soviet leadership concerning domestic and external affairs.
We are assuming therefore that the relevant context of Soviet
arms control policy is to be found in several key underlying
factors: externally, the military-strategic situation, and the general
foreign policy situation, featuring not only the more traditional
view to the West of Moscow but increasingly the view to China;
and internally, the pressures generated by the state of the
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Soviet economy; and the state of agreement or dissent among the
Soviet leadership.
Our task as we have seen it is to reconstruct as best we can
from the available evidence and with the benefit of hindsight the
motivations behind Soviet shifts in manifest arms control policy.
This means in effect calculating in retrospect the sum of
pressures, perceptions, goals, and expectations that add up at
any given moment to define Soviet interests. Soviet interest in
arms control is, we assume here, a product of factors at least
some of which we can analyze. What were they and how do they
help to explain (or obscure) the alterations that took place on
the surface of Soviet policy?
In terms of what impulses actually moved Soviet leaders of
the time, what their purposes and expectations were, in short,
what they really believed, the data available to us (that is, the
manifest signs of policy) represent only the small visible frac-
tion of the iceberg of Soviet strategy and motivations. Given the
general nature of Soviet policy in the period it is impossible to
determine with any assurance the relationship between the key
factors in the manifest Soviet policy--drive for detente with the
West, accompanied by dramatic shifts in the Soviet negotiating
posture on questions of disarmament and arms control. They
were obviously related. But analysis is profoundly complicated
by the complex nature of the interaction between them.
Increased recognition of the dangers in a nuclear war under-
lay the detente strategy. Disarmament and/or arms control might
in that sense have seemed a rational means to lessen the dangers
of such a war. But since a conciliatory stand on disarmament had
the additional virtue of helping to reduce tension in general, it
might have been viewed purely as a tactic to support the detente
strategy with no real intention of accepting significant interna-
tional inspection or other controls. Conversely, a lessening of
East-West tensions would have a feedback effect into the arms com-
petition, tending to abate it at least in the West. In sum, then,
the same factors that may have impelled Moscow toward East-West
measures of arms control also worked for a general softening of
Soviet policy toward the West and vice versa, and we cannot be
certain of the exact relationship. What we can do is to examine
such evidence as is available in order to form some judgments.
If we were to follow a rigorously scientific method, we
would probably seek to construct a model of sorts from the several
variables we have identified as operating. We would make certain
assumptions about the interaction among them, and a general
hypothesis about the probable effects of such interaction. Proof
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of the validity of the model would presumably emerge after the
study is completed. In our acute sense of insufficiency
concerning the possibility of definitive findings in this area we
have deliberately refrained from tying ourselves to such a
rigorous framework. In fact at the outset of our analysis we are
not asserting any particular hypothesis about the relative weights
of the factors or even about their effect on policy. At the end
we shall not be able to say with authority that any given
constellation of underlying factors at any given time is likely
within a given range of probability to produce a given result in
terms of arms control policy.
Another mind, perceiving our method along with its profound
cautions, might prefer to assert the hypothesis we have refrained
from making, to the effect that Soviet interest in arms control
is likely to be high when the underlying factors are in a certain
constellation or conjunction. It is not difficult to formulate
such a hypothesis: "Soviet interest in significant measures
affecting the arms competition between the Soviet Union and the
West is likely to be high when a dstente strategy predominates
in the Soviet foreign policy orientation; when no genuine military
or strategic breakthrough favoring the Russians is visible on the
horizon; when Western strategic superiority is accepted as inevi-
table and permanent; when no political end-runs such as Egypt in 1955
and Cuba in 1960-62 look overwhelmingly tempting; when China
(and here the model becomes a bit blurred and uncertain) poses a
sufficient threat to force Moscow to face westward (but it could
also read 'when China is discounted as posing no physical threat');
when the Kremlin leadership elite is united around a policy; (but,
conversely, it could say: 'when a bold disarmament move represents
a way to demolish internal opposition'); and when the economic
'burden' of armaments is excessive (but here it should be noted
that rational Western calculations of what a 'burden' constitutes
are not really applicable) ."
If one were bold enough to construct this model for analytic
purposes, undoubtedly it would throw into relief the interaction
of factors and manifest policy for each of the periods we have
studied, and at the end it would give us a framework around which
to draw conclusions. By deliberately not tying ourselves to such
a model, however, we regain lost flexibility that may be essential
to avoid the pitfalls of a mechanistic approach, even at the cost
of some lost rigor. Even without calling our research scheme a
model we remain mindful of complementarities among and within
factors, their relative weighting, and their varying significance
as indicators. As a scheme, ours is neither traditional Kremlin-
ology nor the model-building of systems analyses. Hopefully, it
has sufficient flexibility and rigor for our purposes here. And
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we are certainly asserting the modest proposition that the inter-
relationship of our factors at times when Soviet arms control
activity ran high may not be devoid of significance.
So far as our time-span is concerned, the same kinds of
caveats must be asserted as with respect to the factors. The
historian's attempt to impose a scheme of his own upon history is
of course always to some extent artificial, misleading, and even
dangerous. History does sometimes cooperate to create natural
boundaries of time, and Nikita Sergeievitch Khrushchev, by his
emergence to a position of predominance in the Soviet-Union by 1955
following the death of Stalin, supplied a natural starting point
for our analysis. By his unceremonious removal at the hands of
envious, resentful, and equally ambitious colleagues in the fall of
1964 he provided the neeiful final punctuation mark, reinforcing
our sense that we had in fact dealt with a self-contained "period"
in time. By the device of looking back at what we can now call
the Khrushchev decade from the vantage point of the sudden end of
that era, 1955 seen from 196 acquires depth, breadth, and
meaning; so do the other landmarks of Soviet arms control and
disarmament policy in the Khrushchev era.
The most important thing that can be said about the decade
in question is that it has been one of phenomenal movements of
change. But the second most important thing about it was the
presence of powerfully fixed elements that set rigid limits to
change. There is paradox and irony in this extraordinary period
of struggle between forces of change and forces defying change,
because it was not except in a literary sense a struggle in the
classic mode between nations representing status quo and revolution.
In this decade there were revolutions struggling to be born, so to
speak, in both the Soviet bloc and the West as well as to the
South. Indeed, both sides had status quos of their own to protect
and revolutions to foster in the other's camp.
In classic terms the nuclear weapons revolution brought the
United States and the Soviet Union to have a stake in and even
crudely to share an "established order" of sorts; and both came to
find common ground against a new threat to their established order--
China. Both had to face the policy consequences of the most trans-
forming revolution of all--the end of general warfare as a rational
means of resolving differences. Both grappled with the end of
monopolistic positions within their alliance structures when
nuclear standoff bred the revival of politics around the world.
As nuclear warfare came to look like a nonzero-sum enterprise, the
prime antagonists--the United States and the Soviet Union--had to
become the prime collaborators if any steps were to be taken to
moderate the arms competition.
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The forces of inertia were almost as strong as the forces
of momentum working for change. There was a perceived need on
both sides to change in some way the ground rules of the conflict,
however protracted that conflict might be. But the accumulated
history of political warfare a outrance between Communists and
capitalists left a towering obstacle to any such move. The
pluralistic features of both societies--one pluralistic because
pluralism was cherished, the other at least crudely pluralistic
in spite of itself--set tight internal political limits to the
freedom of maneuver of those in either camp who would innovate,
with powerffil men on both sides ready to pounce at the first sign
of major concessions. And the infernally complex nature of the
arms problem itself posed inhibitions both of a technical and an
intellectual nature to otherwise simple solutions. In addition it
rendered almost insoluble the old and traditionally thorny task
of calculating and equating national power by giving appropriate
weights to non-comparable features of terrain, power, weapons,
targets, and the like.
A fina.1 complication of the landscape we have sought to map
is its shifting internal quality. We may assert our belief that
Soviet interests in arms control measures might best be assessed
by correlating with the manifest and overt expressions of that
interest--or disinterest--the underlying factors of foreign policy,
Soviet assessments of the West and of China, internal Soviet
consensus or dissensus, economic pressures, and developments in
the military-strategic field. Any one of our three slices
of history reveals interesting interconnections between these
several factors. But the most crucial fact is that over time all
of them were in motion; not one of them remained fixed and constant
through the Khrushchev decade. All not only shifted; all
interacted one upon the others, feeding back on the system and in
turn altering it. (Indeed, the research tool that suggests itself
for predictive value building upon our analysis is the analogue
computer.)
In our work, then, we have approached the problem of Soviet
interests by first outlining briefly the manifest expressions of
arms control policy in the form of negotiations and propaganda, with-
out either accepting or rejecting the face value of these expressions;
second, seeking to look beneath surface policy to analyze the key
relevant contextual factors that we believe underlie arms control
and disarmament interest as revealed in the manifest policy; I
third, drawing certain limited conclusions for each of the three
periods; and fourth, attempting to pull together at the end our
findings and conclusions.
* * * *I
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A number of individuals contributed to this study. Working
on it full-time during the whole period of research were Walter C.
Clemens, Jr. and Franklyn Griffiths; contributing on a part-time
basis were Fritz Ermarth, John Hoagland, Peter Kenez, Paul Marantz,
and Joseph L. Nogee. Occasional consultants were Franklyn D. Holzman
Herbert Levine, and Marshall Shulman.
The division of labor in the research phase involved
concentration by Walter Clemens on the negotiations and foreign
policy aspects plus supervision of research assistance, while
Franklyn Griffiths concentrated on the propaganda and political
uses of disarmament and internal Soviet politics. Fritz Ermarth
contributed the economic inputs, John Hoagland the military-
strategic data, and Joseph Nogee the negotiating history for the
1962-1964 period.
When it came to drafting chapters of the report itself
Clemens prepared the initial version of Chapter III and Griffiths
Chapter IV and both contributed to Chapters II and V. The
undersigned served as over-all supervisor and editor and drafted
certain sections of the report. Indispensable substantive and
intellectual contributions were made at all stages of the study
by Donald L. M. Blackmer, Morton Gorden, and Alexander Korol, and
the editing process was generously assisted under acute pressures
of time by Jean Clark. Judith Tipton and Lisa Walford helpfully
assisted at all states with the typing, production and
administration.
As Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Director, Arms Control Project
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CHAPTER II
THE SPIRIT OF GENEVA: A NEW ROUND AFTER STALIN
1954-1956
A. Introduction
The year 1955 was a turning point in both the style and
content of Soviet postwar disarmament diplomacy, following a
frigid--and occasionally superheated--spell since 1946. In the
1954-1956 period, and particularly in the spring of 1955, the
Soviet Union astonished not a few observers by announcing a series
of apparent concessions that in several important instances
represented a clear acceptance, at least verbally, of positions
that for years had been vainly advocated by the Western powers.
The 1955 Soviet disarmament concessions were of course not
made in a vacuum; they took place in the period of Soviet glacial
thaw that followed Stalin's death. The atmosphere in which they
were advanced reflected the process of internal "de-Stalinization"
that came to a peak at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. It
reflected revised notions about the relations of "socialist"
states within the Communist bloc. And it reflected a basic
reappraisal of the hard external line that since the end of the
war had helped sustain an unprecedented state of international
tension. The origins of the altered climate dated back to Stalin's
death in 1953, and they were incipient in modifications of Soviet
policy as early as 1949. As it turned out, the "spirit of Geneva"
ebbed quickly after the Conference of Heads of Governments in July
1955. But many of the factors that led to the Summit persisted,
continuing to impel both Moscow and the West toward renewed
attempts to modulate their conflicts and regulate their armaments.
The primary change in position in the 1954-1956 period was
a significant shift toward accommodation with the West. For the
first time since the cold war had set in, Soviet behavior suggested
at least the possibility that Moscow sought and perhaps expected
to bridge the gap separating its disarmament positions from those
of the West. For the first time it was at least plausible to
debate whether in fact East-West agreements on arms control were
possible. The trends in Soviet policy were away from the Stalinist
proclivity for sweeping and immediate measures that were crudely
aimed at crippling the West militarily, and away from antagonistic
propaganda designed to set the "masses" against the Western govern-
ments. The style of Soviet disarmament diplomacy became more
conciliatory, less evasive, and more apparently oriented toward a
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narrowing of East-West differences instead of their "exposure."
Moscow's new proposals explicitly endorsed many of the prin-
ciples and specific details espoused by the West. If Moscow did
not accept aspects of the Western program, the Soviet proposals
nevertheless showed greater apparent feasibility than in Stalin's
time. Moscow seemed then to accept the Western concept of compre-
hensive disarmament in stages while at the same time showing a
new interest in a wide range of partial measures to safeguard
peace and curb the arms race. Even on the delicate issue of
inspection Moscow showed a new willingness to consider at least
some international controls. Formal Soviet recognition of the
clandestine-weapon problem indicated a new readiness to weigh the
hard realities and implications of nuclear technology.
At the same time, even in the proposals advanced on inter-
national inspection and enforcement, the Soviet position remained
ambiguous in some respects and restrictive in others, for example,
in limiting inspection to unspecified "objects of control." The
Kremlin's comprehensive disarmament proposals of May 10, 1955
posited a timetable that seemed unrealistic to Western observers.
Moscow persisted in advancing proposals that would benefit only
one side militarily, such as the early liquidation of overseas
bases. Even more fundamentally, while Moscow may have perceived a cer-
tain "moderate" trend of opinion in the United States, its
historically antagonistic expectations regarding the West were
probably greatly reinforced by the calculation that the
"moderate" Western forces were unlikely to prevail.
Which of these two opposing forces in the Soviet outlook had
more potential strength cannot be measured. For the West did not
after May 10, 1955 explore either the possibilities or ambiguities
in the Soviet demarche, but shifted the axis of Western proposals
toward various inspection measures and investigation of the
technical problems of control. In September 1955 Washington placed
a "reservation" on its previous disarmament positions. In the
light of all this it seems fair to conclude that the full measure
of Soviet policy was never actually taken.
It may of course be that the Soviet leaders had no intention
of following through on any of their arms control proposals.
Perhaps these proposals were purely tactical, serving the political
purpose of promoting a detente and inhibiting Western armament,
particularly in West Germany, by relaxing tensions. Or perhaps
some--but not all--Soviet leaders argued successfully that nothing
would be lost and much gained if the West were to accept the 1)55
proposal. The fact is that we shall never know for sure.
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At a minimum, however, the May 1955 change in Soviet arms
control policy, even if meant as a tactical device at the time,
became elongated over the years, at least suggesting the possi-
bilities inherent in a strategy of limited adversary
collaboration.
B. Manifest Soviet Policies
1. The Negotiations: Style and Substance
The principal evidence of change in manifest Soviet policy
was supplied by Moscow's proposals of September 30, 1954 and May 10,
1955. In both proposals, particularly the latter, the Soviet
government made major departures from its prior negotiating
positions on disarmament. The trends initiated on these two
dates were sustained by further conciliatory moves in March and
July 1956.
a. September 1954 to May 1955: Oscillation. The shift in
manifest Soviet policies toward arms control can be dated from
September 30, 1954 when Andrei Vyshinsky announced to the U.N.
General Assembly that the Soviet government was now willing
to negotiate on the basis of the principles laid out in the so-
called Anglo-French memorandum of June 11, 1954 which Moscow had
previously spurned. Since the Western memorandum provided for con-
ventional and nuclear disarmament to proceed in stages, Vyshinsky's
statement implied that Moscow had dropped its traditional insistence
upon the unconditional prohibition of all nuclear weapons regard-
less of conventional arms reductions or control measures.
This ostensible concession was retracted in February,
only to be made again in March and expanded in May 1955.
TASS on February 18, 1955 carried a statement proposing the imme-
diate destruction of all nuclear stocks, the freezing of conventional
forces and military budgets as of January 1, 1955, and the convening
of a world disarmament conference forthwith. Thus when the
Disarmament Commission Subcommittee (DCSC) reconvened on February
25, 1955, Soviet representative Andrei Gromyko, by insisting
on priority for the position stated by TASS, appeared to renege
on the position originally presented to the Assembly.
On March 11, 1955, however, Moscow again seemed to return
to its previously stated willingness to negotiate on the basis of
the Anglo-French memorandum. The details were spelled out in a
Soviet proposal of March 18, 1955 that was in many ways similar to
the French elaboration of the plan originally introduced by the
Western nations on March 8. The Soviet and Western plans appeared
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to be in agreement that (1) the disarmament program should begin
with a freeze on military forces and spending; (2) reductions of
military manpower and conventional armaments should take place in
two stages; (3) production of nuclear weapons should halt at the
end of the first stage (Western proposal) or at the beginning of
the second stage (Soviet proposal); (4) following the latter two
stages there might be a reduction of forces to the minimum levels
needed for internal security and fulfillment of U.N. obligations;
and (5) "existing" stocks of nuclear materials would be used
exclusively for peaceful purposes.
This set of proposals seemed to constitute a wide framework
of consensus potentially broader than any East-West agreement since
1945. There were important differences, which Western
proposals in mid-April of the same year helped to bridge. But the
Soviet demarche of May 10, 1955 seemed to go still further toward
narrowing the gap between East and West.
b. May through December 1955: Soviet Demarche and U.S.
"Reservation." The Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955 were particu-
larly significant in three respects. First, they acknowledged that,
as the West had been insisting for years, hidden nuclear stock-
piles were an undeniable possibility in the contemporary world;
this effectively put an end to Soviet demands for a simple
uninspected ban on nuclear weapons. Second, although they
constituted a comprehensive package, the May 10 proposals also
embodied the seeds of a partial measures approach which became
increasingly explicit in the remainder of 1)55 and an ostensible
principle of Soviet policy in March 1956. And third, they
represented a movement toward Western positions on some of the
details of disarmament, particularly in terms of the inter-
relationship between disarmament and security, that was nothing
short of dramatic by contrast to the glacial pace of
negotiations until then.
Specifically, the Soviet May 10 proposal adopted the Western
position on force levels, the timing of nuclear disarmament, and
the principle of a single control organ. It also accepted the
Western view that the base period for the initial freeze should be
1954 rather than 1955. At the same time the major East-West
differences on inspection and control were still unresolved.
Questions of control were in fact discussed in a separate section
of the May 10, 1)55 document, which argued that international
distrust did not presently permit states to allow international
inspection of industrial and other facilities basic to their
security. An agreement that purported to authorize such
inspection would "create a false sense of security" because
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"there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control
for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine
manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons. . . ."1
Clearly an inner contradiction pervaded the Soviets' May 10
d6marche, growing out of their acknowledgment of the clandestine
weapon problem coupled with a call at the same time for complete
nuclear disarmament under what might or might not be adequate
international control. Moscow offered two approaches in an
apparent effort to overcome this dilemma. First, the May 10
demarche began with a "political declaration" listing the major cold
war issues and calling for their early resolution in order to
"create the requisite conditions for the execution of a broad
disarmament program" with "international control over its
implementation." Second, the May 10 statement on control proposed
the establishment, during the first stage of conventional reductions,
of static control posts to guard against surprise attack. These
would be established "at large ports, at railway junctions, on
main motor highways, and in aerodromes" in the territory of the
states concerned. These posts would be supplemented by the single
control organ with expanding powers and unlimited access to
the objects subject to its jurisdiction.
Without wholly facing up to the many political and technical
difficulties raised by its new proposals, Moscow implied that
confidence-building measures--including measures to guard against
certain types of surprise attack--would create a climate in which
unrestricted inspection might either be allowed (though this was
never specified by Moscow) or--more likely in the light of increased
good will between states--become superfluous.
The seeds of the partial-measures approach that Moscow pursued
increasingly in the next two years existed in the comprehensive
program espoused on May 10, 1955 not only in the surprise attack
posts but in another measure proposed for the first time by a great
power: a nuclear test ban, to be implemented in the first stage.
The May 10 proposal posited that the test ban would be supervised
by an international commission reporting to the General Assembly.
(However, Moscow's position evolved in 1955 and 1956 to deny the
1U.S. Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-
1959 (2 vols.; Washington, 1960), Vol. I, p. 465. Hereafter cited
as Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959.
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need for special machinery to inspect a test ban.)1
The May 10 initiative involved other unresolved problems.
One was its timetable, calling for only one year per stage.
Another was its proposed liquidation of all overseas bases in
1)56 and 1957. Also it postponed many vital details for a world
disarmament conference to be called early in 1956. Finally,
all measures of "prevention" and "suppression" regarding
violations of the agreement were entrusted to the veto-ridden
Security Council.
Despite the difficulties, the Soviet demarche of May 10,
1955 appeared an oasis in the barren desert of ten years'
disarmament negotiations. The response of the Western
negotiators indicates the degree of at least verbal consensus
that seemed suddenly to have been achieved. For example,
United States delegate James Wadsworth on May 12 said he was
"gratified to find that the concepts which we have put forward
over a considerable length of time . . have been accepted in
a large measure by the Soviet Union." Further exploration of
the meaning of the May 10 proposal was put off as the Western
delegates in the DCSC moved, over Soviet opposition, to
suspend their deliberations on May 18, 1955 until after the
Heads of Governments Conference expected in July.
The chiefs of state met in Geneva in July from July 18 to
22, 1)55. They discussed disarmament, European security and Ger-
many, and cultural and economic exchange programs. On the first
topic, Premier Bulganin introduced a modified version of the
Soviets' May 10 proposal, dropping its "political declaration,"
its statement concerning clandestine weapons, and some of its
less feasible features, such as the two-year timetable and the
proposed liquidation of foreign bases. But some troublesome
changes were also made. The most egregious of these was an
additional specification that non-great-power armed forces be
limited to 150,000 to 200,000 men--a provision obviously directed
against the recently developed NATO plans to build a 500,000-man
Bundeswehr. (The May 10 proposal had said that limits on the
forces of smaller powers would be fixed early in 1)56 by a "World
Disarmament Conference.")
ISee, e.g., Bulganin's September 11, 1956 letter to
Eisenhower in Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. I, p. 692.
2United Nations Document DC/SC.1/PV.48, p. 43.
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At the Summit meeting there was actually no real negotiation
on disarmament. In fact, in Geneva the Western heads of govern-
ment made no reference to the positions they had advanced and
debated earlier that spring in the DCSC, nor did they reply to
Bulganin's amended version of the Soviets' May 10 proposal ex-
cept to assert that static control posts were insufficient to
guard against surprise attack. Instead the Western leaders spoke
in terms of control measures, each advocating an approach that
would, they said, lead later to disarmament. President Eisenhower
thus made his surprise "Open Skies" proposal for aerial inspection
of the Soviet Union and the United States. British Prime Minister
Anthony Eden pushed for an experimental zone of arms limitations
and inspection in Central Europe; French Premier F ure espoused
budgetary controls of armaments.
The various issues and proposals dealing with control of
armaments were soon overshadowed by the chief item of contention
at the Summit: European security and Germany. Moscow proposed
that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact be replaced by an all-European
security pact within the framework of which the presumably neutral-
ized Germany might be reunited. The West, however, refused to dis-
band NATO and insisted that Germany should be reunited only on the
basis of free elections and a free hand in foreign and military
policy--conditions that Moscow quickly rejected.
Disarmament negotiations continued when the DCSC reconvened
in New York late in August of 1955. Each delegation continued to
press the basic line taken by its government at Geneva. On Septem-
ber 6 Harold Stassen announced that his government was placing a
"reservation" on all American "pre-Summit" disarmament positions.
He and the other Western delegates still espoused the control meas-
ures advocated by their governments at Geneva but called for addi-
tional research to overcome the difficulties of control alluded to
in Moscow's statement of May 10.
From October 27 through November 16, 1955 the Foreign
Ministers meeting in Geneva wrestled with the same issues discussed
at the Summit conference in July. They finally admitted what the
heads of government had not: that such new "spirit" as existed
in East-West relations was not adequate to resolve divergent posi-
tions on European security and Germany, on economic and cultural
exchange--and on disarmament and its control.
c. 1956: Detente and Partial Measures. The Summit meeting
of 1955 was followed up by a series of letters between President
Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin which was kept up throughout 1956.
Premier Bulganin's letters were particularly interesting for their
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circumspect and "reasonable" tone, and their emphasis on agreements
already reached and on the common interests of the two superpowers.
In letters of January 23 and February 1, 1956, for instance,
Bulganin called for a United-States-Soviet treaty of friendship
and cooperation.
The major Soviet arms control proposal in 1956 was intro-
duced in the DCSC on March 27, 1956. It was notable first for its
emphasis on conventional rather than nuclear weapons disarmament;
second for its explicit advocacy of a "partial measures" approach;
and third for its detailed provisions for inspection--not just over
"disarmament" but over-all conventional armaments. The first part
of the Soviet proposal provided for limiting and reducing conven-
tional armaments and armed forces to the levels specified in the
May 10 document but in two rather than the three years proposed
earlier. The control provisions were somewhat more specific and
far-reaching than Moscow had proposed in 1955. Ground control
posts were again suggested, but with the clarification that they
would be enumerated in a special agreement that would also extend
to the signatories' foreign bases. The control organ again was
to have unlimited access to all objects of control, now spelled
out as "military units, stores of military equipment and ammuni-
tion; land, naval, and air bases; factories manufacturing
conventional armaments and ammunition." Since no ban on nuclear
production was contained in the Soviet proposal the problem of
dealing with clandestine nuclear production did not arise. The
1956 draft even seemed to take a step toward the "prior position-
ing" of control by specifying that the control organ would be
established within two months of the convention's entry into
force and one month before the first reductions began.
The March 1956 proposal outlined a scheme for a zone of arms
limitation and inspection in Central Europe that was similar to
the 1954-1955 Eden Plan and the Rapacki Plans of 1957 and 1958.
"Both parts of Germany and of states adjacent to them" would be
included. First, ceilings would be placed on foreign forces in the
zone. Second, the stationing of atomic formations and weapons
in the zone would be prohibited--a move obviously desitned to
thwart U.S. plans for NATO. Third, "joint inspection of the armed
forces and armaments" in the zone would be instituted.
The March 27 proposal also called for agreement on three
partial measures, not contingent on progress in other problems
of disarmament:
"1. To discontinue forthwith tests of thermonuclear
LsicJ weapons.
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"2. To ensure that no atomic weapons are included in the
armaments of troops in German territory. The states
concerned shall take the necessary measures to carry
out this provision within three months.
"3. To reduce the military budgets of states by up to
15 per cent as against their military budgets for
the previous year."i
The preamble of the Soviet document stated the hope that the
proposed reduction of conventional weapons would "facilitate I. .
agreement on the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and
their elimination. . . ." Soviet delegate Gromyko took the line
that the Soviet Union was proposing a "different approach" to the
disarmament problem since the linking of conventional and atomic 2
disarmament "has been a serious trouble on the way to agreement."2
This generally conciliatory Soviet public posture on disarma-
ment questions continued when Gromyko on July 12, 1956 appeared to
accept the ceilings proposed by the Western powers in March 1956 of
2,500,000 men for Soviet and United States forces and 750,000 men
each for Britain and for France. Moscow said it was prepared to
agree to these levels "as a first step," provided the West agreed
to follow this in a second stage with reductions to the lower levels
that Moscow had endorsed at the 1955 Summit. The Soviet "acceptance"
was also within the context of a larger program that included a ban
on the testing and use of "atomic" and "hydrogen" weapons, a ban on
the production of nuclear weapons, and the destruction of all nuclear
stocks.3
After the Disarmament Commission adjourned on July 16, 1956
President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin resumed their correspon-
dence. Most of the letters concerned nuclear testing, the Soviet
Union urging an immediate test ban without inspection, which it
held to be superfluous. 4
On November 17, 1956 Moscow sent Washington a declaration
attacking alleged imperialist plots in Hungary and Egypt, which
closed, however, by presenting a modified version of the May 10, 1955
'Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. I, pp. 603-607.
(Italics added.)
2
Doc. DC/SC.l/PV-73, p. 11, March 27, 1956.
3Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959., Vol. I, pp. 670-671.
4ibid., Documents Nos. 175, 176, 177, 178, 182, and 184.
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proposal thus returning to advocacy of nuclear as well as conven-
tional disarmament. This document would later serve as the basis
for the Soviets' opening position when the DCSC met again in 1957.
The declaration defined for the first time the territorial limits
in which Moscow would permit armed photography--a zone 800 kilo-
meters to the east and west of the line where NATO confronted Warsaw
Pact forces in Europe--but failed to indicate when this variant of
"Open Skies" might come into effect.
In 1956, however, neither side addressed itself directly to
the other. Dual and even quadruple monologues were the result.
"Interim sparring" is Bechhoefer's apt term for the disarmament
proceedings in the latter half of 1955 and throughout 1956, while
both sides groped toward the positions adopted during the "intensi-
fied effort" begun in 1957C2 Certainly until the United States
completed its announced reappraisal of policy in mid-November 1956
the many exchanges of views could have been only "debates, even
among our allies, and not true negotiations." 3
2. The Propaganda and Ideology of Disarmament
Not quite in lock-step but rather with some cultural or
technical lag, Moscow's manner of manipulating the disarmament
issue outside the negotiating forum came to parallel the shift in
the content of Soviet disarmament proposals. The possibility, the
necessity, indeed the alleged achievement of a significant relaxa-
tion of East-West tensions emerged as the dominant themes in
Moscow's propaganda line in 1955.
These themes evolved however somewhat spasmodically. Soviet
mass communications did little toward the end of 1954 and during
the first months of 1955 to reinforce the conciliatory impression
made by Vyshinsky on September 30 at the United Nations in his
agreement to negotiate on the basis of the Anglo-French disarma-
ment memorandum. Rather, Soviet propaganda adhered to a hard line
1lIbid., I, pp. 721-729. In October 1955 Molotov had stated
that aerial photography could be considered during the final stage
of a comprehensive disarmament program.
2 Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1961), pp. 313 and 326.
3Ibid., p. 325.
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damage on the USSR. Painful experience in a half-century of warfare
made the Russian people and probably also their leaders especially
sensitive to the possibility that the Soviet economy and society
might be obliterated by the new weapons.
The Kremlin's policy response to the implications of nuclear
weaponry in 1954-1956 was two-fold. First, the foreign policy
line summed up in Khrushchev's 1)56 pronouncements on peaceful
coexistence and the non-inevitability of war reflected a desire to
advance Soviet interests in such a way as to reduce the possibility
of military encounters with the West, and particularly with the
United States. Second, the disarmament proposals of May 10, 1955
marked, for the first time in the post-war period, an apparent
Soviet readiness to consider whether Soviet security might benefit
directly from limited arms control agreements over and above any
relaxation of East-West tensions or political settlements that
might be achieved.
And yet, although this response to the advent of nuclear weapons
was undoubtedly stimulated in part by the Soviets' awareness of
their immediate strategic inferiority to the United States, Moscow
also presumably recognized at some point in 1954-1956 that it had
achieved substantial progress toward a credible minimum deterrent
and thus toward genuine mutual deterrence. This new situation was
most promising for external policies of controlled risk based on
the significant improvements in Soviet strategic power which Moscow
began to look forward to in this period. Thus, while new restraints
in foreign policies and an incipient interest in partial measures
of arms control followed from the new Soviet strategic outlook, a
desire not to restrict Soviet freedom of action prematurely with
limited arms control agreements may have reinforced Moscow's
antipathy to agreements with the adversary. The Soviet reading of
the military-strategic ledger in this period resulted, then, in
contradictory influences on Soviet interests in arms control and
disarmament. What were the facts?
-21-
a. Stated Military Doctrine. In the early months of
1955, as Bulganin and Khrushchev ascended to power, a broad restate-
ment of military strategy was made in the Soviet press, in which
the outmoded "basic operating factors" of the Stalin years were
replaced by modern strategic doctrine based on nuclear weapons and
new delivery systems. 1 There were probably three main reasons for
the open publication of a revised military doctrines
(1) First, there can be no doubt that a revision
had already occurred among higher levels of the Soviet military
community, and there was a pressing need to educate the lower
levels of the military establishment and, to some extent, the
populace.
(2) Second, the Bulganin-Khrushchev faction,
which apparently enjoyed strong military support, had successfully
employed the issue of military preparedness in its attacks on
Malenkov, charging in particular that the Malenkov faction had
failed to make necessary investments in the defense industries nd
armed forces, leaving the Soviet Union open to surprise attack.
The resurgence of energy among military editors, which took the
form of modernizing public expressions of policy, reflected to some
extent an increase in the prestige and influence of the armed forces
as a result of the Malenkov ouster.
(3) Third, these published doctrinal revisions
represented a long overdue response to the defense "new look"
formulated in the United States during 1953 and 1954, with its
substantially increased emphasis on strategic air power. It is
essential to bear in mind that in the United States the President's
budget message of January 1954 (for FY 1955) called for the "crea-
tion, maintenance, and full exploitation of modern air power." Of
the total $29.3 billion proposed in that message for the three
services, the Air Force was to receive $11.2 billion, or about
38 per cent, representing for the first time in the postwar years
a definite departure from the relatively equal allotment of funds
1See, for example, Herbert S. Dinerstein, The Soviet Military
Posture as a Reflection of Soviet Strategy, RAND Research Memoran-
dum RR-2102 (Santa Monica, Calif oinia, March 24, 1958). See also
Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (New YQrk: Frederick A. Praeger).
2See, for example, Komsomollskaia Pravda January 8, 1955;
also, Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, o cit. and Raymond
S. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1958).
-22-
among the services. Consequently the Strategic Air Command became
in the first two years of the Eisenhower administration a primary
instrument of U.S. military strategy and national policy. 1 It is
against this background that the published Soviet strategic doc-
trinal revisions of 1955 must be considered.
The appearance of new Soviet strategic aircraft in 1954 and
1955 gives clear evidence that the Soviet military establishment
had initiated major programs for the development of strategic
nuclear-armed aviation as early as 1950. Therefore a revision in
military strategy must have actually occurred at a high and secret
level of the military establishment even under Stalin. The publica-
tion of changes in early 1955 in military doctrine was probably
intended mainly to revitalize the lower ranks of the armed forces.
b. Strategic Forces in Being. Chart II.1 provides a
comparison of the strategic forces actually operational in the year
1955. The United States held clear superiority in the capability
to deliver nuclear weapons over great distances. The B-36 heavy
bomber, a few hundred of which were still in the SAC inventory, was
capable of carrying a 10,000 pound bomb load a distance of some
10,000 nautical miles. Supplementing the B-36 was the new B-47
medium bomber, then being delivered in substantial numbers to SAC
(see Chart II.1) and, in conjunction with forward bases and aerial
refueling, representing a long-range, high-speed., and high-payload
nuclear capability.
In contrast, the Soviet operational force in 1955 was still
based mainly on the aging TU-4, a copy by the Tupolev design bureau
of the B-29A, with performance characteristics similar to the original
piston bomber. It was generally assumed that some 700 of these air-
craft were still available to the Soviet Air Force in 1955. Although
constituting a force that required a definite plan of counteraction,
the low speed and low payloads of the TU-4 rendered it a compara-
tively low-grade threat.
In final development or early production, however, were three
new high-performance strategic jet bombers--the Tupolev TU-95 long-
range turboprop bomber, the Miasishchev M-4 turbojet heavy bomber, and
the Tupolev TU-16 medium jet bomber. With the exception of a rela-
tively few TU-16's in the Soviet Air Force inventory, none of these
aircraft had reached true operational status. Through the skillful
use of secrecy and deception, however, the Soviet government success-
fully created an illusion of operational capability in strategic
'Robert Hotz, "Air Force Takes Key Role in U.S. Policy,"
Aviation Week, March 15, 1954.
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Sources for Chart II.1 and for
All Following Charts and Tables
United States Defense Policies ir _1957 (House Doc. 436, 1958);
ibid. 1958 (House Doc. 227, 1959); ibid. 19_ (House Doc. 432, 1960);
ibid. 1960 (House Doc. 207, 1961); ibid. 1961 (House Doc. 502, 1962);
A Compilation of Material Relating to United States Defense Policies
(House Doc. 155, 1963); Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara Before the House Armed Services Committee, January 30, 1963;
Department- of Defense Statement ,on U.S. Military Strength, April 14,
1964 (release 308-64) New York Times, April 16, 1964; The Institute
for Strategic Studies, Disarmament and European Security (London,
August 1963); "Statement of Secretary McNamara to Democratic Plat-
form Committee, August 17, 1964," New York Times, August 18, 1964.
See also: "Reds Boast of H-Missile,' Christian Science Monitor,
November 18, 1959; "Gates Sees U.S. Safe," Christian Science
Monitor, January 19, 1960; "Secret Missile Report to Senate Re-
vealed," New York Times, February 5, 1960; "U.S. Downgrades Missile
Gap," Christian Science Monitor, March 16, 1960; Hanson W. Baldwin,
New York Times_, March 25, 1959; Aviation Week, March 11, 1963; and
Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, February l4, 1964.
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aviation that finally triggered the "bomber gap" debates of mid-
1955 in Washington.1
On May 13, 1955 the U.S. Department of Defense issued the
following official release:
The Soviets have recently elected to expose some new aircraft
developments in air parade formation over Moscow. These
observations establish a new basis for our estimate of Soviet
production of the heavy jet bomber (Type 37) Myasishchev M-4
and of the medium bomber (Type 39) Tupolev TU-16. There has
also been an appearance of the turboprop bomber [Tupolev TU-951
and a new all-weather fighter has appeared, as expected. This
knowledge is evidence of the modern technology of the Soviet
aircraft industry and advances which are being made by them.2
In rehearsals over Moscow prior to May Day a flight of
eight M-4 heavy bombers had been observed on one day, and on the
following day a flight of ten. Numerous TU-16 medium jet bombers
were also seen in the rehearsals as well as the new turboprop TU-16,
which appeared in a single copy. On May Day of the previous year
(1954) one M-4., believed to be a prototype, had been observed.
The sighting of a possible 10 to 18 aircraft apparently prompted
the announced revision in estimates of Soviet bomber strength.
(It should be noted that the degree of revision was not stated,
leaving the way open for exaggerated conjectures.)
The appearance of these various aircraft on and around May
Day 1955 was followed by several articles in the Soviet press by
Defense Ministry officials who warned in effect that the Soviet
Union now had at its disposal the weapons systems necessary "to
anticipate a surprise attack and to strike before the aggressor
can take advantage of his own preparations for an initial strike." 3
Several of these statements were published on May 8, 1955, two
days prior to submission of the first major new Soviet disarmament
proposals of the postwar period.
1See, for example, Stewart Alsop in New York Herald-Tribune,
May 16, 1955; also in ibid., May 27, 1955.
2 The New York Times, May 14, 1955.
3 arshal A. M. Vasilevskii in Izvestia, May 8, 1955.
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On July 3, 1)55, just two weeks before the opening of the
Summit Conference, the Soviets staged an elaborate air show at
Tushino Airfield outside Moscow. For several weeks in advance of
the show flights of new military aircraft appeared daily over
Moscow, apparently to convince foreign observers that Soviet stra-
tegic nuclear capability was a reality. It seems likely in retro-
spect that every available aircraft of the three main types was
put into the air for these displays. The appearance of even rela-
tively small numbers of these aircraft at Tushino did in fact
serve to convince many Western observers that the United States
was in immediate danger of losing its air supremacy. 1 Consequently,
by skillful deception the Soviets were able to approach the Summit
Conference at Geneva with what appeared to be an intercontinental
nuclear delivery capability.
c. Strategic Weapons in Development. In 1955 the new B-52
intercontinental jet bomber, the world's most advanced
strategic weapon system, had completed its development cycle and
was in full-scale series production, leading to initial deliveries
to SAC late in the year. Throughout the remainder of the 1950's
the SAC B-52 force was to remain the prime strategic deterrent
to Soviet aggression.
In contrast with the highly competent management of its
strategic manned bomber program, the American missile and space
efforts in 1955 were somewhat diffuse. The best efforts in
ballistic missile development were being made by the Army
Ballistic Missile Agency at Huntsville, Alabama, which, on
the basis of V-2 technology, was to complete development of the
reliable short-range Redstone ballistic missile. The Air Force,
with primary responsibility for long-range strategic delivery,
until 1955 had concentrated primarily on the development of air-
breathing cruise missiles such as the Navaho supersonic rameet
and Snark subsonic turbojet. It seems likely that failure of the
United States to concentrate on a unified ballistic missile pro-
gram during the 1950-1955 period offered still another reason
to the Soviets to place increasing effort in this direction and so
accomplish a technological leapfrog in the arms race.
In January 1955, shortly after a thermonuclear warhead of
reduced weight had become available, a development contract was
issued in the United States for the Atlas ICBM. In September 1955,
at least partly in reaction to heightened U.S. awareness of new
1See Interavia, August 1955.
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Soviet weapons programs, the Atlas program was placed on a priority
basis.
On the Soviet side, all three new strategic aircraft had
undoubtedly completed their development cycles and were in series
production. As force level estimates for 1963 indicate, however,
the two long-range aircraft, M-4 and TU-)5, were apparently never
mass produced, leading to a possible conclusion that the promise
then apparent in the Soviet ballistic missile effort led the leader-
,hip to conserve its resources in order to concentrate as much man-
power and industrial capacity as possible on strategic missile
programs.
Concerning the Soviet rocket program, the various events of
August to November 1957 indicate clearly that several different
Soviet missile and space programs must have been established and
in operation during 1)55. The key events from which an estimate
of this kind must be dated are: the successful firing of multi-
stage ICBM in August 1957; the launching of Sputnik I on October 4,
1357; the launching of Sputnik II (with an 1,100 pound payload,
indicating substantially higher thrust of Soviet vehicles) on
November 3, 1957; and finally the showing of the medium-range bal-
listic missile SHYSTER (NATO designation) in Red Square on November 7,
1957. Although the Soviet rocket program as a whole had begun in
earnest immediately following the surrender of Germany in 1)45, it
is likely that the most promising MRBM and ICBM programs were placed
on a crash basis in 1955. The strongest evidence for this is the
reallocation of scientific and technical manpower in 1955 noted by
Korol.2 It is apparent then that even in 1)55 the Soviet ballistic
missile program was achieving substantial success. By early 1956,
for example, the Soviet leadership was openly claiming a nuclear
missile capability. In a speech before the Twentieth Party Congress
in February 1356, Marshall Zhakov said:
Soviet armed forces, due to the constant attention of the party
and government in securing the defense capability of the nation,
have been completely reorganized. They now have diverse
atomic and nuclear weapons, mighty guided missiles, among them
long-range missiles. They are in possession of a first-class
jet air force capable of solving any problem that might arise
IJane's All the World's Aircraft, 1963-1964 (New York: McGrzw
Hill, 1)63), p. 3)8.
2
Alexander G. Korol, Soviet Research and Development: Its
Organization, Personnel and Funds (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T.
Press, 1964), pp. 6) ff.
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in the event of aggressive attack. The Soviet Union does
not threaten anybody and does not intend to attack anybody.
While the total volume of the defense effort, measured in
current rubles, remained roughly stable in the 1953-1956 period, its
composition seems to have altered radically. (See Part D, Section
5, for further details of the Soviet economic situation in this
period.) In 1952 the Soviet Union was arming to meet what was
perceived to be an immediate military threat. Thus the maintenance
of large ground forces, the procurement of conventional equipment,
and the expansion of tactical air power accounted for a high pro-
portion of the defense budget, although, to be sure, feverish
efforts in the area of nuclear weapons technology and long-range
aircraft were being made. But since the threat was immediate,
much emphasis had to be placed on the available weapons systems.
After 1953 the immediacy of the military threat to the Soviet
Union declined appreciably, and the need to procure existing
weapons systems was correspondingly reduced. At the same time,
within a total defense effort that declined only marginally, ex-
penditures on the development of advanced strategic delivery
systems, mainly manned aircraft at this point, and nuclear weapons
probably increased somewhat.
There is reason to believe that in 1955 or 1956 the Soviet
Union intensified its development program of intermediate and
intercontinental ballistic missile systems. Thus, between July
1955 and December 1956 total employment in Soviet research and
development institutions 'increased by a startling 23 per cent.
Total defense expenditures did not reflect the crash effort in the
missile field because military manpower costs and the procurement
of conventional weapons seem to have been concurrently reduced.
These efforts were visibly rewarded by 1957 when the Soviet Union
began serial production of MRBM's and successfully tested an ICBM.
A decade of vigorous research in missile technology, initiated
by Stalin after the war, had opened the prospect of turning the
strategic balance against the United States. If it were true
(which proved not to be the case) that the Soviet Union was moving
into a position of military parity with the West and would perhaps
soon surpass the West in some respects, this development could
have tremendous advantages as a backdrop for political and economic
warfare. No less important to the Soviet perception of its own
security requirements, the threat of force might also be needed as
a last resort to maintain order within Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union.
1AP from TASS, February 20, 1956.3
d. Implications for Policy. The development of the Soviet
strategic outlook in 1954-1956 that rested both on increasing
Soviet recognition of mutual deterrence and on the expectation of
a breakthrough in strategic nuclear weapons, had many implications
for the Soviet position on arms control and disarmament.
1) Comprehensive Disarmament. The Anglo-French proposals
of April 1954--espoused by Washington, accepted by Moscow as a basis
for discussion in September 1954, and then partially incorporated
in the Soviet proposal of May 10, 1955--envisioned extensive nuclear
and conventional disarmament carried out in two stages, calling for
but not spelling out the nature of a third stage of general disarm-
ament. Stopping short of a third stage, the net effect of either
the Western or the Soviet proposals would have been to transform
the military balance so radically as to leave virtually unanswerable
the question of which side would profit the more strategically.
For example, the elimination of nuclear weapons, proposed for
late 1957 in the Soviet plan, would eliminate the basis of Western
deterrence policy, but it would also strike at the key area in which
Moscow expected to achieve superiority. Such uncertainties, combined
with the as yet unresolved questions of inspection and control,
the fixing of ratios, etc., as well as Moscow's assessment of
Western intentions, must have made comprehensive disarmament
appear unfeasible in 1954-1956 if not undesirable from the stand-
point of military-political bargaining power. In any event,
Moscow's intensive rocket development program and its willingness
to export arms to the "third world" did not assume an early
abatement of the arms race, and Soviet readiness to rely on limited
numbers of prototype long-range bombers indicated an expectation that
Western inspectors would not soon uncover Soviet military weaknesses.
We must conclude that so far as the military-strategic outlook
was concerned, Moscow did not regard comprehensive disarmament to
reflect vital Soviet interests in the 1954-1956 period.
2) Partial Measures. The Soviet attitude to partial
measures in this period was somewhat different, and it can even
be argued that the several agreements reached in 1963-1964 had
their origins in 1954-1956. What the Soviets term "partial
measures of disarmament" and what some Westerners call "arms
control" appeared to receive serious consideration from the Soviet
leaders for the first time in the postwar era in 1954-1956. The
May 10, 1955 proposal included such measures as part of the
comprehensive disarmament program that was put forward, and later
in 1955 and 1956 Moscow showed an increasing willingness to
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negotiate them separately. This new approach to partial measures
seemed to dovetail with the Soviet strategic outlook, as indicated
by the various partial measures of conventional and nuclear
disarmament espoused by Soviet diplomats in 1954-1956.
a) Reductions and Limitations of Conventional Forces.
Clearly the military systems of both nations would have been pro-
foundly altered by the reduction to 1.5 million men envisaged by
both Western and Soviet proposals of April and May 1955. However,
Moscow's ability to agree in principle to reduced ceilings for
Soviet armed forces was aided by military moves in progress, which
were to be accompanied by reductions in Soviet ground forces by
some 2 million men in 1955-1956, while Western forces had already
been drastically cut immediately following the Korean Armistice.
Although Soviet forces would have suffered a larger proportional
cut than American forces, the 1.5 million ceiling would probably
have compelled the United States to shut down many of its foreign
bases. The Soviet Union in contrast could have kept its demobilized
soldiers in reserve training more easily and moreover would remain
geographically closer to probable areas of East-West conflict.
Reductions of British and French forces to the 6 50,000-man
level proposed by the West and endorsed by Moscow would have entailed
little sacrifice for London and Paris. But Bonn's proposed Bundeswehr
of 500,000 men would, as we have pointed out before, have been
seriously curtailed by Moscow's summit proposals to limit the forces
of smaller powers to 150,000 to 200,000 men.
b) Liquidation of Foreign Bases. This step, a common
theme in postwar Soviet propaganda and policy, would have deprived
the Western alliance of its major support deriving from United
States conventional and strategic forces in Europe and around the
Soviet periphery. Moscow already planned in 1955 to withdraw from
Austria, Porkkala-Udd, and Port Arthur and claimed to have eliminated
all its foreign bases, though many remained in East Central Europe.
The West was thus urged to reciprocate by abolishing some if not all
its foreign bases.
c) Arms Limitations, Disengagement, and/or Neutraliza-
tion in Both Germanies and Neighboring (East European) States.
Hints in 1955 by President Eisenhower and in the Eden Plan of Western
interest in such measures were well received by Moscow. If executed
they could have resulted in American withdrawal from the continent,
a strategic desideratum that might even justify the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from eastern Central Europe. Similarly, prevention
of West German rearmament might have compensated for withdrawal of
Soviet influence in East Germany, a vulnerable outpost difficult to
control.
d) Fixed Control Posts to Inhibit Surprise Attack.
It is likely that the installation of such posts would have helped
to allay Soviet anxieties about a first-strike from the U.S.
Strategic Air Co mmand bases surrounding the Soviet Union. Perhaps
of even greater future importance would be the inhibiting effect
of such controls on a possible offensive initiated in the future
by a rearmed West Germany. The sites proposed for these
posts did not include missile launching stations from which future
Soviet threats could be made, and the proposal was faulted by the
West in part on this ground. Nevertheless, since at least
significant factions in the Soviet debate on strategic theory
discounted a missile attack without an accompanying buildup of
conventional forces, there is no reason to assume on that ground
alone that the proposal was not serious.
e) Limitations on the Stationing of Nuclear Forces.
Such limitations in practice would have frustrated Western plans
to emplace tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe to offset
Soviet conventional forces; they would have also rendered impossible
the nuclear armament of West Germany. Moscow, for its part, could
have retained on Soviet territory its bomber and, later, missile
forces targeted on Western Europe.
f) A Nuclear Test Ban. Whether Moscow actually wanted
a ban would depend on the state of the nuclear weapons art in both
East and West. In 1955 it probably seemed to be a guestion that could
be resolved later, given the likelihood then that Washington would
probably oppose a test ban until a control system could be devised
and unless limitations were also placed on conventional forces. In
any case the Soviet Union was rapidly catching up to and in some
respects surpassing the United States in the testing of nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons and could look forward to the day when--from
a position of parity if not superiority--it could afford to halt
testing.
g) Ban on Nuclear Weapons Production. So long as
Moscow lagged behind the West in important areas of nuclear weapons
procurement and deployment such a ban was obviously unthinkable.
Moscow's 1955 proposals staged the "cutoff" on nuclear weapons
production slightly later in the disarmament process than in
Western plans. In 1956 Bulganin rejected any such cutoff that was
not part of a larger disarmament program since it would "legalize"
existing nuclear weapons of which the West still had more than Moscow.
And, as we have seen, Moscow went on record in May 1955 with the
statement that the international confidence necessary for Moscow
to admit foreign inspectors in the near future was wholly insufficient
to support the degree of inspection required to ensure a ban on
nuclear weapons production.
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h) Limits to Partial Measures. The basic limitations
on Soviet interest in these partial measures included those that
interfered with Moscow's desire for East-West detente and those
that adversely affected the material and ideological support required
to keep Communist governments in power and to sustain the dynamism
of anticapitalist forces in the underdeveloped countries and in
the West. In addition certain political and military conditions
presumably would have had to be fulfilled before Moscow would enter
into any partial measure. The limits set thus included at least
the following:
(1) No measures that weakened the Warsaw bloc more
than NATO. This ruled out Eisenhower's proposal for mutual aerial
photography of the Soviet Union and the United States, which would
have provided the West with much more new intelligence than it did
the East. Moreover, United States bases abroad were not included
in Washington's proposal.
(2) No inspection or controls in excess of the
disarmament immediately planned. This condition also ruled out
the "Open Skies" proposal, since the West portrayed it only as a
"gateway" to disarmament. Similarly, French proposals for elaborate
machinery to check "financial disarmament" probably struck Moscow
as an intrusion not justified by the anticipated result.
(3) No staged disarmament without a defined
timetable. The West should have no opportunity to stop midway
in the disarmament process, for example, at some moment when its
intelligence requirements had been satisfied.
(4) No limitations on Chinese forces without
Peking's participation. This at least was Moscow's position at
the well-publicized Summit and Foreign Ministers Conferences.
But on several occasions in the Disarmament Subcommittee Soviet
delegates proposed limiting Chinese forces to the same level
suggested for United States and Soviet forces.
In surveying the evidence we have assembled under the Soviet
military-strategic outlook in 1954-1956, it is evident that certain
asymmetries in the military balance, summarized in Table 11.3,
exerted a very strong limiting influence on the range of measures
which Moscow could regard as being both advantageous for the Soviet
Union and acceptable to the West. From the military-strategic
point of view only the most marginal of measures would seem to have
offered Moscow any immediate interest or practical expectations.
These, as we have suggested, may have included ground controls against
surprise attack, limitation on the stationing of nuclear forces,
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Table 11.1
SOME MILITARY ASYMMETRIES IN 1955
The West The Soviet Union
Expectations for gradual Expectations of sudden improve-
changes in the military ments in the Soviet position
environment. vis-a-vis the West.
Reliance on SAC and nuclear Reliance on conventional
weapons. forces with Europe as hostage.
Weak military intelligence Strong military intelligence
and security. and security.
Strategic dependency on No strategic dependency on
foreign bases. foreign bases.
measures to inhibit West German rearmament, and perhaps at some
future point, a nuclear test ban.
Soviet appreciation of the possible advantages of such measures
seems to have been a by-product of the new realism of the post-Stalin
Soviet military-strategic outlook, enhanced by a doubtless worrisome
sense of Soviet strategic inferiority to the West. But if present
weakness could have prompted a Soviet interest in detente and
possibly in arms control agreements the expectation of strategic
parity or even superiority probably set severe limits to sustained
interest in such moves. Nonetheless, on the premise that the
Soviets, like the West, prefer to negotiate from strength rather
than from weakness, the prospect of ICBM's in inventory could at
least arguably have made Moscow more confident of its longer-
range ability to negotiate with the West on favorable terms.
2. The External Political Situation.
What did Moscow expect to achieve with its shifts in foreign
policy manifested in the detente of 1955 and in the Twentieth Party
Congress line? In adopting a more conciliatory foreign policy
toward the West and in taking a more "reasonable" approach to
disarmament and arms control was Moscow seeking merely to attenuate
the struggle with the Western powers and thereby to lower the
danger of war? Or did Moscow now perceive an additional interest
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in cultivating those in Western governments who were more favorably
disposed to agreements with the Soviet Union? These are some of
the questions that arise in considering the political factors which
influenced Soviet conduct in these formative years of a new
approach to the West.
a. Structural Change in Foreign Policies. The developments in
1954-1956 in both the Soviet negotiating position and in Moscow's
political use of the disarmament issue were part of a more
pervasive but not unprecedented shift from a relatively antagonistic
to a somewhat more relaxed and manipulative line in Soviet foreign
relations generally. During the first postwar years Stalin had
chosen to emphasize foreign policies based on a view of the world
characterized by the struggle of two irreconcilably opposed camps.
Realization of the counterproductive consequences of such a
posture led to some moderation of harsher policies in 1949 and to
official recognition in 1952 that "contradictions" within the non-
Communist camp could be profitably exploited by such devices as
the Communist-led peace movements. Nonetheless up to the time of
Stalin's death in the spring of 1953 the Kremlin's official view
tended to portray the world in terms of a simple dichotomy: the
world of socialism versus the world of imperialism. Intermediate
political forces and opinions were not openly recognized to any
great extent between or within these two camps. There were no
neutralist tendencies in Western Europe to warrant significant
Soviet policy change. Western "ruling circles" were seen as
uniformly antagonistic to the Soviet Union and committed to a
relentless struggle to reimpose the capitalist order. Nehru and
those like him were essentially the "agents of imperialism," as
was Tito. Such was the basically unworkable view from Moscow when
Stalin died.
Significant alterations had taken place in this world view by
the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. Recognition of diversity
within the non-Communist world (and to some extent within the
Communist world as well) was at the heart of the new Soviet efforts
to manipulate and persuade rather than coerce, to accumulate indirect
influence rather than struggle for direct control. The 1954-1956
period marked the first major phase of, this change. In 1955 the
Summit Conference and the pronounced detente that accompanied it
symbolized the first series of Soviet moves to attenuate the basic
See Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963).
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two-camp struggle of Stalin's years and to promote the development
of what Palmiro Togliatti in April 1954 characterized as exploitable
"intermediate" forces.
International moves by Moscow in this period almost uniformly
reflected the changed orientation. The signing of the Austrian
State Treaty on May 14, 1955 was entirely consistent with an inten-
sified and as it turned out, long-lasting desire to exploit
neutralist and anti-American sentiment in Western Europe. Khrush-
chev's pilgrimage to Belgrade in May-June 1955 suggested a new
sense of sophistication about the hitherto anathematized diversity
within international communism (and may well have also sharpened
latent Sino-Soviet antagonisms). At this time also Moscow and
the Western European Communist parties were seeking to tap new
sources of mass sympathy and support within Western societies, as
later evidenced in Khrushchev's Twentieth Congress pronouncement
on the "peaceful transition" to socialism and in the new prominence
assigned to peace fronts in Soviet strategy.
Finally, the striking disarmament move of May 10, 1955
reflected both the recognition of "healthy forces" within Western
leadership groups and an intensified interest in their cultivation
to reduce the risk of thermonuclear war. It must be borne in mind,
however, that this and other conciliatory gestures of the period
were consistently reinforced by displays of Soviet military power.
The annual May Day parade featured repeated overflights of
prototype intercontinental bombers whose appearance had profound
repercussions in American military circles. And the Soviet
answer to Germany's entry into NATO was to cancel the wartime
treaties of friendship with London and Paris and to form the
Warsaw Pact a week later. These seemingly contradictory moves
suggested a strategy aimed at building an atmosphere in the NATO
countries inimical to the continuation of harshly anti-Soviet
policies. The saliency of Soviet military power would give pause
to whatever "aggressive forces" in the West might be weighing an
attack on Soviet territory. More to the point, it would increase
dissatisfaction with the policies of men like Secretary of State
Dulles and German Chancellor Adenauer, identified by Moscow as
its chief enemies for their assumption of unremitting struggle
between the two sides. The military consequences of such antagonism,
the Kremlin made clear, should cause anxiety in America as well as
Europe. If, on the other hand, the West steered a more moderate
course, the Soviet government pledged reciprocation. In Bulganin's
words, Moscow would "support those . . . elements which show a
desire to ease international tension and maintain peace."1
'New Times, No. 21 (May 21), 1955.
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This relaxation of frontal pressure on Western Europe and
the pursuit of indirect advances generally in relations with the
West was accompanied by the initiation of the drive for influence
in the economically underdeveloped world. The start of this
campaign was signalled by Nehru's visit to Moscow in June-July
1955. Simultaneously there was an intensification of the
tendency of the Communist parties in the third world to enter
into collaboration with the "national bourgeoisie" they had so
long treated with enmity. Moscow's new focus on the emerging
nations was also reflected in the Czech arms shipments to Cairo,
initially negotiated in the summer of 1955, and in the Khrushchev-
Bulganin Asian tour later that year as the Soviet Union became
the first power to detonate a hydrogen bomb from an aircraft.
Thus, as Soviet policy toward the West adopted a more cautious
and complex mixture of blandishments and threats, Soviet
political expectations centered increasingly on the erosion of
Western influence in the new states and the expansion of an
anti-Western "zone of peace" that would lay the basis for new
additions to the Soviet camp.
In short, the pendulum movement observed in Soviet foreign
policy in the interwar years and in 1945-1947 was occurring once
more. In 1955, for the first time since 1919, there was in
Moscow a "serious expectation of having the socialist camp
emerge as the leader of mankind in the near future."I The
path to victory, as in the 1920's was expected to lead through
the East and only from there to the West. Little noticed in 1954-
1955, however, the changes in Soviet strategy toward the West and
the "third world" were helping to create a long-term danger to
Soviet interests in a politically hostile and ultimately a
militarily threatening China. No doubt the Kremlin still hoped
in 1955 to keep China within a Soviet-led Communist camp--a wish
that helped to motivate the termination in 1954 of unfavorable
economic relations that Stalin had imposed on Nationalist and
subsequently Communist China. However, the Sino-Soviet
ideological differences that followed the Twentieth CPSU Congress
in 1956 were probably in the air as early as 1955. Although the
nature of Peking's influence on Soviet policy in 1954-1956 is not
clear, one can at least speculate that Moscow's desire to move
effectively into the tiers monde was quickened by the relaization
that Peking could also vie for leadership in Africa and Asia,
as was demonstrated at Bandung.
Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 115.
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b. The View to the West. While the expansion of Soviet power
and of international communism was seen increasingly in terms of an
extended historical process, in the short term simultaneous collabora-
tion and struggle with a heterogeneous adversary became somewhat more
possible. As we have seen, the broad foreign policy trend of 1954-
1956 to seek out and exploit differences of interest and opinion--
"intermediate forces"--in the non-Communist world included a new
Soviet political interest in the disarmament and arms control issue
to influence decision-making in the West. This change in the Soviet
approach marked a significant step in the development of Moscow's
willingness to collaborate with its Western adversaries to deal
with the threat posed by contemporary armaments.
When the Soviet leaders looked to the West in these years,
they are likely to have seen exploitable opportunities in differ-
ences existing within the leadership of each major Western country
including the United States, and between the various NATO govern-
ments. To a lesser extent, new advantage may also have been per-
ceived in the exploitation of differences between Western European
governments and their populations, especially in France and Italy.
A hostile and uncompromising foreign policy line toward the West
would diminish the various Western leadership divisions, causing
the divergent groups to rally around the flag in defense against
the Soviet threat--as must have been brought home to Moscow by
German entry into NATO on May 9, 1955 via the Western European
Union after long years of the cold war. On the other hand, a less
antagonistic foreign policy line might well exacerbate Western elite
differences, lower the military and political pressures from the
West, and facilitate local Comnunist advances in Western Europe.
The Soviet press gave an indication, albeit in flamboyant
language, of the Kremlin's view of differences within the "ruling
circles" in Washington.1 On the one hand there were the "madmen"
1See William Z. Foster, "Usilenie fashistskikh techenii v
SShA," Kommunist, No. 1 (January), 1955; editorial, "The U.S.
'Policy of Strength'--Its Miscalculations and Failures," Interna-
tional Affairs, No. 2 (February), 1955; N. Sergeyeva, "The Sentiment
of the Ordinary American," New Times, No. 14 (April 2), 1955; E.
Korovin, "The A-Weapons vs. International Law," International Affairs,
No. 5 (May), 1955; M. Krementsov and G. Starko, "Military Bases in
Foreign Territories," New Times., No. 21 (May 21), 1955; editorial,
"End the 'Cold War'!" International Affairs, No. 6 (June), 1955;
Y. Lebedev, "Adlai Stevenson on U.S. Foreign Policy," New Times,
No. 27 (July 1), 1955; and editorial, "On the Eve of the Four-Power
Conference," International Affairs, No. 7 (July), 1955.
QI
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who backed "positions of strength"--Dulles, Nixon, Senators McCarthy
and Knowland, Admiral Radford, General Gruenther, and the Pentagon
as a whole.1 Opposed to these "aggressive" forces were influential
men who took a gore "sober" approach to foreign policy--such as
Adlai Stevenson and Senators George and Mansfield. 3 President
Eisenhower, although he received some criticism, was not linked
among the "madmen" or the "healthy forces." Later in 1955 Moscow
characterized Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal as well intentioned
and "sincere" but subject to abuse by those around the President.
The appointment in March 1955 of Harold Stassen as Special Assistant
to the President for Disarmament Affairs was termed a maneuver to
divert public attention from the .S. government's policy of
conducting a frenzied arms drive.
See A. Trianin and G. Morozov, "Podgotovka i propaganda
atomnoi voiny--tiagchaishee prestuplenie protiv cheloveshestva,"
Kommunist. No. 8 (May), 1955; Iu. Arbatov, "Imperialisticheskaia
propaganda SShA--ugroza miru narodov," Kommunist, No. 7 (May)., 1955;
"Ialles vastaivaet na gonke vooruzhenii . . ,," Pravda, May 27, 1955;
A. Alexayev, "The U.S.S.R. Disarmament Proposals--A Major Contribu-
tion to Peace," International Affairs, No. 7 (July), 1955; and edi-
torial, "On the Eve of the Four-Power Conference," International
Affairs, No. 7 (July), 1955.
2 Sh. Sanakoyev, "New Type of International Relations," Inter-
national Affairs, No. 1 (January), 1955; M. Slavyanov, "Firm Founda-
tion of European and Universal Security: The Warsaw Conference,"
International Affairs. No. 6 (June), 1955; Y. Lebedev, "Adlai
Stevenson on U.S. Foreign Policy," New Times, No. 27 (July 1), 1955;
editorial, "On the Eve of the Four-Power Conference," International
Affairs, No. 7 (July), 1955.
3
"Zaiavlenie senatora Dzhorzha," Pravda, May 19, 1955; "Ameri-
kanskii senator o soveshchanii, " Pravda, June 18, 1955.
4
For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, April 1, 1955,
and "The Friends and Foes of Disarmament," New Times, No. 13 (March
26), 1955.
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In addition to opportunities for a political use of the disarma-
ment-arms control issue in relations with the United States leader-
ship, Moscow also perceived important exploitable differences between
Europe and the United States, among the NATO governments generally,
and within European societies.1 Many of these differences Moscow
attributed to "farsighted" European tendencies toward independence
from Washington. The Kremlin probably hoped for an even greater
impact of its soft line in Europe than in the United States by reason
of the keener interest there in disarmament and an end to the cold
war, in the Austrian settlement, in independence from American
policies, in trade with the East, and also because of organized
pro-Soviet peace fronts and Communist parties, especially in
France and Italy. Even after ratification of the London-Paris
Accords strong voices in France and the Federal Republic
opposed West German rearmament.
The Soviet media pointed to "irreconcilable contradictions,
overt and covert [that] are growing both inside each capitalist
country and between them [and that] undermine the military and poli-
tical agreements of capitalist states from within." 2 Manipulation
of these conflicts, Moscow may have hoped, would throw uncertainty
into the NATO alliance and maximize the pursuit of policies indepen-
dent of U.S. direction, which in turn would limit the policy alterna-
tives open to Washington.
c. Implications for Policy. In place of the traditional
Soviet efforts to expose Western "hypocrisy" in the disarmament
negotiations and to provoke mass opposition to Western foreign
policies with simplistic slogans to ban the bomb, the Soviet
leadership showed an increasing interest in directly manipulating
influential opinion in Western countries. Soviet political
exploitation of the disarmament issue in 1954-1956, in conjunction
with other moves for a relaxation of East-West tensions, assumed
a more sophisticated form, seeking to obscure East-West antagonisms
'Editorial, "Mezhdunarodnaia solidarnost' trudiashchikhsia,"
Kommunist, No. 6 (April), 1955; M. Slavyanov, "Firm Foundation of
European and Universal Security: The Warsaw Conference," Interna-
tional Affairs, No. 6 (June), 1955; editorial, "Za urkeplenie
druzhby sovetskogo i iugoslavskogo narodov," Kommunist, No. 9 (June),
1955; and N. Inozemtsev, "Amerikanskaia politika 's pozitsii silu'
i Zapadnaia Evropa," Kommunist, No. 9 (June), 1955-
2M. Slavyanov, "Firm Foundation of European and Universal
Security: The Warsaw Conference," International Affairs, No. 6
(June), 1955. See E. Menzhinsky, "French-American Contradictions
in the World Capitalist Market," International Affairs, No. 8
(August), 1955.
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and to encourage the development of moderate opinion in and around
the Western governments, especially in the United States.
In this way Moscow evidently hoped to influence Western
decision-making to favor a number of inter-related Soviet policy
objectives: (a) to deprive the more antagonistic elements in the
Western policy line toward the Soviet Union of their justification;
(b) to dissolve the social and political basis of Western
willingness to use nuclear weapons; (c) to destabilize and
demobilize Western military alliances and specifically to undermine
the position of American foreign bases; (d) to neutralize the
ability of the United States to make political use of its military
force in keeping NATO together; (e) to discourage Western commitment
to an all-out arms race; and (f) to inhibit and prevent West German
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Thus, Moscow could hope to influence
the moral and physical base of Western security by political action
short of agreements.
That the May 10, 1955, and subsequent Soviet disarmament moves
were aimed at influencing Western decision-making at a high level
was strongly suggested by Soviet propaganda restraint in the
following months. Instead of hanmmering away at signs the West was
reevaluating its previous stand, Soviet propaganda stressed the
positive prospects for detente and the desirability, if not immediate
possibility of disarmament. Even the U.S. "reservation" of
September 1955 was not played up in Moscow's multilingual journal
International Affairs and was hardly noted in the official organ of
the Cominform, and then only toward the end of the year.1 In
contrast to the line of these public media, however, Soviet diplomats
in the DCSC and at the October Foreign Ministers Conference sharply
criticized the West, particularly Washington, for not standing
behind its pre-Summit proposals. And the Twentieth Party Congress
in February 1956 heard Khrushchev himself accuse the West of reneging
after Moscow accepted its position on forced levels in May 1955.2
Soviet propaganda restraint was presumably based on the
assumption that a hostile propaganda of exposure would have had
the effect of neutralizing any tendency in the Western leadership
to seek some accommodation with Moscow. At the same time the Kremlin
may also have been curious to wait and see what policy line was
forthcoming from the West, rather than foreclose some favorable
change by aggressive Soviet actions.
1
For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy. November 25
and December 30, 1955.
2
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, No. 4., 1956, p. 9.
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In addition to the question of how to treat the Western posture
on disarmament there was the problem of presenting the new Soviet
line, not only to the Communist world and the developing countries
but to the West. A poignant note was sounded by one Soviet
publication which noted that at the Helsinki Assembly convened
by the World Peace Council in June 1955 "many speakers expressed
regret that the new1Soviet proposals were still not sufficiently
known in the West." As it was, this gathering had unexpectedly
been postponed in April, apparently to take the new Soviet line
to the West into account.
The changes in the Soviet approach to disarmament and arms
control in this period complicated the tasks of Communist propaganda
and agitation in that the Kremlin now sought to impress a number of
quite different audiences, some of whom would respond favorably
to simplistic slogans while others could be influenced if at all
only by a more sophisticated appeal. Thus, while Moscow's
new gradualist approach to controlled prohibition of nuclear
weapons and its new recognition of the problem of clandestine
storing of nuclear weapons had direct meaning for Western govern-
ments, these changes were counterproductive for the traditional
World Peace Council agitation for the immediate prohibition of
nuclear weapons (manifested in the Vienna Appeal of January 1955),
and did not translate readily into attractive and self-evident propaganda
propositions on which to build peace organizations in the West and the
"third world." Consequently Moscow at times pursued contradictory
themes in its negotiating and propaganda line on specific measures,
comprehensive and partial.
1) Com prehensive Disarmament. As indicated, the major
comprehensive plan put forward by Moscow in 1954-1956 was that of
May 10, 1955, which was reiterated at the Summit. While such a
sweeping measure might seem suitable only for mass agitation, the
fact that it seemed to accept some major elements in the Westts
negotiating position made the May 10 draft useful for appealing to
more influential opinion in the West. Out of the complex staging
of the May 10 proposal Soviet propaganda usually seized on the
issue of conventional force reductions, stressing Moscow's willingness
to accept precisely those levels called for by the West. In the
Soviet view propagation of comprehensive disarmament (and eventually
of GCD) in the East-West negotiations and at the United Nations
would also serve to condition the international political atmos-
phere, identifying the Soviet Union with the cause of peace in the "third
world" and promoting public awareness of the disarmament problem,
iNew Times, July 1, 1955
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if not pacifist attitudes, in the NATO countries. In addition
Moscow could pursue the "fight for peace" involving the mobilization
of peace fronts under the slogan of general disarmament, while
under this cover it could slowly begin to explore the possibility
of measures to control the military environment with the United
States.
2) Partial Measures. While some of the partial measures
which Moscow advocated in 1954-1956 could communicate directly to
Western leaders at least some degree of interest in coming to terms
on certain arms controls, Soviet proposals seemed generally designed
to aggravate differences within NATO, especially in connection with
German rearmament and Bonn's full participation in the Western
alliance.
(a) Ground Control Posts and Regional Arms Controls.
The Soviet proposal of ground control posts to prevent surprise
attack lacked ready mass appeal, and the main Soviet interest here
was probably to encourage Western governments to recognize a mutual
interest in avoiding the outbreak of war, if not yet in entering
into joint measures to this end. This proposal may also have
represented an attempt to lower the apparent Soviet military threat
to the West by indicating a desire to stabilize the military environ-
ment. We may also speculate that in addition to the military-
strategic desirability of having observers at SAC bases around the
Soviet perimeter, the implementation of the ground control proposal
would have reflected a Soviet political interest in reassuring
the West against conventional attack in Europe, since Moscow
certainly did not need such an agreement to learn of a mobilization
in the open societies of the West.
In addition Moscow may have hoped for a certain disruptive
impact upon NATO. With West Germany now a member of the alliance
as of the day before the Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955, Moscow
had a new interest in finding and exploiting points of difference
between Washington and Bonn. Relatively feasible arms control
measures affecting the European region offered a means to this end.
The ground control post proposal might have some appeal to the United
States leadership for military reasons, and would become more
relevant in future years. But it would remain disadvantageous to the
West German Government, owing both to the hardening effect of such
measures on the status quo in Central Europe, and to the limitations
they would place on Bonn's freedom of action in the military and
political spheres.
Discussion of the disengagement issue with the West also
offered Moscow certain political advantages. Coupled with the
Soviet political use of intercontinental air power and the
increasing deployment of Soviet MRBM's against Western Europe,
indications of Soviet interest in disengagement helped to undermine
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the United States influence in Europe. From the point of view
of popular propaganda, Moscow's support for disengagement offered
a means of mobilizing against NATO anti-American, anti-German and
neutralist sentiment in Western Europe and Britain. In particular,
disengagement seemed to present a reasonable alternative to West
German rearmament and to NATO plans (announced in December 1954)
to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe.
A less feasible measure, however, was the Soviet proposal of
an all-European security pact to replace the military alliances
of East and West. From the Soviet point of view, however,
propagation of this measure clearly followed from the Kremlin's
rising interest in obscuring the "two-camp" struggle between East
and West. Like Soviet fraternization at the Summit with the
leaders of the adversary states, and the new affability of the
Soviet leaders at diplomatic receptions in Moscow, the proposal to
dissolve the opposing military alliances reflected the new Soviet
interest in moderating the East-West confrontation, allowing somewhat
less anti-Soviet opinion to gain influence in the West, and in reducing
the external pressures which helped to maintain the unity of the
North Atlantic alliance.
(b) The Nuclear Test Ban. An issue on which Moscow could
appeal both to influential opinion in the West and to mass sentiment
throughout the world was the problem of nuclear testing. A number
of events in 1954-1955 had dramatized the problem--the "Lucky Dragon"
incident of March 1954, the February 1955 announcement of the United
States Atomic Energy Commission on the unexpected contamination from
Strontium-90 as a result of nuclear testing, and the April 1955
opposition of the Bandung Conference to nuclear testing. Moscow
sought to capitalize on this popular sentiment and in 1955-1956
began to put itself forward as the chief exponent of a test ban.
In this the Soviet Government clearly sought to enhance its international
image, and to stigmatize and inhibit Western testing. Perhaps the most
clearly directed pressure was aimed at the British hydrogen bomb
program, especially against the first British thermonuclear test
early in 1956, when Soviet proposals called for the prohibition of
thermonuclear rather than nuclear testing. Although the test ban
problem had acquired leadership interest in both East and West by
1957, on the whole it remained politically somewhat novel in this
earlier period and was more energetically exploited by Moscow as an
agitational issue.
Having considered Moscow's view of the West and its political
interests in proposing certain arms controls to Western governments,
we may surmise that Western conduct in the months following the May 10,
1955 proposal resolved any doubt that Moscow might have entertained
about the readiness of the "moderate" forces in Western governments
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to enter into meaningful disarmament measures with the Communist
states. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that the Soviet leaders
also perceived in the revision of United States positions in 1955-
1956 an indication of a somewhat more serious approach to the whole
problem of arms control and disarmament. Khrushchev's experiences
at the Summit probably sharpened his awareness that Western
leaders, above all Eisenhower, also recognized the suicidal nature
of nuclear war and would probably do all they could to avoid such
war. At the same time, even though the pax atomica was expensive
and dangerous to maintain, it precluded Western efforts to "roll
back" the Iron Curtain and would deter Western attempts to interdict
the Soviet entry into the "third world." In this perspective there
is no prima facie reason to assume as some have done that the Soviets
necessarily drew from the growing nuclear stalemate the conclusion
that disarmament agreements were essential or possible. What is
likely, given the shifting tides of strategy and outlook, is that a
more rational and therefore reasonable negotiating position on control
of armaments was put forward, much as it had increasingly been in
the West, out of a new sense of urgency and seriousness of the
problem but without great expectations for agreement.
3. The Economic Factor
What economic incentives may have reinforced the Kremlin's
interest in lessening East-West tensions and in reducing military
allocations of men and material? Were there arms control measures
that would be economically as well as militarily advantageous?
The evidence suggests first of all that economic pressures
of a sort that would have provided Moscow with an urgent motive
in 1955 to pursue disarmament agreements with the West did not
exist. What was present, however, was an economic situation in
which significant relaxation of tensions would allow the Kremlin
to divert resources to a concentration on weapons systems of
possibly decisive future importance while saving on both funds
and manpower required for present defenses.
a. The Economic Burden of Soviet Defense. As can be seen
from Chart 11.2, the absolute level of Soviet arms spending in 1955
was approximately equal to that prevailing in 1952 at the height of
the defense efforts during the Korean War. While arms spending was
visibly lower in 1953, 1954, and 1956 than in 1952 and 1955, the
rough stability of the volume of total possible arms spending over
this period is probably the most significant feature of the data.
In 1953 and 1954 the Malenkov leadership announced reductions in
the planned level of the defense budget, as did Khrushchev in 1956.
In terms of actual reported expenditures and total possible arms
Chart 11.2
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spending these reductions were less than dramatic. The 1956 budget
cut made by Khrushchev, who only the previous year had chided
Malenkov for neglecting defense, was larger in volume and percentage
than the reductions of 1953 and 1954. These minor deviations in the
defense line probably reflect more the convolutions of the post-
Stalin struggle for power than thoroughgoing disagreements on
basic policy. Both Malenkov and Khrushchev seem to have been
interested in the stability and perhaps retrenchment of the
defense budget. (Soviet production data suggest that in 1953 and
1954 the output of tanks, military transport, and artillery was
cut in favor of the production of tractors and other civilian
machinery. The use of defense plants for the production of con-
sumer durables such as refrigerators suggests that airframe
production for tactical craft may also have been reduced.)
On the basis of what we see when we look back Moscow probably
expected that the costs of the defense effort would not rise
beyond a tolerable level since increased outlays on advanced
weapons procurement could be counterbalanced with cuts in military
manpower and conventional weapons procurement. On the other hand,
it is possible that Soviet leaders underestimated the costs of
defense in the missile age that they were soon to enter. In re-
ducing military forces by over 2 million men in 1955 and 1956
Moscow may have not thought only to make "savings" that would pay
for rising investments in military technology; the transfer of
the demobilized soldiers into the economy was also probably thought
of as a productive asset in a period when the demographic effects
of World War II would begin to create labor shortages, although in
1954 the industrial labor force was still rising. The consequences
for the economy of this large-scale transfer of scientific manpower
to the defense industry, which began during 1955 and 1956, were not
yet apparent.
The Kremlin possibly failed to appreciate the extent of the
cost differential between developing prototype long-range bombers
(and later, ICBMts) and procuring them in large numbers. Or it
may have planned to rely largely on prototypes, the exact number
of which would be shrouded in secrecy, rather than on mass produc-
tion of these fearful and expensive weapons.
But on balance, given that costs of defense generally have
to be unbearable to outweigh political gains in the typical Soviet
calculus of benefit, it cannot be said that the burden of defense
weighed heavily on the Soviet economy in 1955, as a determining
factor in the minds of the nation's leaders, and we believe that
changes in Soviet policy were due primarily to other factors.
To engage the West in a full-scale arms race for the future might,
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however, have seemed in 1955 to pass the threshold both of economics
and of strategy. And in fact the Soviet Union was not forced to
make significant sacrifices of other goals in order to maintain
the defense effort at its prevailing level. Indeed, in the years
1954-1956 Soviet industry appears to have grown at the most rapid
pace seen in the 1952-1962 decade. 1
Stalin's successors inherited an agricultural situation
marked by virtual stagnation. Owing to increased attention to
incentives and especially to the supply of greater amounts of
capital to agriculture, in 1955 the leadership could expect marked
improvements in the near future, if not exactly at the present.
The hopes of the regime centered principally in the Virgin Lands
Program, under which large areas of marginal farm land in Siberia
and Central Asia were being brought under the plow in order to
raise total grain output. The program depended on massive inputs
of machinery that were made possible only by the reduction of con-
ventional weapons production after 1953, but it required less
capital investment than other approaches to agricultural progress.
Substantial improvements were being made in civilian living
standards largely owing to Malenkov's "new course," which, although
it did not proceed to the point of altering the basic predominance
1Professor Abram Bergson's studies of Soviet national income
indicate that the proportion of GNP devoted to defense in 1955 was
about the same as in 1950 before the Korean War rearmament got
under way. (Bergson's figures were 10.9 per cent in 1950 and 10.3
per cent in 1955, but they appear to be based on the official bud-
get, which is an understatement of total defense outlays.) The
diversion of resources to current military production during 1950-
1952 sharply retarded the growth of civilian machine production,
which in turn cut into Soviet investment capabilities. The growth
of civilian industry was thus retarded. After 1953, although the
level of military R&D probably rose and the output of some advanced
aircraft may have increased, much plant capacity and current material
supply were diverted to the production of civilian machinery. The
growth rate of civilian machinery output increased from about 7.5
per cent per year in the years 1951-1953 to about 16 per cent in
1954-1956, and aggregate civilian industry from slightly over 9 per
cent to slightly over 11 per cent per year in the same periods.
Owing to an increased capacity to emplace new equipment in industry,
industrial labor productivity (output per employee), a cherished
indicator of progress to Soviet planners, increased in 1954 and 1955
at about twice the rate of the previous three years.
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of heavy industry, had infused sufficient new investment into the
consumer industries to produce impressive relative increases in
the output of consumer durables and food. A significant role in
raising living standards was played by the release of inventories
of consumer goods in 1953 and 1954.
Thus Khrushchev made the best of two possible worlds in 1955
by temporarily raising the defense budget--a source of gratifica-
tion to his military constituents, hard-line elements in the party,
and some plant-managers and scientists--and by promising more food
as well. The still rapid Soviet growth rate permitted living
standards to increase absolutely even while heavy industry and
defense retained or even increased their share of the economic pie.
The tone and content of the Twentieth Party Congress early
in 1956 indicated that the Soviet leadership was highly pleased
with the current growth record of the Soviet economy, relatively
confident that growth would continue to be rapid, and highly sen-
sitive to the manifold implications of Soviet economic performance
for the achievement of its international goals. The future military
potential of the Soviet Union, its prestige in the eyes of neutrals,
and the respect it received from opponents were seen to hinge very
greatly on economic growth; peaceful economic competition with
capitalism was becoming the most active front of the cold war. At
the same time Soviet leaders appreciated that broad secular trends
were acting slowly to retard the growth rate of the economy, as
evidenced by the relatively conservative goals of the Sixth Five-
Year Plan relative to the Fifth. They were therefore concerned to
keep the claims of defense on the resources of the economy from
increasing significantly.
b. Implications for Policy. We can now inquire whether there
were in fact any economic reasons why the Soviet Union chose to
demonstrate a serious interest in disarmament and arms control
measures in 1955. Two alternative explanations are plausible. They
hinge not so much on the general level of arms spending and the
condition of the economy but on the point in time at which the Soviet
leadership decided that a missile breakthrough was distinctly possible
and that they should proceed in its pursuit. If the decision to
proceed with missile development on a crash basis were taken late
in 1954 or early in 1955, it could be argued that the Soviet Union
would have been interested in disarmament discussions aimed pri-
marily at promoting detente with the West, on the theory that
relaxation of tensions would allow the Soviet Union to concen-
trate its arms effort on systems that would come to fruition only
after several years.
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By avoiding the necessity of procuring existing weapons
systems, the possession of which even in large numbers might not
alter the current strategic balance significantly, the Soviet
Union could develop advanced systems without detracting from
economic growth. Certain kinds of arms control and disarmament
agreements would not endanger this objective since rocket develop-
ment could continue under the rubric of space exploration. Agree-
ments to limit possession or testing of nuclear missiles were
F1 extremely remote in 1956. Even if such agreements were actually
reached, however, Moscow might still withdraw at a propitious
moment in its R & D program, especially if it had a substantial
lead over the West.
But if it is assumed that the Soviet leadership did not
decide until late in 1955 or early in 1956 to exploit the revolu-
tionary implications of the missile technology under development
(an assumption supported by the previously described dramatic
increase in R&D employment between July 1955 and December 1956),
another explanation of Soviet behavior at the negotiating table
may be advanced. Until the missile breakthrough became a reasonable
certainty the chances for the success of Soviet strategy must have
appeared uncertain though hopeful, since the absolute superiority
of the United States in intercontinental aircraft was large and
growing despite talk of a bomber gap. To overtake the United
States on this front would have been not only expensive but less
than fruitful strategically since the developing air defense
systems in the West were tending to increase the number of bombers
required to inflict even marginal damage, and it was probably not
considered economic to step up production of bombers, particularly
in the light of promising missile developments. While the Soviet
Union was the vastly inferior competitor in the bomber race, an
arms control agreement--or period of detente--that reduced the
margin of American superiority was economically as well as militarily
attractive because it would buy an increased measure of security
without increased economic sacrifice.
Two additional economic advantages of detente, although
marginal in importance, should be noted. First, the long-term
credits to finance the import of Western machinery would be much
easier to obtain in an atmosphere of relaxed East-West tensions.
Such trade, the Soviet Marxist view suggests, would also be useful
in building a material base for peaceful coexistence. Second, the
still prevalent view among Soviet economic spokesmen was that the
capitalist economies might collapse without defense spending or,
short of that eventuality, that the latter would benefit less from
defense savings than would a planned socialist economy.)
~50-
Combinations and variations of the various alternative expla-
nations of Soviet behavior may be suggested. Soviet leaders may
have perceived the implications of missile technology early in
1955 but may have been hesitant to proceed with its development
on a crash basis because they were not sanguine about the costs
involved, in which case a final strenuous attempt to achieve a
favorable disarmament agreement would have appeared a reasonable
course. They may also have felt that any agreement could be
structured so as to preserve their nascent missile lead while
diminishing American superiority in manned aircraft.
What we have called manifest Soviet arms control and disarma-
ment policies in 1954-1956 were, we believe, intimately connected
to the strategic posture, present and planned, of the Soviet Union.
This connection we see as part of a more broadly orchestrated
political and diplomatic offensive growing out of the changing
perceptions of Soviet leaders as to the best way to protect the
security of the nation and at the same time to advance its
international objectives. In this sense, while the over-all
allocation of economic and human resources was an internal part
of the strategic outlook, economic factors in the narrower sense
were probably not of vital importance in conditioning Soviet
policy on arms control and disarmament in 1955. (Moreover, if
we are correct in our belief that the cost of the arms race was
underestimated and the prospects for Soviet growth overestimated
in 1955, Moscow was without the strong economic incentives to
cut back defense expenditures that it faced in later years.)
4. The Internal Political Situation
A key factor in determining the shifts in the Soviet approach
to arms control and disarmament was of course the arrival of a
new leadership in the Kremlin. In certain respects, the military-
strategic, external political, and economic factors enumerated
above were present, albeit to a lesser extent, in Stalin's day.
What had changed most was the Soviet decision-makerst
perception of those factors and their reactions to them. Molotov,
Stalin's close associate, continued to advance Stalinist views
on foreign policy in 1955, deriving contrary conclusions to those
drawn by Khrushchev in observing the same situation.
The zigzag in Moscow's external relations from September
through May 1955 particularly on the disarmament issue, seemed to
correspond with the changing power positions of Malenkov, Molotov
and Khrushchev. The intraparty struggle seems to have proceeded
in three stages. First, from Stalin's death to Malenkov's
removal in February 1955 Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov, and
others attacked and defeated the Malenkov-Mikoyan line featuring
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the "new course" in domestic economic policy, involving possible
limitation of investment in defense and heavy industry together
with tendencies to compromise in external relations. In the fall
of 1954 there had been signs of a Malenkov-Khrushchev alliance
against Molotov on foreign policy issues, including relations with Tito
and possibly the disarmament move of September 30, 1954 and the
settlement on Trieste in October 1954. However, a sharpening of
the Soviet foreign policy line took place between November 1954
and February 1955 that strongly suggested a rapprochement of
Khrushchev and Molotov with others for the purpose of ousting
Malenkov. As a consequence, in February 1955 Moscow seemed to
retract its negotiating offer of September 1954.
Second, after Malenkov's removal a grouping composed of
Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Bulganin, and conceivably Malenkov seems to
have been formed, as Khrushchev evidently led an attack against
Molotov in February-April 1955. In this period the Soviet position
on disarmament returned to the more conciliatory position of
September 1954. By the end of April 1955, following Soviet moves
toward an Austrian settlement, the publication of Tito's criticism
of Molotov in the Soviet central press on March 9, the promotion
of eleven top military men, and the progressive Soviet change of
its negotiating position in the disarmament negotiations on March 12,
it seemed that Molotov's resistance had been broken. Late in April
1955 a decision was apparently taken by the Presidium to discuss
Molotov's attitude at the forthcoming July plenum of the CPSU Cen-
tral Committee. At the same time, however, Pravda and Komnunist
reminded Khrushchev (not by name) that the Central Committee Secre-
tary was chosen to execute the decisions of the Central Committee,
suggesting that an alliance had coalesced to check further direct
advance by Khrushchev.
Nonetheless in the following weeks until the July plenum and
the Summit Conference, the third period of the intraparty struggle,
Khrushchev apparently preserved sufficient latitude to make a
powerful attack on Molotov's position. By proposing and making
foreign policy concessions Khrushchev may have been able to pro-
voke debate and decisions within the Presidium that had the effect
of isolating Molotov. By May 1955 the point had evidently been
reached where the new foreign policy line could go ahead on all
fronts, in effect locking Molotov out. This was formally confirmed
at the July plenum, when, with the new foreign policy line at its
peak, the decision was taken to convene the Twentieth Party Congress.
The shock of de-Stalinization that was to meet the delegates there
had in fact been preceded by significant progress in the "de-Stalin-
ization" of postwar Soviet foreign policy. It was doubtless no
accident that one effect of the new foreign policy moves to strengthen
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the "moderates" and weaken the "aggressive circles" within Western
elites was to isolate and weaken Molotov and the more inflexible
proponents of a two-camp struggle within the Soviet elite.
Stalin's successors needed a breathing space in which to
carry out their factional struggle and stabilize a new rule. This
meant that his proffered detente had to be persuasive to the West,
which had demanded "deeds" of Moscow. Khrushchev's regime might
be thought to have been too unstable even in the summer of 1955 to
carry out major agreements with the adversary. But already in May
there were major concessions in Soviet policy toward Austria and
Yugoslavia and in Moscow's negotiating position on disarmament.
Khrushchev's policies, somewhat in the Bolshevik tradition, were
"all out": They ventured much to gain much--but all the bets were
hedged in the sense that even losses would not be inordinately
painful.
Tension relaxation of this sort was not only a "policy." To
some extent it was a process taking place that Khrushchev tried to
channel. The modernization of Soviet society--a function of indus-
trialization, urbanization, and education--created pressures for
greater freedom and prosperity internally. Although no mechanism
exists by which these pressures could directly affect the Kremlin's
policy, Stalin's successors have stressed their devotion to the
domestic and external issues most salient to the Soviet public--
prosperity and peace. While public opinion can still be molded and
even disregarded, the pervasive modernist tendencies in Soviet life
reinforce the other forces militating for a liberalization in Soviet
foreign policy.
On the other hand, it still remained very much in question
whether the Soviet regime and the international Communist
movement could withstand the psychological-political impact of a
long-term disarmament treaty and/or detente, and whether disarma-
ment or d/tente might not vitiate the 4lan and the very raison d'etre
of communism. Even if we assume that Khrushchev faced up to this
question we can only conclude that the potential repercussions of a
possible disarmament treaty may have seemed in 1955 far too hypo-
thetical and remote or, if they were actually faced up to, were
probably dismissed in the face of Khrushchev's general optimism
about the future of Soviet communism.
To sum up, the line that triumphed in May and July 1955 was
more dynamic and expansionist than Malenkov's but more flexible
and subtle than Molotov's. It evolved from the interaction of
expedience and experience, doctrinal residue, and the new top
men's personal manner of perceiving and acting. One of its prime
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characteristics was ebullient optimism about the future of the
Soviet Union in world affairs. This optimism was a function of
all the factors mentioned, as perceived by the new leadership: military
equality or superiority vis- a-vis the West, "contradictions" in the
West, opportunities in Asia and Africa, and expectations of Soviet
economic growth and capitalist economic decline.
D. The Rise and Decline of the "Spirit of Geneva"
Despite the apparently narrowing differences on disarmament
in the May, 1955 negotiations, and despite the "Geneva spirit",
it was clear half-way through the 1955 Geneva Summit Conference
that both sides were still in fact taking opposite stands on basic
questions. The reservation placed in September 1955 on all U.S.
pre-Summit Conference disarmament positions made the differences
explicit, and the rancorous Foreign Ministers meeting in October
rendered the coup de grace.
What were the factors pro and con that worked to promote
and then subvert the movement toward d6tente and disarmament?
We can sum them up briefly, starting with the factors that favored
agreement.
First, the virtual impossibility of achieving invulnerability
to nuclear attack, the desirability of curbing nuclear production
and proliferation, the fear that the opponent might make a techno-
logical breakthrough--all these expressions of a revolution in mili-
tary strategy imparted a greater urgency to progress toward
stabilizing the military environment. The desire in Moscow and
Washington to avoid a nuclear holocaust was reinforced by
increasing demands from the emerging nations of Africa and Asia
to resolve East-West differences, halt the arms race, and stop
nuclear testing.
Within the two alliance structures, proponents of Bonn's
participation in NATO delayed East-West summit talks until
ratification of the London-Paris Accords in April-May 1955. Some
in the West argued that talks could then proceed from strength and
without the danger of the debacle that befell the European Defense
Community project. On their side, Soviet negotiators were presumably
confident that Communist unity would not suffer from East-West
negotiations. The ferment that was to be stirred by the February
1956 CPSU Congress had not yet weakened Moscow's influence in Peking
and Eastern Europe. Soviet optimism about the growth of the
socialist camp and "anti-imperialism" in general tended to outweigh
cautions concerning the possible repercussions of detente. The
Warsaw Pact, formalized in mid-May, offered "parity" in negotiations
with NATO.
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Finally, the "spirit of Geneva" was in large part a function
of the new leadership in both Moscow and Washington. Khrushchev
and Bulganin in Moscow, Eisenhower and Eden in the West were new
men in those offices; they brought a new spirit of conciliation to
East-West relations.
On the negative side, the same factors that implied the
desirability of curbing the arms race made it extremely difficult
to do so. Nuclear production had already reached a point where
hidden caches of atomic weapons could evade inspection. The
fear that the adversary might even achieve a technological break-
through was accompanied, especially in Moscow, by hope that one's
own scientists might overturn an unfavorable balance of power.
While the West hoped to improve its position in Europe by the new
Bundeswehr, this development produced increased anxieties in what
soon was formalized as the Warsaw Pact. And aside from these
dynamic factors, the existing military situation in 1955 embodied
many asymmetries that made it hard to find equivalent strengths
to trade off in disarmament agreements.
These factors, in combination with the uncertainties of
future technological development, meant that an extremely compli-
cated formula would be needed to persuade both sides that their
security could be enhanced by some package of arms limitation or
reduction. Comprehensive disarmament, it is true, could blot out
the unique strengths of each side, but the political prerequisites
for such extensive measures were lacking. The superpowers were
not entirely ready for partial measures such as a test ban or
surprise-attack controls because of technological and political
uncertainties as yet unresolved.
For another thing, ideological conflict, suspicions
reinforced by historical experience, and continuing political
disputes all conspired to undermine and impede East-West d6tente.
The range of conflict appeared in the issues that one side proposed
and the other rejected for discussion at the Summit Conference:
liberation of Eastern Europe and an end of international Communist
subversion, suggested by the West; the seating of Peking in the
United Nations and the return of Taiwan to Communist China,
advocated by Moscow.
Although Moscow and the West agreed to side-step these issues
at the Summit Conference, the problem on which most debate turned
was (and remains) the most immediate source of Soviet-Western conflict:
Germany and European security. Western insistence on "allowing" West
Germany--or a reunified Germany--to join NATO was diametrically
opposed to Soviet demands that Germany be neutralized as the price
for possible reunification. The ill-feeling resulting from this
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encounter vitiated whatever impetus toward disarmament seemed to flow
from the "spirit of Geneva."
The formal unity on both sides was to some degree in doubt.
In the West it rested on persuasion and compromise of diverse
interests; in the East it sprang from the fact of Communist rule
in each country. Washington's flexibility in dealing with Moscow
was sharply circumscribed by the objective of obtaining West German
rearmament, and as this goal became more an accomplished fact,
Soviet policy toward Germany was a basic factor hardening lines
between the alliances.
And finally, the new heads of government, while more flexible
than their predecessors, had by no means altered the fundamental
objectives of their countries. Moreover, both had to contend with
powerful conservative forces within their own societies.
As to the proposals themselves, they were characterized by
greater realism and feasibility on both sides. Comprehensive
proposals struck a more reasonable balance than ever before in
the staging of conventional and nuclear disarmament. Although both
Soviet and Western proposals in 1955 envisioned the complete
destruction of nuclear weapons prior to complete disarmament, mutual
recognition that their elimination should follow drastic conventional
cuts foreshadowed the positions endorsed by both sides in 1962 and
1963 on the need for a nuclear umbrella throughout the disarming
process. Both Western and Soviet comprehensive proposals in 1955
focused on the rough equivalent of what appeared as Stage II in
the later general and complete disarmament plans--an aim that some
analysts now regard as more feasible than Stage III.
Partial measures proposed in 1955 also reflected a greater
sophistication and foreshadowed an increasing East-West concern to
inhibit surprise attack, halt nuclear testing, prevent frictions
along the frontiers in Central Europe, and maintain high-level
communications particularly in times of international tension.
Increasing awareness of the dangers of nuclear weapons spread, and
of the complexities as well as the importance of international
inspection, was now shown by Moscow.
In short, the new realism shown in manifest Soviet arms control
policies correlated positively with the new acknowledgement in
Soviet strategic thinking of the importance of surprise nuclear
attack, and with such manifestations of the importance now attached
to disarmament as the issuance of a new journal late in 1954,
International Affairs. (This journal, printed in many languages,
showed a more sophisticated propaganda approach to non-Communist
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audiences and has reflected over the years, especially since 1959,
a more serious consideration of the problems of disarmament.)
But on the negative side, neither side had really done its
homework. United States negotiators in March and April 1955 made
proposals beyond their probable capacity to deliver, given the
review of American disarmament policy begun only in March 1955 and
not completed until mid-November 1956. Basic research and analysis
of inspection procedures to control a nuclear test ban, budgetary
limitations, and other disarmament measures were seriously deficient--
a fact repeatedly stressed by Western representatives in the latter'
half of 1955. The major Western response to the May 10 ddmarche--
the "Open Skies" proposal--was designed by experts in psychological
warfare. Eisenhower's decision to present it was not taken until
after the Summit Conference had begun and Bulganin had offered a
more feasible variant of the May 10 program. 1
Soviet disarmament positions seemed no better prepared than
Western ones. When examined, the proposal of May 10, 1955, for
example, revealed an inner inconsistency in that it called for compre-
hensive disarmament by 1958, while at the same time emphasizing
that sufficient confidence to permit agreement on the inspection
of nuclear disarmament did not exist. A further indication of
Soviet uncertainty in this period occurred earlier in 1955, when
Pravda and Izvestia on March 16 and 20 defended the uncompromising
Soviet proposal of February 25, apparently oblivious to the more
conciliatory position adopted by Gromyko in negotiations on March
11 and 18. Lack of realism and a portent of future difficulties
were reflected by the absence of a major power, Communist China,
at the negotiating table; Peking's participation, Moscow warned,
was essential to any large-scale agreement.
What comes clear about 1955 is that if it in fact revealed
the first glimmer of hope that the ideal of international agreement
to reduce and limit arms represented a national policy instead of
a purely utopian dream, by the same token the conditions were in-
sufficient either to generate a spirit of urgency about it or, more
importantly, to overcome the negative weight of past conflicts,
continued hostility, unresolved disputes, mistrust of intentions,
and the general inertia that characterize a traditional mode of
response. Thus the turning point was at best a partial and
inconclusive one.
See Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower, the Inside Story (New
York: Harper & Bros., 1956), pp. 345 ff; corroborated in Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co.,
Inc., 1963), pp. 519-520.
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Our analysis has suggested that certain features of the Soviet
May 10, 1955 proposal, notably its practical concern over surprise
attack, as well as Moscowts belated public recognition of the facts
of life about nuclear stockpiles, could be construed as reflecting
"sincerity"--always being careful to define "sincerity" as a serious
intent to negotiate on a measure, and not necessarily a repudiation
of international ambitions or an intention to negotiate a genuine
political settlement. By these standards we can provisionally
conclude that in 1955 the new Soviet leadership probably wished to
"do something" about the arms problem to a degree that it had not
previously.
But we have tried to emphasize that Soviet disarmament
diplomacy in this period--as always--is subordinate to the larger
Soviet overview of the place of the Communist movement in history,
the prospects for advancing its fortunes, and the choice of
optional strategies for so doing. Soviet disarmament policy cannot
be viewed, as disarmament sometimes is in the West, as autonomous,
representing an imperative, whether strategic or moral, before
which all other goals and strategies pale. The interplay between
disarmament and security--or politics--remained crucial for both
sides.
The relevance of this axiom is that the apparent preference
of Soviet leaders in 1954 and 1955 for a detente in East-West
relations grew at least in part out of new calculations about the
unacceptability of general nuclear war; and that the disarmament
and arms control measures proposed by Moscow were governed in turn
by the basic decision to seek detente. But the interconnection
between d6tente and disarmament meant that if detente was possible
without surrendering on sensitive and vital points regarding inspec-
tion (that is, penetration and intrusion) the Soviets were not about
to jeopardize their system for an abstract concept of arms control.
On the other hand, if some arms control steps would create or
reinforce a relaxation in the West, their price might be acceptable.
But arms control was possible only if it were essential to achieve-
ment of the grand strategy.
The shift in manifest Soviet disarmament policy, then, was
subordinate to the larger shift in Soviet foreign policy. Moscow's
most pressing concerns were to avoid the military calamity of
nuclear war and the political liabilities of the hard Stalinist
line. A virtue could be made of necessity by advancing a concilia-
tory position that "disarmed" the West politically and figuratively
if not militarily and literally.
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The Kremlin seemed to assume that while detente was both
possible and desirable, disarmament, though desirable in some forms,
was not so readily attainable. At the same time, the evidence
suggests a Soviet calculation that a "reasonable" position toward
disarmament, even if spurned by the NATO allies, would tend in the
long run to strengthen the moderates who wanted to soften the West's
stance vis-a-vis the Communist camp. Demonstrations of Soviet
military strength (bomber flights and H-bomb tests) mixed with
assurances of peaceful intent would foster such "sober" thinking
in the West.
Soviet proposals for partial measures in 1955 and 1956
probably seemed more feasible and certainly less risky to Moscow
than the more sweeping disarmament proposals. Of course, some
measures seemed in the interest of both sides, while others were
obviously of unilateral advantage. Demilitarized zones and con-
trol posts, for example, were advocated or endorsed by the West
as well as Moscow. Although a source of potential political
dangers, they could work to Soviet strategic advantage by guarding
against surprise attack from forward United States air bases. If
the West agreed to such measures, Moscow perhaps would have stood
behind its proposals. Other Soviet proposals such as an all-
European security system or the prohibition of nuclear weapons on
German soil, while advantageous to Moscow, were clearly unaccept-
able to the West and therefore had potential only as propaganda.
Soviet appeals to reduce troop levels proportionately and to
liquidate foreign bases accorded with Moscow's military planning,
but were infeasible then for the West. The major United States
proposal--the "Open Skies" plan--was rejected by Moscow on the
ground that it constituted "inspection without disarmament" and
would pinpoint targets for SAC.
In looking at several specific factors that tend to underlie
Soviet policy, we have suggested an interaction between internal
intraparty shifts and the external quest for detente. We have
suggested further the lack of apparent connection between economic
factors and serious motives for cutting arms, although the
achievement of a relaxation of East-West tensions was a pre-
requisite if Soviet military personnel were to be drastically
reduced and Soviet deterrence to depend on prototype instead
of mass produced long-range bombers.
Perhaps the most significant underlying factor behind Soviet
strategy was the military. If the uniquely destructive nature of
nuclear weapons acted as a brake on Moscow's willingness to go all
the way in war or in an arms race, the future prospects of potent
new strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems must have had a
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contrary effect at the same time. Communists may be conditioned
not to succumb to temptation. But where temptation took the form
in 1955 of an ICBM capability only two years away, the strategic
outlook must have looked dynamic enough to make Soviet leaders
hesitate to foreclose the possibility of a new trump card of this
sort. But here, as we have warned, it should be kept in mind that
the prospect of improvement in the strategic balance may have con-
tributed to the possibility that the Soviets could later negotiate
from strength--including negotiations on arms control measures.
A series of complementary conditions can thus be assumed to
have stimulated the shift in Soviet foreign policy and especially
in Soviet policies toward arms control, which in practice inter-
acted to produce a common orientation. The prime determinant was
Moscow's acknowledgment of the policy consequences of the possibility
of a surprise attack and nuclear holocaust. This consideration was
reinforced by the desiderata for checking or neutralizing Western
strengths (manifested by the ring of SAC bases, West German rearma-
ment, and plans to employ tactical nuclear weapons in Europe) while
maximizing present and expected Soviet advantages (in the form of
medium and intercontinental missiles). These combined strategic
reasons for avoiding direct conflict with the West were paralleled
and buttressed by the political judgment that the harsh two-camp
struggle of the late Stalin era had only strengthened Western unity
and foreclosed opportunities to exploit contradictions within and
between NATO governments and between the West and the emerging
nations. The gains from the new Soviet strategy were expected to
outweigh the political dangers to the elan and the unity of the
Communist movement.
The sine qua non for these basically optimistic calculations
was the manner in which Stalin's successors, Khrushchev in parti-
cular, perceived and reacted to the problems and opportunities
confronting the Soviet government. The new line was not the auto-
matic product of historical forces but resulted from "voluntarism"
as well as "determinism."
Of course there is no way to determine with assurance the out-
come that Moscow anticipated would follow from its 1955 proposals.
The very complexity and far-reaching nature of the May 10 compre-
hensive program (not to speak of the expected Western response)
must have made the consequences of its implementation seem rather
hypothetical. It remains entirely speculative whether, if confronted
with Western acceptance in principle of the May 10 package, Khrushchev
would have been prepared to make reasonable compromises that were
necessary for agreement. In fact because United States disarmament
proposals were virtually withdrawn after Moscow threw down the
gauntlet on May 10, the extent of Soviet willingness to put away
swords and to struggle with political and economic means was not
fully measured.
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What can be said is that the strength of the many factors in
the Soviet and international picture favorable to detente and arms
control in 1955 have proved to be surprisingly long lasting, per-
sisting through bouts of cold war, and enjoying at least partial
fruition in 1963. For Moscow and the West the 1955 negotiations
can be said to have laid the groundwork for technical improvement
in disarmament proposals, both comprehensive and partial. More
important, they may have helped to cultivate the frame of mind
in which adversaries could collaborate in containing their poten-
tial for military conflict, looking forward to a day when a more
profound consensus might exist between the parties, and when the
multiple factors behind the disarmament and arms control policies
of both sides might converge to favor serious agreements.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II
Sources and Explanation of Data for Chart 2
Line A represents an estimate of possible total defense and
space expenditures developed by J. G. Godaire, "The Claim of the
Soviet Military Establishment," in United States Congress, Joint
Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power (Washington,
1962), passim, and pp. 39, 40. It is known that the official
defense budget grossly understates actual Soviet outlays on
defense inasmuch as it fails to encompass the bulk of military R&D,
some advanced weapons procurement, and some installation costs.
Godaire's estimate involves addition to the official defense budg-
et of (1) official outlays on science, much of which are known
to go for defense purposes, and (2) certain unexplained residuals
in the Soviet budget, arbitrarily reduced to reasonable limits.
It is not possible to distinguish civilian from military space
research. As regards absolute magnitudes of the Soviet defense
effort in given years, the accuracy of Godaire's estimates is
highly problematical. His assessment of relative magnitudes,
that is, the shape of the curve, appears to be closely suggestive
of reality. In most years Godaire's estimates parallel the offi-
cial defense budget; a sharp upward deviation in 1958 and 1959 is
confirmed by a sharp decline in the growth of civilian machinery
output as a result of a presumed diversion of resources to defense.
See Rush V. Greenslade and Phyllis Wallace, "Industrial Production
in the USSR," in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, op. cit., p. 120.
Line B depicts the official Soviet defense budget as realized
and announced at the end of the fiscal year coextensive with the
given calendar year. As a rule, the official published annual
defense budget is slightly lower than the official planned budget
announced at the beginning of the fiscal year. Since the official
realized defense budget for 1963 and 1964 has not yet been pub-
lished, planned expenditures for 1962, 1963, and 1964 are shown
by a dotted line. Official realized defense expenditures are from
Godaire, loc. cit., p. 3T. These figures are available for some
years also in Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR under "Finansy i Kredit."
Planned expenditures for any year are available in the published
budget, which usually appears in December or January.
Line C represents the estimated costs of Soviet military
manpower (pay and subsistence) and is a product of military man-
years, from Godaire, loc. cit., p. 43, times an estimate of the
average cost per man (1,090 new rubles) derived by Abraham S.
Becker, Soviet National Income and Product: The Goals of the Seven-
Year Plan, RAND Memorandum RM-3520-PR (Santa Monica, 1963), p. 139.
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Line D represents possible total "weapons and space systems
development and procurement" outlays and is derived by subtracting
the cost of military manpower (Line C) from possible total defense
and space expenditures (Line A).
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CHAPTER III
FROM SPUTNIK TO CUBA: 1957-1962
A. Introduction
The "spirit of Geneva" marked the high point of a movement
from both sides to reduce international tensions and, the danger of
war. By October 1955, however, the Foreign Ministers meeting
smothered all hope that any of the underlying issues between Moscow
and the West could soon be resolved or that tensions would abate.
Many of the manifestations, objectives, and determining factors
of Soviet policy during 1954-1956 persisted in the years to be
covered in this chapter--the period prior to the Cuban missile crisis
in 1962. Many of these factors were sharply modified, however, and
some were virtually transformed. Moreover factors that seemed to
play no role in 1954-1956 intruded and came to weigh heavily in
Soviet policy.
Moscow's stated position and propaganda on the disarmament issue
sustained or amplified many of the patterns that had emerged during
1954-1956. But significant changes could be noted as well. Tacit
East-West arms control became a fact. Experts' talks on purely
technical aspects of arms control were inaugurated and produced
agreements. Joint agreement on the principles of a balanced and
controlled program of comprehensive disarmament was achieved. One
regional arms control agreement was signed.
Had Soviet objectives and expectations altered? Again only
informed speculation is possible. We continue to face the problem of
unraveling an interest in arms control agreements from a desire,
perhaps transitory, to lessen international tension. Further, while
the manifest policies of each side often seemed to move toward major
agreement, as on a nuclear test ban, the curves of apparent interest
never quite intersected, and the question always remained whether
either side was ready to make the concessions necessary for a compro-
mise agreement.
The years from 1956 until the Cuban affair and its aftermath
are significant for the refinement that took place in Soviet
thinking on the technical and political implications of arms
control; for the growing awareness in Moscow that international
politics may be seen as a nonzero-sum game in which collaboration
as well as competition can be advantageous to adversaries; and for
the profound changes that came increasingly to militate for radical
change in Moscow's approach to maintaining its security and ideo-
logical interests.
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The 1954-1956 period can readily be viewed as a 'round"
in which Moscow and the West sought to reduce tensions and the
danger of war. The years 1963 and 1964 may be similarly regarded,
as both sides stepped back from the brink they approached late in
1962. The years from 1956 to 1962 are much more difficult to
categorize, for several reasons: one is the longer time span under
review; another is that the intensive moves of one side toward
detente rarely coincided with comparable movements from the opposite
side. More basically, whatever soft notes could be heard were
almost drowned out by hard notes in the policies of each side that
made it almost impossible to determine which theme, if any,
predominated.
Several ways of looking at Soviet policy during the 1956-
1962 period can be hypothesized, and each could find some validation
in the record. First, Moscow's policy can be depicted as a linear
if zigzagging curve leading continually toward detente and arms
control. Second, this course can be regarded as a march, with
occasional retreats, toward overpowering the West from a position
of strength. Third, the "round" approach, in which Moscow's
policy can be viewed as an alternating hard and soft line,
reflecting a possible ambivalence about whether to seek to dominate
or collaborate with the West. Fourth, Soviet policy can be viewed
as pursuing a hard and soft line simultaneously, using each one
opportunistically to deal with the exigencies of time and place.
Such an analysis is the more difficult because, as Marshall
D. Shulman has pointed out, both the left and the right syndromes 1
of Soviet behavior may be used for offensive or defensive purposes.
A militant direct line could serve as a mode of revolutionary
advance or as a way of imposing constraints on the adversary. A
manipulative, more flexible style could be employed (as in 1955)
to undermine the unity of the opposition while promoting an
advance by other means.
Our perspective on the years from 1956 to 1962 is probably
too short to determine whether Soviet policy was moving inexorably
toward detente with the West or, at least in the Kremlin's hopes,
toward a power position from which it could dictate to the West.
We can say with confidence, however, that Soviet policy and its
policy on arms control in particular manifested both hard and
soft, left and right tendencies. Further it may be argued
plausibly that at moments one or the other mode of behavior seemed
to predominate but that usually both could be found. This
'Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 4-7.
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simultaneity of apparent opposites may have reflected ambivalence
in the outlook of the Kremlin leadership, divisions among the
leadership, a response to a complex international and domestic
situation--or all of these.
But above all, it should be reiterated that this period of
widely differing policies has been brought together in a single
chapter primarily for convenience of presentation.
B. Manifest Soviet Policies
1. The Negotiations: Style and Substance
a. An Overview. Prior to analyzing the various measures put
forward by Moscow from 1957 until 1962 it may be useful to outline
the major subjects of negotiation during those years and the
forums in which the negotiations took place.
The U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee (DCSC) was the
main venue of negotiations in 1957, when, from March to August,
its final session was held. While Moscow initially put forward
some comprehensive proposals, the major focus of the negotiations
was on a series of partial measures that could be implemented
without great delay. The State Department has termed this round
of negotiations "the intensified effort," reflecting in part the
fact that the United States had finished in November 1956 the
basic policy review it had begun in March 1955.
The year 1958 was notable because it marked the first uni-
lateral test suspension by any country and because this was
followed later in the year by a de facto three-power moratorium
on nuclear testing that persisted until 1961. 1958 also witnessed
the first East-West conferences of experts, meeting on the subjects
of a nuclear test ban and the prevention of surprise attack--
issues the West hoped could be dealt with as technical rather than
political aspects of arms control and disarmament. The first
of these meetings produced one of the first East-West agreements
of the postwar era in the form of a statement defining the kind
of system needed to control a test ban.
Technical and political talks on the test ban problem con-
tinued in 1959, during which period Moscow also made a rash of
aU proposals for nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.
Of great political importance, Chairman Khrushchev laid before
the United Nations General Assembly a plan for general and complete
disarmament (GCD), but accompanied it with alternative proposals
for partial measures.
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The year 1960 saw both sides discuss GCD in a Ten Nation
Disarmament Committee, while negotiations continued among the three
nuclear powers on the test ban issue, and France began the tests
that would bring her into the nuclear club. Both sets of nego-
tiations faithfully reflected the deterioration in East-West
relations following the U-2 incident and the abortive Paris Summit
Conference.
Test ban negotiations continued in 1961, but the Soviets
became increasingly intransigent, a portent that they would soon
break the moratorium that had existed since 1956. But even while
Moscow prepared to test a 50-megaton bomb, Ambassadors McCloy
and Zorin on September 21, 1961 reached a joint U.S. -Soviet
agreement on the principles to guide future disarmament talks.
The General Assembly late in 1961 endorsed a proposal of
the three nuclear powers that an Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee meet in Geneva early in 1962, composed of eight neutral
states in addition to the five Communist and five Western states
that made up the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee in 1960. The
Conference of Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC)
convened in Geneva in March 1962 without France, which refused
to take part. Earlier in the year the Geneva conference on the
cessation of nuclear testing, which had had well over 300 meetings
since 1958, met for the last time. Its members then gathered as a
subcommittee of the ENDC, where the nuclear powers continued their
deliberations on a test ban.
The zigs and zags in Soviet negotiating stance on comprehensive
and partial disarmament measures in the various negotiating forums
from 1957 to 1962 will now be outlined in more detail.
b. Comprehensive Disarmament. In the period from 1957 until
1962 Moscow brought forward four different versions of comprehensive
disarmament, all of which purported to deal with both nuclear and
conventional weapons, and all of which spelled out the steps to
be taken through a third and final stage of complete disarmament down
to the level of police forces needed for internal security and
fulfillment of U.N. Charter obligations. None of the comprehensive
proposals advocated by Moscow from late 1956 until late 1962 seemed
to offer a promising basis for East-West agreement. The problems
common to all of them were:
Inadequate inspection procedures, especially in the
refusal to allow verification of existing armaments.
An inflexible and probably unrealistic timetable of
four to five years.
Provision for the elimination of overseas bases in
the first or the second stage of disarmament.
United Nations peacekeeping forces subject to great
power veto.
The Soviet proposals between late 1956 and August 1957 were
particularly striking for the manner in which they backed off from
the inspection procedures Moscow had endorsed in 1955 and early
1956. The subsequent Soviet proposals of 1959-1962 had in common
the structural defect -that they would radically alter the balance
of nuclear and conventional weapons one way or the other. Khrushchev's
proposals to the United Nations in 1959 put off nuclear disarmament
until Stage III. The Soviet proposals of June 1960 and March 1962,
however, would have reversed this priority and destroyed all nuclear
delivery systems in Stage I and all nuclear weapons in Stage II.
Some narrowing of the differences between the East and West
resulted from shifts in Soviet policy in 1960-1962. Moscow has
shown some awareness of the need for an international inspectorate
to affirm that conditions are ready for the transition from one
stage to another. Most important, perhaps, Moscow recognized in
September 1962 the desirability for the nuclear powers to retain
a limited number of nuclear contingents after the first stage of
disarmament.1
c. Partial Measures. In retrospect we can see that 1955
marked a turning point from which a major trend can be dated--a
trend toward a more sophisticated propagation of partial measures,
many of them relatively negotiable in terms of agreements compatible
with the military-strategic interests of both sides. Indeed
Khrushchev's address to the General Assembly in 1959--after proposing
GCD--advocated five partial measures and went on to reaffirm the
May 10, 1955 proposals which he said "outlined a specific scheme of
partial measures in the field of disarmament." The Soviet govern-
ment was still convinced, the Premier added, that the May 10
proposals "constitute a sound basis for agreement on this vitally
1
A revised version of the Soviet draft treaty that
incorporated this and most of the Soviet proposals since March
was circulated by the U.N. Secretariat on September 24, 1962 as U.N.
Document A/C.1/867. However, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin demanded
that the West first agree in principle to the nuclear umbrella
concept before discussions began on its details. See ENDC PV.83,
November 26, 1962, p. 22.
-68-
important issue.
A wide range of partial measures was espoused by Moscow from
1956 to 1962. Khrushchev's 1959 address to the United Nations
mentioned five such measures that the Kremlin frequently endorsed
in this period:
1. The establishment of a control and inspection
zone, and the reduction of foreign troops in the territories
of the Western European countries concerned.
2. The establishment of an 'atom-free' zone in
Central Europe.
3. The withdrawal of all foreign troops from the
territories of European States and the abolition of
military bases on the territories of foreign States.
4. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between
the member States of NATO and the member States of the
Warsaw Treaty.
5. The conclusion of an agreement on the2prevention
of surprise attack by one State upon another.
Here we shall single out two sorts of partial measures for
special emphasis: regional arms controls and a nuclear test ban.
These were the partial measures backed most consistently and with
the most apparent interest by Moscow; by focusing on them we shall
also be able to provide a framework for discussion of related
matters--nuclear-free zones, and surprise-attack measures such
as control posts.
1) Regional Arms C.ontrols and Surprise Attack. As noted in
Chapter II, Moscow responded warmly in 1954 and 1955 to the Eden Plan
and brought forward on March 27, 1956 a Soviet plan for the creation
in Europe of a zone of limitation and inspection of armaments. A
more radical formulation of these ideas was circulated in Soviet
notes to the Western governments on November 17, 1956--at the height
'U.S. Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1)59
(2 vols.; Washington: 1960), Vol. I, pp. 1459-1460. Hereafter cited
as Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959. Later editions, since 1961
published annually by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
are similarly cited.
As quoted in ibid., p. 1459.
of the Hungarian uprising--specifying that all foreign bases should
be eliminated in two years but also accepting the principle of
aerial inspection in Europe.
Variations of the March and November 1956 Soviet proposals
were reintroduced by Soviet diplomats at the DCSC and in notes to
Western governments in the first half of 1957; Moscow again warned
Bonn that arming the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons would preclude
German reunification.T
Various East European governments began also to make dis-
engagement proposals with the effect of reinforcing Soviet positions.
A "Balkan zone of peace" without atomic weapons and joined in a
mutual security pact was proposed by Rumanian Prime Minister Chivu
Stoica in September 1957.
The Rumanian initiative was followed by a similar Polish move.
Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki proposed his plan for a nuclear-
free zone in Central Europe in a speech to the General Assembly
on October 2, 1957. This first version of the Rapacki Plan
suggested the creation of a nuclear-free zone to include Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and the two Germanies. Nuclear weapons would be
neither manufactured nor stockpiled in this zone; the use of nuclear
weapons against the territory of this zone would be prohibited.
The four great powers would guarantee these provisions by a "broad
and effective control" comprising ground and aerial inspection.
The plan did not propose merging NATO and the Warsaw Pact but
argued that the "system of control established for the denuclear-
ized zone could provide useful experience for the realization of
a broader disarmament agreement." No provision was made for a
reduction of troops in the zone.
A second version of the Rapacki Plan was brought forward by
the Polish Foreign Minister at a press conference in Warsaw on
November 4, 1958. Rapacki indicated that the revised plan was 2
intended to meet the Western objections to his initial proposals.
A two-stage plan was now suggested: first, a freeze on existing
'The following analysis of Soviet bloc and Western proposals
and commentary is based largely on documentation in Eugene Hinterhoff,
Disengagement (London: Stevens and Sons, 1959). For a convenient
summary and chronology of disengagement proposals, see his Appendix
10, pp. 414-442.
2For these objections see Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959,
Vol. II, p. 936, 1023-1025; Hinterhoff, op.cit., p. 229.
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nuclear weapons in the zone; second, a reduction of conventional
forces and, simultaneously, complete denuclearization of the zone.
Both steps would be strictly controlled.
The novelty of this revised Rapacki Plan has been exaggerated
by some analysts, for numerous Soviet statements backing the Rapacki
Plan in late 1957 and earlier in 1958 had already advocated not
only denuclearization but also withdrawal of foreign troops from
the zone .1
The utility of ground control posts in Central Europe was
stressed again by Soviet negotiators at the surprise attack
conference that met in Geneva from November 10 to December 18, 1958.
Moscow made clear that these posts would be to little avail if not
linked with other steps to reduce concentrations of forces in
Central Europe. The Soviet government therefore proposed
(a) a reduction in the foreign armies on the territories of Euro-
pean states and (b) not keeping modern 2types of weapons of mass
destruction in either part of Germany.
Another manifestation of Soviet policy toward Central Europe
came on November 10, 1958--the same day the surprise attack con-
ference opened--when Khrushchev announced that the occupation of
Germany must be ended and West Berlin converted to a free city.
The reaction of the West to the Khrushchev stick and Rapacki
carrot was negative, however, and the Soviet response was to pre-
sent still other proposals and to lift, temporarily at least, any
semblance of an ultimatum on Berlin. From December 1958 to September
1959, variations on the Rapacki and free city plans were put forward
in talks by Khrushchev with Philip Noel-Baker, Carlo Schmid, Field
Marshal Montgomery, and Hugh Gaitskell; in Mikoyan's press confer-
ence in the United States; in addresses to the Twenty-First Party
Congress; and finally in the Soviet GCD proposal at the United
Nations in September 1959.
But even before the May 1960 summit, statements by Washington,
Bonn, and Paris made clear that the West was not willing to nego-
tiate a settlement of the German problem on terms even close to
those advocated by Moscow. As a consequence, while Moscow, Warsaw,
1 See, e.g., Bulganin's letter of December 10, 1957 to Eisenhower,
Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, p. 924-926.
2k.N. Document A/4078, S/4145, Annex 8, November 28, 1958,
pp. 3-7.
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and other East European governments continued to affirm their
support of disengagement, these affirmations lost much of their
plausibility after 1960. Their proposals came at moments when they
could have some propaganda potential although their immediate
negotiating value was questionable. Thus while Moscow was
preparing to test a 50-megaton bomb in a show of strength over
Berlin it asked the General Assembly (on September 26, 1961) to
consider a variety of measures including nuclear-free zones
initially in Central Europe, then in the Far East and Africa.
China had deferred comment on the original Rapacki Plan until
December 19, 1957, when Peking announced its support of the Soviet
Union's recent eace proposals including a nuclear-free zone in
Central Europe. In addition the Chinese welcomed the TASS
proposal of January 21, 1958 that the Middle East be turned into
an area free of nuclear and rocket bases. On several occasions
in 1958 Peking indicated a reserved and qualified interest in
the proposal of an atom-free zone in the Far East. But Peking
took umbrage at Khrushchev's emphatic statement on January 27,
1959 that a "zone of peace, above all, an atom-free zone, can
and must be created in the Far East and the entire Pacific basin
area." 3 The most restricted Chinese endorsement of the denuclear-
ized zone concept came on April 18, 1959, when Chou En-lai advocated
an area of peace and free from atomic weapons "throughout the whole
of East Asia and the Pacifi regions"--an implication that only part
of China would be included, and hardly Sinkiang--where nuclear
energy facilities are known to be located.
On May 26, 1959 Khrushchev revived the idea of a nuclear-free
zone in the Balkans. On July 11, 1959, he proposed a nuclear and
missile-free zone in the Scandinavian peninsula and Baltic area.
Moscow also endorsed at this time the demands of some African
statesmen that Africa be made a nuclear-free zone to prevent French
atomic testing in the Sahara.
Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 496-504. Poland intro-
duced a slightly revised version of the 1958 Rapacki Plan into the
ENDC Committee of the Whole in March 1962, but the proposal was not
given formal consideration due to procedural wrangling.
2This summary of Chinese views is based on Alice L. Hsieh,
Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Age (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 103-108, 154-166.
3Pravda, January 28, 1959.
4 Hsieh, ok. _cit., pp. 159-160.
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In the one contemporary example of formally agreed demilitari-
zation of a significant territory the Soviet Union, United States,
and ten other countries with interest in Antarctica on December 1,
1959 signed an agreement to use that territory "for peaceful pur-
poses only." The parties obligated themselves not to build military
bases there carry out maneuvers, test weapons, or carry out nuclear
explosions.
2) Nuclear lest Ban. If disengagement may be character-
ized as an arms control problem that is predominantly political,
the problem of halting nuclear testing is one that has been
complicated by intricate technological factors. But its political
ramifications were global in scope both because of their relation
to the nth-country problem and because they reflected pressure from
world public opinion.
To summarize the complicated story of the test ban negotia-
tions, we can focus on the major alternatives presented in terms of
U.S. interest in effective controls and Soviet requirements for
secrecy and military security: (1) a comprehensive test ban;
(2) a partial ban with a moratorium on underground tests; (3) a
partial ban with no restriction on underground tests.
First, the several Western versions of a comprehensive treaty
were unacceptable to Moscow because of the extensive control
measures proposed. The Soviet versions were turned down by the
West because they offered too little control. Western insistence
on technical reliability was interpreted in Moscow as stalling or
as a desire for espionage, while Soviet resistance to intrusion
raised fears in the West that Moscow might cheat.
The second hope for a compromise agreement seemed to lie in
a limited test ban accompanied by a moratorium on underground
testing, during which control systems were expected to be improved
so that seismic disturbances could be detected and identified with
minimal or no intrusion. A number of obstacles prevented such a
compromise.2 First, the Soviet Union in 1956 and 1957 treated a
'Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp- 1550-1556.
2Of course many other problems remained to be solved even if
East-West differences were reconciled on the moratorium. As
Eisenhower and Macmillan made clear March 29, 1960, their agree-
ment to a moratorium was conditional on progress in the negotia-
tions concerning the composition of the international control
organ, its voting procedures, and so forth-
test ban as a separable measure but the West did not. Therefore
the West turned down the Soviet proposal of June 1957 for a two-
or three-year moratorium on all nuclear testing with international
control posts on U.S., U.K., and Soviet territory. Second, after
the West accepted the idea of a separate test ban in 1958 and a
phased (that is, limited) test ban in 1959, the West tended to
advocate a much shorter moratorium than was acceptable to Moscow.
The Eisenhower-Macmillan statement of March 29, 1960, stated that
the moratorium had to be of agreed duration. Moscow on May 3, 1960
proposed a limited ban with a four- or five-year moratorium, but
the West on September 27, 1960 advocated a moratorium of 27 months
and on March 21, 1960 a moratorium of three years. Third, after
Moscow resumed nuclear testing in 1961, the West turned down the
very concept of a moratorium not formalized by treaty. Therefore
the Soviet proposals of November 28, 1961 and August 29-September 3,
1962 for a limited test ban with moratoriums of indefinite length
were summarily rejected. Fourth, when some momentum toward
East-West agreement existed in the spring and summer of 1960, it
was interrupted by political and military developments extraneous
to the negotiations. Fifth, measures that one side would have
found acceptable at one moment were proposed prematurely or
too late. Thus the two- or three-year moratorium proposed by
Moscow in 1957 corresponded with a position acceptable to the
West only in 1960 and early 1961. And the four- to five-year
moratorium advocated by Moscow in late 1961 and 1962 was not much
longer than the three-year measure proposed by the West prior to
the resumption of Soviet testing in 1961.
The third alternative was a limited test ban without any
limitation on underground testing. This was offered to Moscow by
the West on April 13, 1959, on February 17, 1960, on September 3,
1961, and on August 27, 1962, but it was not accepted until July 25,
1963.
2. The Propaganda and Ideology of Disarmament
a. The Appeal to the West. Soviet diplomacy sought maximum
publicity for its proposals. The propaganda importance Moscow
attached to its disarmament campaign is seen from the large number
of changes in the Soviet line that were announced not in the
negotiating chamber but in more public arenas. To give just a
few examples, Moscow's acceptance in 1957 of the principle of
inspection over a nuclear test ban was first stated by Khrushchev
in Finland before Zorin could reverse the Soviet stand in the DCSC.
The Rapacki Plan was announced in the General Assembly in 1957 and
modified in a press conference in 1958. Moscow's proposals for
nuclear-free zones in 1959 were generally expounded far from any
negotiating chamber. Khrushchev's GCD proposal was made to the
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General Assembly in 1959. The Supreme Soviet announcement in
1960 of a unilateral reduction in Soviet armed forces was communi-
cated to all the parliaments of the world and to the Inter-
Parliamentary Union, ostensibly to obtain reciprocal action in
other states. The General Assembly was the forum for Gromyko's
announcement in 1962 (and 1963) that Moscow endorsed a "nuclear
umbrella" principle.
Soviet propaganda to the West from 1956 to 1962 generally
continued the emphases inaugurated in 1955, stressing the possibil-
ity and desirability of disarmament and East-West detente, the
need for reasonable compromise on East-West differences, and the
benefits to all interests from a reduction of international
tension and military expenditure.
"Restraint" rather than "exposure" was the usual way of
dealing with Western disarmament positions. Moscow often claimed
that Western intransigence was the main reason why disarmament
negotiations had failed. But when compared with Soviet propa-
ganda of the Stalin period or even with the treatment of other
themes during the 1956-1962 period (such as Western policy toward
the underdeveloped nations or Western military strategy), Soviet
criticism of Western arms control policy was relatively restrained
and mild. The apparent concern of Soviet propaganda on disarma-
ment was less with attacking the West than with projecting to
Western and third-world public opinion the image of the Soviet
Union as a peace-loving country with which productive negotiations
could be conducted.
This general picture must be modified, however, to take
account of a certain hardening in Soviet disarmament propaganda
at many moments from 1956 to 1962--usually in connection with
some new manifestation of East-West tension. Such was the case
in late 1)56 and early 1957 (Hungary and Suez); in mid-1958
(Lebanon and Quemoy); mid-1960 (the U-2 and the Paris summit);
and 1961 (Berlin and related events). At these moments
publications such as International Affairs, the World Marxist Review,
and the Soviet daily press took a much tougher line toward the West.
Soviet propaganda also registered its concept of the 'good" by
reference to "evil." Thus, depending on the exigencies of time
and place, certain Western leaders were singled out for personal
attack, for example, John Foster Dulles, Konrad Adenauer, Charles
de Gaulle, along with strategists such as Henry Kissinger,
Herman Kahn, and Maxwell Taylor.
The most drastic innovation in Soviet propaganda to the West
from 1956 to 1962 was a reversal of the traditional position
on the economic consequences of disarmament for capitalist society.
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Beginning in 1959 the arms race was no longer depicted as a
necessary crutch for a "degenerate capitalism." It was portrayed
rather as an obstacle to the kind of growth that Japan and Germany,
relatively unburdened by defense expenditures, enjoyed. This
argument was adumbrated in a colloquium published in May 1958 by
International Affairs and an article in Kommunist of August 1959.
The stage was set for Khrushchev to reassure American businessmen
in his September 1959 trip to the United States that they stood to
gain from a redirection of industry from war to civilian production.
b. The Apeal to Anti-Capitalism and Anti-Imperialism. There
was another side to the coin presented to the West, for Soviet
policy regarding East-West detente and disarmament had to be
rationalized for the benefit of party workers in the Soviet Union,
Communists abroad (especially in China), and the non-Communist
revolutionaries of the emerging nations. This rationale emerged
in stages. In 1956 Khrushchev denied the fatal inevitability of
war and proclaimed the possibility of a peaceful transition to
socialism. In 1957 it was announced that the opponents of peaceful
coexistence were "anti-party." Later in 1957 it was argued that
Sputnik showed that the balance of forces was swinging in favor of
the socialist camp. The economic benefits of disarmament for the
developing countries and for the socialist economies were also
reiterated. In 1959 and 1960 the argument that disarmament was
economically feasible for capitalism was also addressed to the
readers of Kommunist and to the Supreme Soviet. As in 1954-1956,
the Kremlin posited the existence of "sober forces" in the West
who knew that peace was necessary; now it was added that some of
them recognized that it could also be profitable.
The years 1959-1960 saw the Kremlin initiate important changes
in ideology as well as propaganda to justify both its image of a
heterogeneous adversary and the utility of collaborating with certain
elements in the Western'ruling circles." Opponents of "capitalism"
and"imperialism" were now told that peaceful coexistence and
disarmament constituted the best means for pursuing their objectives.
There was no alternative to peace except war; but peaceful coexistence
meant "struggle" as well as "cooperation." By economic competition
socialism would triumph; disarmament would bring savings that
socialist and developing countries could utilize to better advantage
1The major Soviet work on the economic consequences of
disarmament has been I. Glagolev, ed., Ekonomicheskie Problemy
Razoruzheniia (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk, 1961).
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than capitalist economies. And disarmament would remove the physical
instruments by which the capitalists held back the tide of social
change. New documents were published to demonstrate that Lenin
himself advocated that socialist diplomacy should1try to strengthen
the moderate elements in the Western bourgeoisie. Other aspects
of Lenin's views, such as the inevitability of imperialist wars,
were termed not applicable to modern conditions. 2
C. Factors Conditioning Soviet Policies
The qualitative changes in Soviet policy in 1954-1956, it
was argued in Chapter II, rested ultimately upon a number of
optimistic expectations by the new leadership in the Kremlin:
that the strategic balance would soon shift to their advantage;
that this gain could be acquired without detriment to Soviet
economic growth; that contradictions in the West could be
successfully manipulated; that vast opportunities existed in the
underdeveloped countries for Soviet penetration; and that Soviet
communism could spread its influence quickly and effectively by
means short of force.
These optimistic assumptions became the foundations for the
quantum jump Soviet arms control policy took in 1954-1956. In the
years from 1956 to 1962, however, the bases for these calculations
disintegrated, one after another, militating in favor of an even-
tual reappraisal and reformulation of Soviet policy to accord with
new realities. In part the world had changed in 1956; in part the
Soviet perception of the world had become more realistic. Both
sets of changes impelled Soviet policies toward more radical ad-
justments than were apparent from late 1956 to mid-1962.
In this period of transition what relative weighting ought
we to assign to the factors we have identified as possible deter-
minants of Soviet arms control policy? We begin with those that
appear to have exercised a more decisive influence, turning then to
those that exerted an important but more marginal role. In the
first category we would rank Soviet calculations about the East-
West military balance, the opportunities and problems in dealing
with the West, and the prospects of Sino-Soviet relations. Among
1 See Franklyn Griffiths, "Origins of Peaceful Coexistence: A
Historical Note," Survey, No. 50 (January), 1964, and Walter C.
Clemens, Jr., "Lenin on Disarmament," Slavic Review (September 1964).
2Speech by Khrushchev in Bucharest, Pravda, June 22, 1960.
I
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the marginal factors we would include the economic burden of de-
fense upon the Soviet economy and the role played by the Russian
opponents and supporters of Khrushchev's policies. In considering
each factor we shall try to weigh both its positive and its nega-
tive impact in bringing arms control policy closer to accommodation
with the West.
1. The Military-Strategic Outlook
The years from 1955 to 1962 witnessed a continued evolution
in Moscow's view of the strategic situation and its implications
for Soviet policy, based on the profound changes in Soviet
strategic doctrine in 1953-1955. Before discussing elements of
change, we note several constants in the Kremlin's perspective
from 1955 through 1962 because they may go far toward explaining
the persistency of some features of arms control policy. These
constants can be analyzed in terms of immediate, medium-range
and long-range planning.
For the immediate future, Moscow seems neither to have feared
an imminent attack from the West nor to have planned one against the
West, despite some talk on both sides about pre-emption. It
doubtless calculated that an atmosphere of detente would help to
lower the danger of a nuclear initiative from the West. Since
central war was not expected, medium-range planning could
emphasize the political effects of Soviet military posture
rather than actual fighting capacity. Prototype rather than
mass-produced weapons systems could therefore be relied on and
minimum deterrence might suffice. But this strategy meant that
Soviet military secrecy would have to be maintained against the
foreign observation sought by the West as the price of arms
control agreements. For the long term Moscow seems to have feared
the spread of nuclear weapons, war by accident, a last-ditch
capitalist reflex action, or catalytic war by a "revanchist"
Germany, or an ambitious China. These considerations militated
for agreements on certain forms of arms control.
Within this framework of continuity three stages in the
Kremlin's perception of the military-political environment may
be noted: from 1955 to 1957 Moscow expected that the general
military balance would soon turn to favor the East; from late
1957 to 1960-1961 the Kremlin showed confidence that, at least
for "world opinion," the Soviet Union was the equal or better
of the West militarily; from 1961 to 1962, Soviet confidence
seemed to wane as the Kennedy Administration dismissed in
theory and fact the possibility of a "missile gap" favoring
Moscow. Underlying these perceptions were important developments
in Soviet strategic thought and the East-West military balance.
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a. Soviet Strategic Doctrine. Throughout the 1956-1962
period Soviet military thought generally took account of traditional
power factors as well as the facts of the nuclear age that had
been officially acknowledged in 1954-1955. If questions of arms
control policy were left to military men alone, they might have
decided that Moscow should not reduce or limit either its
nuclear or conventional forces. But important differences of
emphasis emerged between and within Soviet political and
military elites. Khrushchev sought to rely on nuclear-rocket
forces and reduce conventional forces including the air force
and navy. A secret session of the Central Committee in December
1959 (shortly after Khrushchev's return from Camp David and
Peking) approved a one third cut in the total number of Soviet
forces. The proposed reduction set off another round of
strategic debate between two groups: first, the economy-minded
politicians versus the marshals, and also, the "conservative"
versus the "radical" marshals; Defense Minister Malinovsky
managed to hold a middle position, but inclined to the conservative
viewpoint.
The practical outcome of the debate in 1960 was that the
troop reduction favored by Khrushchev was begun, only to be
halted in midstream by East-West tensions in the summer of 1961.
Khrushchev's preferences were also manifested in the creation
in May 1960 of a fifth branch of the Soviet armed forces--the
strategic rocket forces. However, Khrushchev's suggestion to
transfer demobilized soldiers into a territorial militia was
not carried out, perhaps because the marshals feared it would
serve to justify further cuts of military personnel.
'The following analysis derives from a number of sources
including Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age
(rev. ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962); Garthoff's
introduction to Military Strateg, ed. by V. D. Sokolovsky (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963); the introduction to the same
book by Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Gourd, and Thomas W. Wolfe
in the RAND Corporation's translation entitled Soviet Military
Strategy (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963);
the Sokolovsky volume itself; and materials analyzed in the
Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Soviet Disarmament Proposals and the
Cadre-Territorial Army," Orbis, Vol. VII, No. 4 (Winter 1964),
pp, 778-799, and "The Soviet Militia in the Missile Age," Orbis,
Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Spring 1964), pp. 84-105.
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The strategic debate continued after 1960 and was partially
reconciled in the publication in 1962 of Military Strategy, the
first over-all treatment of Soviet strategy since 1926. The basic
orientation of the 1962 treatise followed the thrust of Defense
Minister Malinovsky's address to the Twenty-Second Party Congress.
The book's editor, Marshal Sokolovsky, had been retired in 1960, per-
haps because of opposition to Khrushchev's radical confidence in
wonder weapons. The articles collected in the book reflect a
compromise between the radical and conservative schools but
leaned toward the latter. In Garthoff's words,
The "Khrushchev doctrine," with its stress on
deterrence, has been modified to meet more fully
the requirements seen by the military for waging
nuclear war should one occur. The compounding of
these divergent professional views has required both
ready forces to meet the contingency of a relatively
short and largely intercontinental war (envisaged by
the 'radicals') and forces to meet a protracted
general war with extensive land theater campaigns
(expected by the 'conservative' majority).2
Many conclusions of the Sokolovsky treatise had direct
implications for Soviet arms control and disarmament positions
which will be considered below. It must be remembered, however,
that the book's views may have suggested the views of the
Kremlin's military advisors, but not necessarily the precise
opinions of the political leadership. The book was not a
complete guide even to the military's thinking, since its
impact on foreign audiences had to be considered.
b. Forces in Being. The objective military balance in
strategic nuclear weapons between East and West is difficult to
measure even when most of the raw data is available because the over-
all analysis would have to take into account the warhead yield,
vulnerability, penetrability, reliability, and accuracy of the
many systems involved.3
1Izvestia, October 25, 1961.
2Introduction to Military Strategy, oa. cit., p. ix.
3The following study is based largely on comparatives of Soviet
and Western forces made by John H. Hoagland and presented graphically in
the attached tables and figures. The work is derived entirely from un-
classified estimates in recent years. Heaviest reliance has been placed
on the many estimates recently made public by the U.S. Department of
Defense. The method used here in making these comparisons has been to
consider only the number of vehicles in operational status. This
approach is believed to provide a reliable if only approximate index of
the strengths of both sides.
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The facts of the military balance as they can now be reconstructed
are sketched in Charts 111.1-111.4. Throughout the 1956 to 1962
period the West enjoyed a commanding lead in numbers of medium-
and long-range bombers. In 1957 and 1958 the Soviet Union began
serial production of MRBM's. Comparable American Jupiters and
Thors were not produced in such numbers because the U.S. deterrent
was to be based more on long-range bomber and missile forces.
Despite talk of a "missile gap," the only moment when Moscow
may have had more ICBM's on launchers than the United States was
in late 1959 and early 1960. Even at that time, the Strategic
Air Command delivery capability far outweighed the total Soviet
capacity to strike North America.
By early 1961 it probably became possible for both sides to
estimate that U.S. productive capacity would in the near
future provide a vastly superior ICBM force and eliminate the
deep-seated Western fears that had characterized 1959 and 1960.
This turn-around was made possible mainly by the accelerated
production of Minuteman, representing a new technology that was
a final payoff to the difficult post-Sputnik U.S. military
development effort. The first Minuteman test launching occurred
on February 1, 1961, and the first two Minuteman flights
totaling 20 missiles were declared operational in December 1962.
The Minuteman force has grown very rapidlyas Chart 111.4 indicates
This rapid mobilization, coupled with broader public dissemination
by the United States of its comparative force level estimates,
probably helped precipitate the Cuban missile adventure.
Possibly the Soviet leadership tolerated a knowledge of actual
Soviet force levels held secretly within the U.S. defense
community, but this was more difficult when these levels were
also published before a world audience.
Throughout the entire period since Stalints death up to the
Cuban missile crisis America's strategic capability to attack the
Soviet Union exceeded Moscow's ability to strike the United States.
Since the mid-1950's and especially since 1959, however, the
Soviet Union has possessed a minimum deterrent capable of
inflicting great and perhaps "unacceptable" damage on the United
States. And if the West chose to exaggerate the extent of Soviet 1
power Moscow did not object and seemed even to encourage such estimates.
1 See, for example, Marshal Zhukov's boast of "diverse atomic and
nuclear weapons, mighty guided missiles, among them long-range missiles,"
at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 and the Sokolovsky
claim of Soviet superiority in nuclear weapons. TASS, February 20,
1956 and Soviet Military Strategy, op. cit., pp. 296-297.
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Chart II. 3
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Soviet secrecy, however, proved to be somewhat counterproductive
to the extent that it goaded the U.S. effort to overcome non-
existent bomber and then missile gaps.
Soviet R&D programs concentrated not only on the perfection
of long-range delivery systems capable of lifting heavy pay
loads but on the development of high-yield warheads, culminating
in the 1961 test of an H-bomb of over 50 megatons. By 1962
Moscow claimed to possess nuclear weapons of 100 megaton yield.1
Khrushchev as well as Western analysts publicly doubted the
military utility of such warheads, but their sobering effect on
the minds of men may have had great political utility in the
Soviet view. Quite to the point, "deterrence" is rendered in
Soviet Russian as "terrorization [ustrasheniel."
The one area in which objective Soviet military might has
been unquestioned--its ability since the mid- to late-fifties to
attack Western Europe with large numbers of medium-range bombers
and (later)missiles--also had heavy psychological overtones. At
low cost to the Soviet Union, Europe served as insurance against
American pressure on the Soviet Union.3 The Cuban episode clearly
showed Moscow's interest in acquiring a military posture important
for its psychological effect along with its military utility.
Why Russia chose not to mass-produce its ICBM's is a key
question about which we can only speculate.4 Did the decision
reflect economic pressures (discussed below)? Faith in the adequacy
1Soviet Military Strategy, . cit., p. 354. For a fuller
documentation of Moscow's exaggerated claims during the period
studied, see the introduction to ibid., pp. 24-27.
ushchev, speaking to the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in
East Germany, declared that 100 megaton bombs were too large to be
employed safely in Europe and that this yield represented the
militarily useful limit of such weapons. (Pravda January 17, 1963.)
3Reporting on an interview with Khrushchev, C. L. Sulzberger of
the New York Times wrote in 1961: "Quite blandly he asserts that these
countries LBritain, France, Italy) are figuratively hostages to the
U.S.S.R. and a guarantee against war." Cited in introduction to
Soviet Military Strategy 9. it., p. 26.
For additional discussion see the introduction to Herbert S.
Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (rev. ed.; New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1962).
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of a minimum deterrent? Technological difficulties in producing
more refined systems? The expectation of a quick-fix such as
Cuba or 50-megaton warheads seemed to offer, to "even" the East-
West balance? A preoccupation with Europe? Or was it a combina-
tion of these and other factors?
Whatever the reason for the relatively low number if ICBM's
Moscow actually produced the distribution of these weapons between
East and West clearly made it in Moscow's interest to propose in
September 1962 that both sides reduce to "an agreed, strictly
limited number" of nuclear delivery systems--the Gromyko "nuclear
umbrella" proposal.
In regard to Soviet ground forces in this period, their role was
highly valued by Soviet strategists, as the Sokolovsky volume made
clear, especially in the "broken-back" aftermath of a nuclear
exchange. They have nevertheless borne a large share of the
reductions in over-all manpower of Soviet armed forces since 1955,
as indicated in Table III.l. During the 1950's, however,
the Soviets carried out a complete modernization of their ground
forces. Yet the Soviets continued to lack in most forms of
strategic long-range mobility. Consequently their ground
forces were tied to the Eurasian land mass.
Actual force levels are difficult to determine. Numbers or
sizes are only relative indicators of absolute military strength.
The size of the ground forces seems to have been fairly constant
at between 2.2 and 2.5 million during the period of 1957 to 1963.
Available information does not indicate any significant down
trend in ground forces in spite of the announced cuts in military
force levels in 1955, 1956, and 1960. The 1956 cut was apparently
executed; the 1960 cut, on the other hand, appears to have been
started but then halted in 1961; the conclusion is that while in
1955 and 1956, the Soviets did reduce their ground forces since
then the level has remained fairly constant except for a brief
reduction in 1960.
The total size of Soviet armed forces throughout the 1955-
1962 period, however, exceeded by far the level which Moscow
proposed for the initial stage of GCD. Thus, Soviet forces in
1955 totaled over 5.7 million and were reduced to their lowest
point in mid-1961--3 million men. (The level that Moscow
endorsed for the first stage of GCD varied between 2.1 million
and 1.7 million men.)
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Sources: B.H. Liddell Hart, The Red Army (New Y rk: Harcourt Brace, 1956); N. Galay, "The New Reduction in Soviet
Armed Forces," Bulletin, Institute for Study of the USSR, July 1956; Lt. Col. J.B. White, "The Army of Communism, "Army
Combat Forces Journal, March 1954; Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Soviet Disarmament Proposals and the Cadre-Territorial Army,"
Orbis, Winter 1964, p.779; William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964),
pp. 21, 84, 120. Disarmament and European Security (2 vols.; London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1963), II,
p. A-13 (ii). The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances: The Military Balance 1962-1963 (London: Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1962). The Military Balance: 1963-1964 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1963).
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Table 111.2
COMPARISON OF NAVAL MISSILE FORCES
United States Soviet Union
First reports of modified Z-class con-
ventional long-range sub to carry three
short-range, surface-launched missiles.
April:
November:
First successful underwater Polaris
launch.
U.S.S. George Washington operational
with 16 Polaris A-1 (1200 nm) missiles.
Nine Polaris subs operational with total of
144 missiles.
12 Polaris subs operational with total of 192
missiles. Subs 1-5, Polaris A-1, 1200 nm;
subs 6-18, Polaris A-2, 1500 nm; subs 18-41,
Polaris A-3, 2500 nm.
FUTURE By late 1960's 41 Polaris subs operational with
total of over 650 missiles, range 1500-2500 nm.
Approximately 15 Z-class missile subs
in production or operation.
Approximately 6 nuclear-powered subs in
construction.
18 Z-class missile subs in operation.
Approximately 10 nuclear-powered subs,
"s ome " carrying short-range, surface-
launched missiles.
30 missile subs ,conventional and
nuclear.
Total 142 fleet ballistic missiles
short-range and surface-launched.
Continuing development and production
of sub-launched ballistic missiles.
SOURCES: Same as Chart II.l. See also Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, December 11, 1960,
and Frederick L. Oliver, "Soviet Navy Learns Value of Submarine," Christian Science Monitor,
January 23, 1961.
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Table III.1 above also suggests the withdrawal and reduction of
Soviet forces from Eastern Europe since 1957, an important point
in analyzing the feasibility of various disengagement schemes for
the Soviet Union. The great majority of Soviet forces in East
Central Europe have been concentrated in East Germany.
c. Implications for Policy. Aspects of Soviet military doctrine
taken along with the changing balance of power probably suggested to
Moscow the desirability of two kinds of arms controls: those that
would reduce the danger of surprise attack, accidental or catalytic
war, or escalation; and those that would reduce certain Western
advantages toward parity with Soviet strength. These desiderata,
however, were probably to some extent vitiated by the expectation
and then the achievement of a psycholcgical environment of over-
all Soviet military superiority vis-a-vis the West from 1956 until
about 1962. Then, from 1960 to 1962, Moscow's waning military
posture in relation to the West seemed to dictate desperate Soviet
efforts to reestablish parity or superiority rather than serious
efforts at detente or arms control agreements with the West.
Before proceeding to consider in detail Soviet interests in
a nuclear test ban, disengagement, and GCD during the 1956-1962 period,
some general comments on the Soviet approach to arms control arising
out of Soviet military doctrine are in order. If the conclusions
of the Sokolovsky treatise were fully shared by the Soviet
political leadership, a number of conclusions followed for Soviet
arms control policy:
First, the official compromise reached between the contending
military factions in favor of balanced forces might suggest that
if Moscow entered a disarmament program the Kremlin would have
preferred that it offer "balanced" reductions of both conventional
and nuclear forces rather than trying to eliminate first one or
the other.1
Second, without disarmament huge expenditures would be needed
to sustain balanced forces. Because of Russia's economic situation
in recent years (analyzed later in this chapter) this prospect
was not a bright one to the political leadership even in 1962.
Third, the Sokolovsky treatise also suggested that the most
likely scenario for the outbreak of global war is a surprise attack
by the West. Since the role of surprise attack in the initial stage
'The Soviet GCD proposal of 1962 was more balanced in this
respect than its 1959 or June 1960 predecessors.
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of a war can be crucial, and Soviet forces must be ready to pre-empt
Western plans for aggression, a nuclear war would wipe whole
countries from the face of the earth. All these considerations may
have prompted the Kremlin to welcome safeguards to prevent surprise
attack, especially since Moscow may have been unable fully to
pre-empt.
Fourth, escalation of limited wars was still regarded as likely,
but for the first time in Soviet writing the Sokolovsky book stated
that Soviet forces must prepare for such conflicts. "Soviet
military strategy must study the methods of waging such wars too,
in order to prevent their expansion into a world war, and in order
to achieve a rapid victory over the enemy." 1 While such a view did
not imply specific disarmament measures, it pointed to an emerging
philosophy of broad restraints and arms controls. The relative
absence in Soviet strategic writing of discussions of "controlled
response" strategies--except to assert their futility--probably
reflected a gap in Russia's military capability rather than any
a priori preference for "massive retaliation."
Fifth, continuing a Khrushchev theme of 1960, the Sokolovsky
volume argued that tactical and strategic bombers were being
replaced by missiles, but added that their "replacement may take
a long time." For the present they could be used side-by-sige
with missiles and even be armed with air-to-ground missiles.
A "bomber bonfire" conducted by both Washington and Moscow might
be acceptable to many marshals as well as to Soviet politicians.
Sixth, no naval authors contributed to the treatise, but the
book conceded that in a war with the United States the Soviet
navy would play a greater role than in the past. Its first task
would be to destroy enemy carriers and then submarines, although
the U.S. Polaris threat was specifically minimized. 3 In accordance
with the logic of the Sokolovsky volume and, probably more
important, with Soviet naval weakness vis-a-vis the United States,
Moscow's GCD plan of 1962 proposed immediate liquidation of all
submarines (atomic-powered and otherwise) and all surface ships
capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
ISoviet Military Strategy, a. cit., p. 288.
2Ibid., p. 54.
3Ibid., p. 55.
4 See above, Table 111.2.
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Finally, the Sokolovsky volume recognized that the instruments
of nuclear attack were superior to defenses against them, and that
the best defense is pre-emption. Nevertheless the book called for
the development of active air defense based mainly on ABM
complexes, and of civil defense.1 If Soviet theory did not yet
appreciate the destabilizing influences an ABM system could have
on the total military environment, the force of economic
determinism may nevertheless have kept Moscow from attempting to
develop an effective defense against American missiles.
Against this analysis of the shifting military balance and
trends in Soviet strategic thinking, we may now examine the Soviet
posture in the East-West negotiations to estimate the Kremlin's
military interests in comprehensive and partial measures of
disarmament.
1) Comprehensive Disarmament. Our earlier review of
Soviet negotiating behavior in this period indicated that none of
the Soviet proposals for comprehensive disarmament offered a
promising basis for East-West agreement, unlike those of May 1955
which had the merit of corresponding at least somewhat to earlier
Western proposals. The comprehensive Soviet plans of 1957, 1959,
and early 1960 contained major characteristics that would have
seriously threatened the East-West military balance. Moscow's
March 1962 plan offered some improvement over earlier Soviet
proposals but it too contained many one-sided "jokers," offered
inspection only "over disarmament,' and made little provision
for adequate peacekeeping arrangements in a disarmed world.
As it was amended in the spring, summer, and fall of 1962,
however, the Soviet GCD proposal came closer to offering an adequate
basis for future negotiations. Since the 1962 proposal, parti-
cularly as amended by September 1962, constituted the most
feasible Soviet program for GCD in the period under review, it
merits closer examination.
There were a number of ambiguities in the 1962 GCD proposal
that indicated a lack of serious attention to its consequences.
Some of the ambiguities would even redound to Western military 2
advantage, as witness some possible effects of implementing Stage I:
1lIbid., pp. 56-58.
2The following analysis is based in large part on Institute
for Strategic Studies, Disarmament and European Security (2 Vols.;
London, 1963), Vol. I, pp. 44 ff.
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1. The over-all force ceiling proposed suggested that the
reductions for NATO countries other than the United States would
be of the same proportion as for the United States itself. The
logic of this was that the forces of the Warsaw Pact countries
would be reduced by the same percentage as applied to the Soviet
Union. Since the percentage reduction of Soviet forces to a
level of 1.7 or 1.9 million men would exceed that of the United
States, the Soviet plan in effect discriminated against the entire
Warsaw Pact.
2. The Soviet 1962 plan specified that the reduction to
1.7 or 1.9 million men should apply to civilian as well as mili-
tary personnel in the armed forces. In that event U.S. forces
should have been numbered at 3.6 and not 2.6 million men. Never-
theless, Mr. Zorin in the negotiations said that U.S. forces were
to be reduced about 35 per cent, which would correspond to a reduc-
tion of the U.S. level exclusive of civilian employees.
3. The plan proposed that all submarines--not just those
that could fire missiles--should be classified as nuclear delivery
vehicles and therefore be abolished in Stage I. This view stretches
military facts to the point of naivete in order to demand the
abolition of the one class of naval weapons in which the Soviet
Union is predominant in numbers, if not in quality.
4. Moscow's refusal to specify the number of strategic
delivery vehicles in the "nuclear umbrella" also suggested a lack
of clarity, deepened by the fact that Moscow's plan did not pro-
pose to abolish any nuclear explosives in Stage I. These could
be delivered by commercial airliners, military transport planes,
and interceptors, all of which were not restricted in the Soviet plan.
The three most basic issues raised by the Soviet GCD plan
as amended in September 1962 were: (1) the implications of the
nuclear umbrella scheme; (2) the enhanced role of conventional
forces; (3) the necessity of an international enforcement and
peacekeeping machinery.
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1. Soviet acceptance of the nuclear umbrella principle in
September 1962 and extended in 1963 was an advance when measured
against the June 1960 and March 1962 position that all strategic
delivery systems should be abolished in Stage I. It seems
evident that any agreement to this principle would have to specify
both numbers of vehicles and megatonnage to be permitted. Assuming
such an agreement, the disadvantages of the principle for the West
would have been: (a) the consequent need to rely on massive
retaliation instead of graduated deterrence; (b) lowering Western
strategic forces more than Soviet; (c) encouraging the development
of ABM systems (since the permitted number of missiles might be
sufficiently small to be intercepted); and, (d) increasing the
role of conventional forces in which the Warsaw Pact countries
would, as discussed below, enjoy superiority in Europe.
The possible advantages of the nuclear umbrella for the West
were that it might (a) stabilize the arms race and encourage both
sides to think of their relationship in other than competing stra-
tegic terms; (b) limit the number of explosives that might be
detonated in case of an all-out war; (c) imply a system by which
other states were kept from building up their nuclear-missile
capability.
2. The drastic reduction of strategic nuclear forces would
increase the importance of conventional forces in East-West
relations. This would, however, work against the West, since
the Soviet plan would have forced the withdrawal of American
forces from all overseas bases. The Warsaw Pact would have been
left in Stage I with a numerical superiority in Europe of about
500,000 men, and half the remaining NATO forces would have consisted
of poorly armed Italian, Greek, and Turkish contingents. U.S.
troops would have been far removed from the danger zone of Central
Europe, but Soviet troops would have remained relatively close.
Communist countries could have trained their civilians in militia
and other reserve units more effectively than the Western
democracies. Finally, the withdrawal of American forces plus
Western reliance on a U.S. "nuclear umbrella" stationed outside
Europe might have seriously fragmented the NATO alliance.
The disadvantages of the Soviet GCD plan for Moscow were
that it proposed a larger percentage cut for Soviet troops than
for the U.S., and the withdrawal of foreign forces from foreign
bases, which might weaken Soviet influence in the people's
democracies.
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3. The impossibility of enforcing the abolition of nuclear
weapons and the permanent fact of unorthodox delivery systems made
nuclear disarmament possible (at least for Stages II and III)
only assuming that an international force could deal with any
remaining secret nuclear force. While the United States had not taken
an explicit stand on nuclear arms for a United Nations force,
Moscow explicitly refused to consider arming U.S. peacekeeping
forces with nuclear weapons and, more important, insisted upon
their oeing subject to great-power veto, even in Stage III.
In favor of the Soviet position was the argument that under
the "nuclear umbrella" the great powers could deter one another;
second, that an international peacekeeping force would be used
mainly to regulate disputes between smaller states thus saving
the superpowers from head-on confrontations in marginal areas.
It can only be concluded that the Soviet position on GCD,I
even as amended in 1962, was primarily designed for its propaganda
effect rather than for its negotiability. In Bechhoefer's words,
Moscow pursued a "two-pronged" approach: it sought the propaganda
gains of advocating GCD; at the same time it moved "in the
direction oL- partial measures that might be capable of immediate
negotiation. "1
2) Partial Measures.
a) Regional Arms Control and Surprise Attack. The
Kremlin's strategic interests in Central European disengagement
cannot be divorced from the political repercussions of such a
measure. In the event the West accepted some version of the Rapacki
Plan, U.S. and British forces would probably have to retire from
the continent and 'the threat from German "revanchism" would be
substantially reduced. For Moscow the threat of surprise attack,
escalation, accidental or catalytic war--possibly involving tactical
nuclear weapons--would be reduced. These strategic desiderata would
probably have been judged by Moscow as justifying whatever loss of
Soviet political influence occurred in Eastern Europe. After 1957
more than twenty Soviet divisions were concentrated in Eastern
Germany but only two or three in Poland, Hungary, and Rumania.
The most serious loss of Soviet influence would be in East Germany,
but that country was already an economic and political liability
and its possible defection from the socialist camp may have appeared
a small price to pay for the neutralization of all Germany. The
Bechhoefer, 2k. cit., p. 324.
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popularity of Communist institutions in other parts of Eastern
Europe was increasingly staked on a kind of "new course." Soviet
forces, in any event, would remain not distant even if they withdrew
from Poland, Hungary, and Rumania, and disengagement would not
affect the Soviet-based strategic forces that held Western Europe
hostage against the United States.
If, on the other hand, the West refused disengagement, Moscow
could still pose as the champion of peace, still tell Peking that
it opposed nuclear proliferation to Germany as well as China, and
still sow dissension among and within the Western governments.
Eastern Europe would still remain psychologically and militarily
dependent on the Soviet Union against the threat from a revisionist
West Germany, and, at the least, Communist propaganda for disengage-
ment would tend to complicate Western efforts to station NATO
forces in Germany and develop the Bundeswehr. The existence of
divergent views on disengagement among the Western elites probably
encouraged Moscow to continue its affirmations of support for
various versions of the Rapacki Plan.
We conclude that Moscow has, at least since 1956, favored
arms limitations in Central Europe, which, though potentially
dangerous to Soviet political influence there, would have admirably
promoted Soviet strategic interests. It would seem that if the
political risks of disengagement were high for the Soviet Union,
the West should have been more interested in such measures, in
spite of the strategic and political complications for NATO. The
revised Rapacki Plan of 1958 went far even toward accommodating
Western complaints about the strategic imbalance that would result
from merely denuclearizing the zone. But while there was a trend
toward feasibility in Soviet-endorsed disengagement proposals, we
cannot pass judgment here on whether some variant of the Eden or
Rapacki Plans may have been negotiable, for many strategists and
political analysts in the West have argued the case pro and con,
and the ultimate judgment on such matters would involve major
assumptions about the role that Germany should play in NATO. What
is clear is that by 1959 the governments in Washington, Bonn, and
Paris had demonstrated an almost complete lack of interest in
further discussion of disengagement in central Europe. After
1959, therefore, even though Moscow might still have been willing
to negotiate on regional arms control in Central Europe, its
proposals could be only for propaganda purposes.
b) Curbs on Testing and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.
A number of military considerations militated for a cessation of
nuclear testing, if not a formal treaty. One probably constant
objective of Soviet policy was to prevent or impede the spread of
nuclear weapons, whether by wider establishment of U.S. bases on
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foreign soil or by acquisition or development of nuclear weapons by
nth countries. Soviet propaganda and negotiating behavior endeavored
to create a climate inimical to wider deployment and proliferation
even if no moratorium or treaty were signed.
Many examples may be cited. The early 1956 emphasis on
banning thermonuclear tests was probably aimed at complicating
Britain's plans to test a hydrogen bomb. A more serious Soviet
concern has been to keep nuclear weapons out of Germany, and Soviet
test ban proposals have usually been paralleled by additional plans
for denuclearization programs. France's entry into the nuclear club
seems to have been treated by Moscow as a foregone conclusion, but
Soviet propaganda backed African protests against French plans to
test in the Sahara. And by the establishment in Dubna in 1956 of
a research center for peaceful uses of atomic energy Moscow may
have hoped to sublimate, as it were, the aspirations of the
Communist countries for nuclear military power--especially China.
For Soviet anxieties about nuclear proliferation to Germany
were probably matched or surpassed by Moscow's desire to keep
nuclear weapons from China, and the entire burden of Soviet pro-
paganda against nuclear proliferation in the West could also be
used to justify the Kremlin's denial of military assistance to
Communist countries, above all, to China. This argument was
explicitly used in Soviet polemics with Peking in 1963-1964.
Whatever the facts about the alleged Soviet agreement in 1957 to
provide China with a "new defense technology," Moscow does not
appear to have been anxious to deliver to China the wherewithal to
produce an atomic bomb or even to place nuclear-rocket weapons
in Chinese hands. By June 1959, in any event, the Soviet Union
apparently refused China a "sample atomic bomb and technical data
concerning its manufacture."I
Early in 1959 Moscow agreed that the first article of a draft
test ban treaty should allow all countries to accede, thereby
dropping an earlier position that the test ban treaty should be
limited to the three existing nuclear powers. Further, the
differences in Soviet and Chinese statements during 1959
concerning the nature and desirability of a nuclear-free Far
East suggest that Moscow was pushing Peking toward a commitment
the latter sought to avoid. Finally, on August 25, 1962 the
Soviet government is reported to have notified China that it would
enter into a nonproliferation agreement with the United States
that had been proposed by Secretary of State Rusk. (Press reports
in 1964, however, indicated that Moscow had turned down a U.S.
proposal in August 1963 to act jointly to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons. )
'The withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China in 1960
certainly injured China's industrial and technological capacity, thus
at least indirectly affecting Peking's nuclear program.
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As for the value of further testing to enhance the strategic
balance, it could have produced changes in the crucial ratios of
yield-to-weight and fission-to-fusion. Improvement of the yield-
to-weight ratio would permit lighter and smaller warheads for a
variety of military purposes, such as allowing rockets of moderate
thrust to deliver warheads of higher yields. By reducing the
fission-to-fusion ratio it would be possible to develop weapons
with little or no radioactive fallout. Any efforts to develop an
ABM capability would also have required some nuclear-rocket
testing.
By the time Moscow proposed a moratorium on all testing in
March 1958 the Soviet government may have concluded that its lead
in rocketry, and perhaps in nuclear weapons development as well,
might justify a ban on all testing. First, since the Soviet Union
could shoot larger payloads into space Moscow may have reasoned
that it should strive to inhibit warhead miniaturization by the
United States. Second, a test cessation would slow down the
development of nuclear weapons of limited explosive yield, mini-
mum radiation effects, and high mobility, thus inhibiting the
development of improved tactical weapons for possible use in limited
war, especially in Europe. Soviet theory, it should be noted,
stressed the virtual impossibility of fighting a "limited" war with
tactical nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union for its part has shown
only modest interest in carrying on underground testing, since 1
it relied more on massive retaliation than on gradual response.
All these considerations help to explain Moscow's refusal during
the period to accept a partial test ban that permitted underground
testing.
1The total number of tests and the megatonnage exploded from
July 16, 1945 to September 24, 1963 has been calculated by the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, based largely on AEC data.
Tests Megatonnage
U.S. and U.K. 332 161
U.S.S.R. 145 350
France 6 0.1
The fact that the U.S. and U.K. test total is double the Soviet,
with megatonnage less than half suggests the relative emphasis of
the West on large numbers of low-yield weapons and of Moscow on
lesser numbers of higher-yield weapons. (Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, November, 1963, p. 44.)
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By 1961 another situation had developed. Although the
Soviet Union retained superiority in the ability to lift heavy
payloads into space, the United States was producing far more
nuclear delivery systems than Russia; this fact more than the
Berlin crisis probably lay behind Moscow's decision to resume
testing in 1961. After the 1961 Soviet tests in September and
October a panel of experts appointed by President Kennedy to
evaluate Soviet progress agreed that "although the United States
retained an overall lead in nuclear weaponry, the Soviet Union
had made important cuts into the American leads and might have
surpassed the United States in certain categories of weapons."i
The evidence suggested that the 1961 tests had allowed the Soviets
to reduce weight-to-yield ratios, increase the absolute yield of
warheads, reduce the size of the fission trigger, 2and test new
weapon designs under simulated combat conditions.
After the Soviet test series Moscow claimed on November 6,
1961 that because the West had conducted about two and a half times
as many tests as the Soviet Union, the latter had the "full moral
right. . .to redress the balance." Publicly announced totals at
that time were: United States, 176; Britain, 21; France, 4--for a
Western total of 201 compared with 86 for the Soviet Union. 3 But
President Kennedy stated on November 8, 1961 that the Soviet Union's
total megatonnage tested was about 170, whereas the U.S.-U.K.-
French total was about 126.
Following the U.S. and Soviet tests in 1962 Washington's
appraisal was that the strategic balance still favored the West.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs testi-
fied in January 1963 that a comprehensive test ban would be in the
U.S. national interest for four reasons: First, if nuclear testing
by both the United States and the Soviet Union continued there
would be increases in the efficiency of higher yield weapons and
the United States lead in light, high-yield weapons would diminish.
Second, the trend with unlimited testing would be toward equality
in strategic nuclear forces. Third, continued testing would give
Moscow the opportunity to match, in time, the West's more diversi-
fied arsenal of tactical weapons. Finally, g4eater nuclear proli-
feration would result from unlimited testing.
1Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 254.
2 New York Times, December 8, 1961.
3Ciro Elliott Zoppo, The Test Ban: A Study in Arms Control Negotia-
tion (Columbia University, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 1963), p. 471.
4 Testimony of Paul H. Nitze before the Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Forces, U.S. Senate, in hearings
held January 24-30, 1963.
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If Moscow's concern to halt nuclear testing was motivated
partially by a desire not to pollute the atmosphere, this desidera-
tum was clearly subordinate to military concerns because the
Kremlin repeatedly rejected Western proposals that would have
stopped atmospheric testing but either allowed underground testing
to continue or prohibit it, provided intensive inspection schemes
were established.
Moscow's interest in a test moratorium in 1958 had flowed from
a confidence that the Soviets were "ahead" in key areas and that a
suspension of testing would keep the United States from making import-
ant improvements in its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. This
calculation failed to take into account the great numbers of
nuclear delivery systems produced and deployed by the United States,
which turned the "missile gap" against the Soviet Union. Attempting
to redress the balance, at least psychologically, Moscow proceeded
in 1961 to explode warheads much larger than any tested by the United
States. Although some observers doubted the utility of such large
warheads (or at least the ability of U.S. rockets to lift such heavy
payloads), the Soviet Union appeared to achieve a kind of parity
once more with the United States.
The importance of the 1961 test series in Soviet eyes--either
militarily or politically, or both--was reflected in a Soviet
statement following the 1963 Moscow treaty to the effect that
neither side "gained" from the partial test ban, but that if either
party benefited, it was the Soviet Union, which possessed much
larger warheads than the United States.
It is impossible to know with certainty whether or not Moscow
genuinely sought a test ban prior to 1963. The burden of available
evidence suggests that the Kremlin sought at least a de facto
cessation of nuclear testing as early as 1957 and probably would
have agreed to a test ban treaty then, provided intrusion by inter-
national inspection could be kept to a low level. The 1957-1961
trend toward a narrowing of East-West differences was spurred by
concessions on both sides and by technological improvements that
facilitated control of a test ban with minimal intrusion by
inspectors in foreign territory. The greatest stumbling block was
the issue of underground testing, and the West had a greater interest
than Moscow in such testing and was more insistent on effective
control than Moscow. The political price and loss of strategic
secrecy decidedly created major difficulties for Moscow.
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2. The External Political Situation
A distinct correlation between the shift in Soviet arms
control policy and a broader turn toward softer modalities in
Soviet foreign policy as a whole could be observed in 1954-1956.
From 1956 to 1962, however, the basic patterns of Soviet foreign
policy were more complex and their impact on Soviet arms control
policy more difficult to discern. It seems useful to recall that
Soviet foreign policy throughout these years was increasingly
engaged in a two-front campaign. Its successes and failures on
one front would naturally interact with and affect its policies
on the other front. Soviet arms control policy--because of its
far-reaching military, political, and other implications--was
naturally caught up in this two-front struggle.
As we turn to consider the Kremlin's "view to the West"
and its "view to the East," therefore, we must remember that
the problems on both fronts impacted simultaneously on policy-
making in Moscow.
Further, as we look at Soviet policy on these two main
fronts we should bear in mind that the general picture that
emerges was profoundly influenced by the strategic problems
facing the Soviet leadership, and by economic factors which we
have yet to consider. The foundations on which the Soviet
government had believed itself able to negotiate from strength
were rapidly being eroded in 1960 and 1961, thereby introducing
a note of desperation into Soviet relations on both fronts not
seen during the immediate post-Sputnik years or indeed during
the 1955 period.
a. The View to the West. Two interlocking assumptions
characterized the Kremlin's world view in this period, especially
after 1959. The first was expanding awareness of diversity among
the Western elites', accompanied by the growing belief that
"compromise" need not constitute betrayal to the Soviet cause
but rather a useful way of promoting it. Both can be seen
as having contributed importantly to Soviet policy on arms
control and disarmament, and in fact the Kremlin's image of the
West came to be a weightier determinant of that policy in the
period under review than it had been in 1955.
The Kremlin's "real" perception of the West and the
"official" Soviet image of the adversary continued to play a
decisive role in the formation of Soviet arms control policy,
as it had in 1954-1956. In order to strive even for detente,
not to speak of arms controls, the Kremlin had to believe that
moderate forces in the Western leadership might respond favorably
to Soviet initiatives.
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As Moscow viewed the role played by hard-liners close to
the centers of power in the West, the Kremlin was probably doubtful
about the possibilities of far-reaching disarmament measures with
the West (on the assumption Moscow wanted such measures), but
remained hopeful that East-West detente was relatively feasible.
Nevertheless, Soviet disarmament policies were generally keyed to
appeal to influential opinion in the West, especially to those
who might exert the most direct influence on policy. The after-
math of the 1955 Summit Conference indicated to Moscow that
Eisenhower was a man of peace, surrounded however by advisers
who kept him from following his natural inclinations toward
conciliation of East-West differences. The East European
uprisings in 1956 soured Soviet relations with the West for a
time, but demonstrated that even the United States would not
act with force to "roll back" the Iron Curtain. Paradoxically,
but none the less strikingly, Moscow and Washington even found
themselves supporting the same side in the Suez crisis in 1957
and, increasingly, India against China. Washington's response
to the Lebanon crisis in 1958 and, later that year, the Soviet
pressure on Berlin indicated that the West intended to "hold
fast," regardless of talk about a missile gap.
By mid-1959 the Soviet government had intensified its
manifest and probably its real commitment to negotiation and
compromise with the West. Behind this inflection in Soviet
policy lay a number of probable factors--Mikoyan's personal
observations while visiting the United States in January, the
deepening rift between Moscow and Peking, the apparent self-
confidence that underlay the new Seven-Year Plan adopted early
in 1959, the passing of Secretary Dulles in May. Reflecting
the new accent in Soviet foreign policy, Moscow intensified
its effort for an East-West summit meeting (which might produce
symbolic as well as tangible results). On June 20, 1959, Moscow
is said to have refused China nuclear weapons assistance. On
July 27 the first of a series of Lenin documents on cultivating
the "pacifist" bourgeoisie were passed to the press, the importance
of which reference is discussed below.
Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September 1959
seemed to reinforce the Soviet line that negotiations were
possible with the West. On October 31, 1959, he told the Supreme
Soviet: "To put it bluntly, under peaceful coexistence states
must meet each other halfway in the interests of peace." Khrushchev
supported his argument by pointing out that the West had made
concessions in dealing with socialist states, even though Western
governments were opposed to socialism.1 Again, in announcing
1CDSP, No. 44, 1959, p. 3.
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a unilateral reduction of Soviet armed forces on January 14, 1960
Khrushchev stated before the Supreme Soviet:
While in the U.S.A. we became convinced that the most
farsighted statesmen, businessmen, and representatives
of the American intelligentsia . . . want not a
continuation of the arms race and further exacerbation
of nerves but tranquillity and peace.'
The distinction between "sober-minded" and militaristic forces in
the U.S. "ruling circles" was painted even more vividly elsewhere
in the Soviet press. 2
In April 1960, on the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth, CPSU
Presidium Member Otto Kuusinen affirmed the existence of both
moderate and aggressive forces in the West. He declared that a
variety of factors had caused differences of opinion to develop
in Western "ruling circles":
The dichotomy in influential bourgeois circles is
unquestionably significant for the success of the
struggle for peace. Even in his time, Lenin pointed
out that it is not a matter of indifference to us
whether we deal with representatives of the bourgeois
camp who gravitate toward a military solution of the
question or with those representatives of the bourgeois class
who gravitate toward pacifism . . . .3
At this same time the Soviet publication New Times produced an
article giving a partial presentation of the 1922 Lenin documents
on the Soviet disarmament and peace program made at the Genoa
Economic Conference, published the previous year in Lenin
Miscellany (available only in Russian). Although some communists
were presumably aware that these documents envisaged a purely
instrumental use of a conciliatory disarmament posture in order
lIbid., No. 2, 1960, p. 8. Khrushchev added: "Any sensible
person in the West who is a stranger to aggressive aspirations will
reason approximately thus: 'Why should we increase our armed forces
when the Soviet Union is undertaking a drastic reduction of its
armed forces?'"
See K. Semyonov, "Obstruction Tactics Continue," International
Affairs, No. 8, 1959, p. 13; Editorial, "The Burning Problem of Today,"
ibid., No. 2, 1960, pp. 3-4; and L. Gromov and V. Strigachov, "The
Arms Race: Dangers and Consequences," ibid., No. 12, 1960, p. 18.
3 Pravda, April 23, 1960.
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to split Western elites, the New Times article in 1960 took them
as evidence of traditional Soviet commitment to negotiated
disarmament and coexistence.'
After going out on a limb regarding the potential of the Camp
David spirit, there is some evidence that Khrushchev was embarrassed
by Eisenhower's acceptance of personal responsibility for the U-2
flight. Nonetheless, while Khrushchev chose to break up the Paris
Summit meeting, he indicated that the Soviet Union was not
rejecting all negotiations, and added that it would be desirable
to hold negotiations in six or eight months when the international
atmosphere had cleared and the United States had elected a new
president.
The Kremlin seems to have viewed Kennedy's advent to power with
cautious optimism, and probably preferred it to a Nixon victory.3
The December 1960 Statement of 81 Communist parties 4 and the January
6, 1961 address by Khrushchev explicitly included statements that
peaceful coexistence was favored by a definite section of the
Western bourgeoisie--a section that Khrushchev said must be "used."5
These assertions, of course, probably had as much to do with the
Sino-Soviet dispute as with the Kremlin's view of the West or of
Kennedy in particular, but it is significant that Moscow continued
to make them in the months following the U-2 incident.
1 A. Leonidov, "The Making of a New Diplomacy, t" New Times, No. 14,
April 1960.
2N. S. Khrushchev, statement, CDSP, No. 20, 1960, p. 5. In his
speech in East Berlin after leaving Paris, Khrushchev was willing to
state: "If we can't get a working agreement or the settlement of dis-
puted international issues with the present leaders of the U.S.A. or
with the president who takes over from Eisenhower, we'll wait until the
president after that." Ibid., No. 21, 1960, p. 4. See also: Editorial,
"The People Demand: Curb the Aggressor and Ensure Lasting Peace,"
World Marxist Review. No. 6, 1960, p. 5; and Editorial, "A Policy of
Perfidy," International Affairs, No. 6, 1960, pp. 3-4.
3 See B. Marushkin, "Post-Election Thoughts," ibid., No. 1, pp. 50-
54; L. Gromov and V. Strigachov, "The Arms Race: Dangers and Consequences,
loc. cit.; Commentator, "After the Elections, the Selection," Pravda,
November 10, 1960, in CDSP. No. 45, 1960, p. 22. A more pessimistic
view is expressed in Joseph North, "On the Eve of the U.S. Elections,"
International Affairs, No. 11, 1960, pp. 35-40; D. Kraminov, "New Tactics,
Old Policy," Za rubezhom, February 25, 1961, p. 13, in CDSP, No. 10, 1961,
p. 29.
4 The Sino-Soviet Dispute, o. cit., p. 189.
5CDSP, No. 4, 1961, p. 11.
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The year 1961 was not propitious for Soviet recognition of
"moderates" in the West. The new Kennedy administration came out
with an increased defense budget; backed a major Soviet defeat
in the Congo; allowed an invasion of Cuba with U.S. support;
gave no ground in a Vienna meeting with Khrushchev; and matched
or exceeded Soviet shows of force in Berlin. At the same time
Moscow's relations with Albania and Communist China grew more
strained as their polemics intensified. All these events conspired
to limit the Soviet freedom of action in dealing with the West on
problems of arms control, although as we have noted there was some
conciliatory Soviet behavior on the Joint Statement of Agreed
Principles in September 1961. Thus, Khrushchev told the Twenty-
Second Party Congress in October 1961 that it would be "the gravest
of mistakes" to imagine that "the imperialists have been brought
to their senses." 1  And yet, in lifting the December 31, 1961
deadline for a Berlin settlement, he conceded that the "Western
powers" had shown a "certain understanding of the situation. . .
and were disposed to seek a settlement." 2 Moreover, in antagonistic
language he emphasized his main theme that Western leaders were
taking a more reasonable approach to foreign relations.
3
The ambivalence in Khrushchev's remarks in October 1961 proved
to be almost symbolic of the vacillation and drift already noted in
Soviet foreign policy generally in 1962. Moscow seemed unsure
whether to emphasize a militant or a conciliatory line in dealing
with its adversaries to the East and to the West. This vacillation
was reflected in disarmament talks, whether Moscow accepted in
principle and then rejected an agreement on its proposal to ban
war propaganda. Similarly, Soviet media and spokesmen alternated
in presenting an image of a homogeneous or heterogeneous adversary
in the West.
"IReport by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU, October 17, 1961," Pravda, October 18,
1961 in CDSP, Vol. XIII, No. 41 (November 8, 1961).
2Report of the Central Committee, CPSU, given by Khrushchev,
Pravda and Izvestia, October 18, 1961, in Current Soviet Policies,
IV (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 50-51. Cf.
Gromyko's address of October 25 to the Congress, Pravda,
October 28, 1961.
3
"Concluding remarks by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, First
Secretary of the Party Central Committee at the Twenty-Second Party
Congress., October 27, 1961," Pravda, October 29, 1961, in CDSP.,
Vol. XIII, No. 40 (December 13, 1961).
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In March 1962 the CPSU turned again to publishing Lenin's
views on manipulating elite differences in the West with the use of
the disarmament issue. This move, it should be noted, paralleled
the opening of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. 1
Kommunist also came out in March 1962 with an article signed by
A. Arzumanyan, which obliquely referred to the desirability of
exploiting elite differences in the West. 2 And in April 1962
Pravda and Izvestia also printed photographs of the 1959 documentation,
and added new archival materials on the decision-making process
for the Genoa conference in 1922. In May 1962 the Soviet line
toward Yugoslavia warmed again, an indicator of a possibly more
manipulative and softer orientation in Soviet policy generally. 3
As noted earlier, the months of June and July also saw United States-
Soviet agreements on scientific cooperation in outer space and, more
importantly, on Laos. They also saw an exceptionally clear
statement of the need to differentiate in dealing with Western elites, 4
which appeared in the Soviet journal for the world communist movement.
At the same time, however, Khrushchev's election speech of
March 10, 1962 had threatened the United States with a new "global
rocket" capable of evading American warning systems and "invulnerable"
to anti-missile missiles; the Berlin issue continued to be agitated
by the Soviet press; and, as the decision was made in the summer of
1962 to place Soviet missiles in Cuba, the Soviet press stressed
the existence of a war danger arising from United States provocations
in the Caribbean. This ambivalence in the Kremlin's private and
public image of the West was not to be resolved until after the
Cuban missile crisis, when Moscow seemed to have concluded that the
United States was militarily strong and politically resolute, but
also stood ready to cooperate in reciprocal actions to keep peace
and minimize tensions, and, where possible, enter specific
agreements of arms control.
On balance, the image the Soviet leadership held of the West
had gained much in sophistication and was deepened by personal
contacts. The decline in black-and-white dichotomies in the Soviet
1L. Bezymensky and N. Matkovsky, "The Peaceful Coexistence
Policy--Early Beginnings," New Times. No. 11, March 14, 1962.
2A. Arzumanyan, 'Yernyi put' obespecheniia prochnogo mira
mezhdu narodami," Kommunist, No. 4, March, 1962.
3 See, for example, Pravda, May 17, 1962.
4 Adam Rapacki, "Socialist Diplomacy of Peace in the World
Arena," World Marxist Review, No. 6 (June), 1962.
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view of the West had great importance for the prospects of detente
and arms control. Increased contacts between statesmen, scientists,
students, and the like reinforced the broad desire on both sides
to minimize tensions which could lead to war. Of special
significance for arms control, Soviet writing on this subject
increased both in quantity and quality since about 1959, and
showed a much greater familiarity with Western publications than
in previous times, and rapport grew in certain areas of discussion
between Soviet and Western writers on arms control and military
strategy.
The Kremlin continued to perceive both hard and moderate
elements in the Western "ruling circles," whose relative weight
could be modified by Soviet behavior. What was new, however, was
the increasing public and ideological commitment which the Soviet
government made to working with moderates in the West. It became
increasingly important for the Kremlin to be correct in its
calculation that the capitalist adversary would agree to modulate
the cold war and make reasonable compromises with the Soviet camp.
For if this calculation proved wrong, all the skeptics in Peking
and those in Moscow could hold it against First Secretary Khrushchev
and his associates. The Soviet leadership, in this sense, had an
increasing stake in proving the viability of "peaceful coexistence."
This strategy, we have seen, denoted both "struggle" and "cooperation."
If the one aspect did not strike pay-dirt, fulfillment of the second
might compensate.
b. The View to the East. There was little evidence that
China played any significant role in the decisions which brought
on the shift in Soviet arms control policy in 1954-1955. But as
early as February 1956 and certainly by the second half of 1957,
the state of Sino-Soviet relations became a key determinant of
the twists and turns of Soviet foreign policy generally and toward
arms control in particular. The period under study was one of
steady deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, precisely in those
areas which would most affect arms control policy, most prominently
featuring steadily increasing Chinese opposition to Soviet detente
and disarmament policy.
The inducements toward accommodation with the West resulting
from the Chinese political and--in the long run--potential military
threat seems to have been much more decisive than the restraints
which flowed from Moscow's interest in keeping its most powerful
ally within the fold.
The Chinese date the downturn of Sino-Soviet relations from
the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, while Moscow dates it from
the Chinese ideological attacks of April and June 1960. One
Western analyst sees the dispute as virtually irreparable after
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the summer of 1959 (subject however to a shift of leadership).
In any event, Moscow appears after 1959 to have decided to run
whatever risks would be involved in pursuing its own course toward
the West regardless of Chinese opposition. Although there were
moments of lessened hostility, divergent power political interests,
ideological differences, and personal frictions moved Sino-Soviet
relations almost inexorably toward an open rift.
According to Peking Moscow had been "correct" until 1956 in
calling for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, and China
supported this view. But at the Twentieth Congress Khrushchev had
stated Russia would stop testing if other nuclear powers followed
suit, and stressed that implementation of "such measures could
pave the way to agreement on other more intricate aspects of
disarmament." (At the DCSC on March 27, 1956, Khrushchev's lead
was followed by Gromyko's proposal for a hydrogen bomb test ban
as a partial measure which could be implemented without inspection.)
In Chinese eyes Khrushchev "divorced the cessation of nuclear tests
from the question of disarmament. Subsequently [the CPSU leaders]
were wrong on certain issues and correct on others, and we supported
them in all their correct views." 2 And while Chinese objections
to the ideological revisionism of Khrushchev were probably more
muted in 1956 than Peking later suggested there can be little doubt
that the Chinese leadership was dismayed at the vigor of the Soviet
Union's economic and political march into the third world, especially
since it was literally at China's expense.
Despite this early evidence of a Soviet interest in stopping
the spread of nuclear weapons, the Chinese leadership decided in 1956
to depend on a transitional military strategy which required heavy
reliance on the Soviet Union. Chinese hopes for Soviet nuclear
assistance may have been fanned by Moscow's 1955 plan for sharing
Soviet experience in the peaceful uses of atomic energy with the
Communist bloc. By mid-1957 ten Chinese scientists were engaged
in research in high-energy physics at the Joint Institute in Dubna.
A research reactor and cyclotron, which the Soviet Union promised
China in 1955, finally began operation in mid-1958.3
William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.:
The M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 18 and 29.
Chinese statement of August 15, 1963, in ibid., p. 352.
3
Anne M. Jonas "The Soviet Union and the Atom: Peaceful
Sharing, 1954-1958" (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND Corporation, RM-2290,
November 20, 1958), p. 88.
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The strengthening of Khrushchev's personal position and the
intensified Soviet commitment to Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence
line which followed the removal of the "anti-party group" in 1957
took place at the same time as the Soviet Union demonstrated its
new military might by the successful launching of an ICBM in August
and Sputnik I in October 1957. These dramatic feats suggested to
Peking that the time had come for a more forward political strategy
by the Communist camp; it turned out that Peking drew more radical
conclusions from these successes than Moscow. For Mao Tse-tung,
the ICBM test meant that the balance of forces had shifted in favor
of the Communist camp; the East wind was now prevailing over the West
wind. Soviet statements on the other hand averred only that the
balance had turned in favor of the Communist bloc. The evidence
suggested that Peking, convinced that the over-all strength of
socialism outweighed that of imperialism, "was not hesitant to
jump the gun on Moscow in an effort to exploit the full significance
of these developments in order to further Chinese aspirations."i
At the same time, Peking may have been encouraged at least
temporarily to exercise restraint in its relations with Moscow
by a Soviet commitment that, Peking later implied, bound Moscow
to help China develop nuclear weapons. The primary source is a
Chinese statement of August 15, 1963:
As far back as June 20, 1959, when there was not yet
the slightest sign of a treaty on stopping nuclear tests,
the Soviet government unilaterally tore up the agreement
on new technology for national defense concluded between
China and the Soviet Union on October 15, 1957, and
refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb
and technical data concerning its manufacture. This was
done as a presentation gift at the time the Soviet leader
went to the United States for talks with Eisenhower in
September.2
Although there was little sign from the Chinese-Soviet
scientific and military negotiations of late 1957 and early 1958
that Moscow had agreed to assist the Chinese with a nuclear military
capacity, we do know that a large delegation of Chinese scientists
headed by the president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences was in
the Soviet Union from October 18, 1957 (three days after the pact
is supposed to have been signed) to January 18, 1958 and that during
1I
Hsieh, og. cit., p. 85.
2 Document in Griffith, OP. cit., p. 351.
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this period agreement was reached for joint Soviet-Chinese
scientific research in 1958-1962 on 122 different items. Later
reports indicated the key fields in this research would be physics
and the peaceful uses of atomic energy.' A hint that military
matters were also involved in these negotiations came on November 6,
1957, when a high-level Chinese mission left for Moscow without
prior publicity. Mao Tse-tung was also in Moscow in November and
conferred with Khrushchev. Although different emphases in speeches
by P'eng Teh-huai and Malinovsky on November 27, 1957, suggested
that Moscow had not yet committed itself to providing nuclear
weapons to China, 2 the Chinese Foreign Minister in May 1958 gave
the first public indication that his country planned to produce
nuclear weapons. A possible Soviet aid commitment in late 1957
or early 1958 might have taken the form of initiating (or
intensifying) Soviet scientific and technological assistance to
the Chinese nuclear weapons program. Such a commitment might well
have been ambiguous, qualified, and long in term; it might have
been tied to the 122-point scientific cooperation program agreed
on in January 1958.
Soviet reluctance to aid China's nuclear program was no doubt
deepened by Peking's independent course in domestic and foreign
policy as dramatically manifested in August-September 1958 in the
bombardment of Quemoy and the initiation of the "great leap forward."
The date of June 20, 1959 assigned by China to Moscow's refusal
to provide a sample bomb is consonant with the Soviet stress at
that time on nuclear-free zones to which Peking was responding
cooly. The timing of the refusal is also consistent with the
Soviet broadcast to North America on June 12 assailing the
"Washington claim" that the test ban under negotiation could not be
trusted because China would not be a signatory. The broadcast
accused Washington of persisting in this refusal "in order to have 3
an excuse for getting out of all kinds of international agreements."
After the Sino-Indian border conflict of September 1959, and
Khrushchev's visits to Camp David and Peking, the Chinese began
increasingly to criticize Khrushchev's pursuit of East-West d~tente
and disarmament. In February 1960 the magazine China Youth called
disarmament an "impractical fantasy" since the imperialists would
never disarm themselves. In April 1960 came the Chinese broadside
entitled "Long Live Leninism'" Imperialism had not changed since
sHiieh, o2. cit., pp. 100-101.
2'Ibid., p. 102.
3International Service, Moscow, June 14, 1959.
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Lenin's day, it was asserted, and to attempt to negotiate
disarmament or a relaxation of tensions was to mislead the people.
The U-2 incident seemed somewhat to vindicate the Chinese image
of the West. But Moscow continued in the following months to uphold
its view that some members of the Western "ruling circles" took a
sober and reasonable approach to East-West relations. Khrushchev
now recalled Soviet specialists from China, sharply reduced Soviet
trade with China, and reportedly tried to overthrow the Albanian
leadership.
Following the attempted settlement at the 81-party meeting
in Moscow in November 1960 there was an apparent lull in Sino-Soviet
relations in 1961. This was shattered, however, at the Twenty-Second
CPSU Congress in October when Khrushchev denounced Albania, later
breaking off diplomatic relations with Tirana. From March to
September, 1962 another outward lull seemed to prevail--a period
of curious ambivalence in Soviet policy.
In late August 1962, however, according to Chinese sources,
Moscow informed Peking of a decision to inhibit the spread of
nuclear weapons:
On August 25, 1962, two days before the United
States and Britain put forward their draft treaty on
the partial halting of nuclear tests, the Soviet
Government notified China that U.S. Secretary Rusk
had proposed an agreement stipulating that, firstly,
the nuclear powers should undertake to refrain from
transferring nuclear weapons and technical information
concerning their manufacture to non-nuclear countries,
and that, secondly, the countries not in possession
of nuclear weapons should undertake to refrain from
manufacturing them, from seeking them from the nuclear
powers or from accepting technical information concerning
their manufacture. The Soviet Government gave an
affirmative reply to this proposal of Rusk's.
The Chinese Government sent three memoranda to
the Soviet Government, on September 3, 1962, October 20,
1962, and June 6, 1963, stating that it was a matter
for the Soviet Government whether it committed itself
to the United States to refrain from transferring nuclear
1
For text, see G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick
MacFarquhar,The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1961), pp. 82-112.
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weapons and technical information concerning their manu-
facture to China; but that the Chinese Government hoped
the Soviet Government would not infringe on China's
sovereign rights and act for China in assuming an
obligation to refrain from manufacturing nuclear
weapons. We solemnly stated that we would not tolerate
the conclusion, in disregard of China's opposition, of
any sort of treaty between the Soviet Government and the
United States which aimed at depriving the Chinese
people of their right to take steps to resist the
nuclear threats of U.S. imperialism, and that we
would issue statements to make our position known.
As a kind of corroboration of Peking's assertions, People's
Daily charged on September 12, 1962 that the United States was
obstructing the progress of the ENDC by demanding on-site inspec-
tions. But the article went on to indicate a deeper concern.
The U.S.-U.K. statement on testing, said People's Daily, declared
that the "treaty would make it easier to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing them. . . . The
reason U.S. ruling circles are so interested in preventing what
they call nuclear proliferation is not secret. . . . Washington
is anxious to tie China's hands in developing nuclear weapons."
People's Daily went on to say that "only a complete ban on
nuclear weapons and the unconditional destruction of all
existing nuclear weapons can prevent a nuclear war. . . .The
discontinuation of nuclear tests . . . should under no
circumstances become a means by which the United States may
achieve and maintain nuclear superiority."2
Did Moscow--as Peking alleges--inform the Chinese leadership
on August 25, 1962, that it would sign a nonproliferation agreement
with the United States? The Soviet rejection of the comprehensive
and partial treaty alternatives proposed by Washington on August 27,
1962, gave no such clue. But, as we shall see, the Soviet
negotiating position did shift slightly on August 29 and September 3,
1962, and Moscow's subsequent advocacy of the "black box" idea and the
return to three on-site inspections quota in the winter of 1962-1963
suggested that the Kremlin may have sought to move the test ban talks
from a standstill.
lDocument of August 15, 1963, in Griffith, pp. cit., p. 351.
New China News Agency, Peking, September 12, 1962. This
policy statement crowned a series of declarations on disarmament
in which nuclear test cessation was generally made dependent on
the banning of nuclear weapons. See Zoppo, 02. cit., p. 385.
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On balance, one is left with the impression that the
"nuclear war" problem and the "Chinese comrades" problem were
proceeding for the Soviet on parallel tracks, as it were, and
that what in fact was happening during this period was that
the Soviets continued to give paramountcy to the "threat of war"
problem, but perhaps were becoming increasingly uneasy at the
growing potential threat to the East. This took concrete form
in adding to the urgency behind Moscow's interest in obtaining
an end to nuclear testing and to nuclear spread. Consciously
or not, the Kremlin's sense of common interest with the Governments of
the industrialized and status quo nations of the West was no doubt
deepened as the Weltanschauung and strategy favored by Peking
parted from that of Moscow. If a choice had to be made, it appeared
increasingly that Moscow would prefer to alienate China than to
forego opportunities for policy successes in the West--especially
if they helped to keep China from obtaining nuclear weapons or
if they undermined the "dogmatist" line on the unchanging nature
of imperialism in the international Communist debate.
c. Implications for Policy. The major objective of Soviet
disarmament policy in the period 1956-1962 remained, as in the 1954-
1956 period, the promotion of the Soviet Union's security interests,
with or without the enactment of East-West agreements on arms control.
But there was this decisive difference: after 1956 the Soviet regime
realized it was locked in a serious engagement on its eastern as
well as on its western flank, and that a "hard" or "soft" move on
one front would react and interact with events on the other. Before
considering Moscow's political interest in various measures we should
consider the role that Soviet arms control policy could play in the
over-all thrust of Soviet foreign policy in this period, first in
dealing with the West and then in the international Communist
movement.
1) In Dealings with the West. How did Moscow's disarmament
policies tie in with the increased bargaining power accruing to
the Kremlin from the alleged "missile gap?" While there was no
simple "post-Sputnik offensive" pushing inexorably to force a
Western retreat, there were soft and hard facets in Soviet policy,
both of which sometimes served offensive and at other times defensive
functions. Similarly Soviet arms control policy could function
either in a basically soft, a hard, or a combined soft and hard
policy for either an offensive or defensive objective. Examples
may illustrate the diverse ways in which arms control proposals
served Soviet purposes.
First, at times when Moscow employed primarily soft modal-
ities to relax East-West tensions, arms control proposals served
to strengthen the peace-loving image of the Soviet Union, to
relax tensions, and to help persuade moderates in the West to
move their governments toward detente. Such was generally the
pattern from 1956 to mid-1960.
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When Moscow reverted to a harsher line and to threats to
obtain political objectives, Soviet disarmament proposals could
provide a soft alternative, to suggest that acquiescence to Mos-
cow's political demands could be rewarded by an enhancement of
peace and improved control of dangerous situations. Thus pressure
for a German peace treaty was accompanied in November 1958, by
another version of the Rapacki Plan, which offered a reasonable
appearing arms control arrangement that could parallel a political
settlement of the German problem.1
Third, arms control policy could be a soft tactic designed
to thwart a tough Western response to hard modalities of Soviet
foreign policy. Thus when Moscow was on the defensive over Hungary
and was engaged in a limited offensive regarding Suez, the Soviet
declaration of November 17, 1956 laid down a detailed disarmament
program, presumably to remind all of Moscow's peaceful intent even
while Soviet tanks roamed Budapest and Soviet volunteers were
threatened for intervention in Egypt. Again, while the West
endeavored to strengthen its defenses in Germany in late
summer and early fall 1961, the Soviet government proposed a num-
ber of partial measures at the General Assembly to provide a reason-
able solution to dangers in Central Europe. This stratagem differed
from the parallel use in 1958 of Khrushchev's ultimatum and the
Rapacki Plan in that by September 1961 there was no imminent pros-
pect of a negotiated settlement, while in 1958 such a resolution
was not foreclosed. Similarly Moscow's moves to resume nuclear
test ban negotiations after the 1961 Soviet series of tests were
obviously aimed at making it more difficult for Washington to resume
testing. (The West also moved to resume test ban negotiations but
eventually used the negotiations as a justification for more U.S.
tests, since the Soviets turned down an effectively controlled ban.)
Fourth, arms control policy could itself be a hard modality
in a general program designed to intimidate the West and show
Moscow's displeasure over Western policies. Several instances
suggest the point: breaking off DCSC negotiations in September 1957;
resuming but quickly breaking off the Ten Nation talks in 1960
after the Paris Summit Conference; insisting in 1961 that the
Soviet test ban proposal be accepted or that the test ban talks
be submerged in GCD negotiations; refusing to approve a Soviet-
sponsored ban on war propaganda in 1962 after U.S. troops moved
into Thailand and after German Defense Minister Strauss wrote that
The revised Rapacki Plan was announced on November 4, 1958,
while Khrushchev's demand for a "free city" of West Berlin came on
November 10, 1958.
-112-
the Bundeswehr should be armed with nuclear weapons.
Fifth, Soviet arms control proposals could keep both hard
and soft modalities open to the Kremlin. Thus GCD was promoted
at a World Congress in Moscow in 1962 even while Soviet negotia-
tors in Geneva claimed to accept a neutralist sponsored test ban
proposal.
Sixth, arms control policy sometimes was little affected by
turns toward the left or right in over-all Soviet policy. Thus some
progress continued to be recorded in test ban negotiations follow-
ing the 1960 summit debacle, although GCD talks at the Ten Nation
meeting were visibly affected. One explanation might be that
Moscow wanted an agreement on nuclear testing and therefore decided
to ignore all histrionics. It could also be that the Soviet Union
had political reasons for keeping open this one line of East-West
negotiations in which some hope for progress existed. Such progress
might make a desired impression in Washington, Peking, and even in
Moscow.
Finally, the diverse ways in which Soviet arms control
proposals could serve the over-all thrust of Soviet policy are
suggested by the times and manner in which GCD was advocated: in
September 1959 as a means toward d6tente; in June 1961 as a way
to prevent further progress on test ban talks; in September
1961 (the McCloy-Zorin agreement) as a basis for further negotia-
tions; in 1962 as a device for promoting mass agitation while
weighing other alternatives, both hard and soft.
The most common function of Moscow's arms control policy,
however, was to control the political climate to promote Soviet
strategic interests, which usually dictated an appearance of
reasonableness and feasibility. This appearance was essential
where Moscow's proposals aimed at East-West agreements or at a
reduction of tensions that might achieve results similar to an
agreement. In this spirit, the Soviet proposals
most likely to strike the West as reasonable were partial measures
on matters of mutual concern such as those involving surprise
attack, nuclear testing, and tensions and armaments in Central
Europe (of special concern in London and Paris if not in Washing-
ton).
'The Strauss article however was written so long before that
it could only have been a pretext. Moscow's reneging on the war
propaganda item may have been motivated in part by a desire to
maintain a tense atmosphere that would help rationalize imminent
increases in Soviet food prices.
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The proposals themselves during 1956-1962 could be inter-
preted as addressing themselves to specific strategic threats.
From 1956 through 1958 Soviet policy (with Polish assistance)
worked hard to promote disengagement or other partial measures
that would frustrate the West's plan to station nuclear weapons
in Germany. In 1958 Moscow proposed an end to testing just after
a Soviet test series had ended and Western tests were to resume.
The nuclear-free zone proposals of 1959 and 1960 were clearly
aimed at frustrating U.S., French, and possibly Chinese plans to
test or station nuclear weapons in the Balkans, the Baltic, the
Far East, and Africa. The 1958 Surprise Attack Conference and
subsequent negotiations provided an opportunity to publicize the
dangers flowing from the ring of overseas U.S. air and (later)
submarine bases. Throughout the 1956-1962 period vocal Soviet
support for a nuclear test ban allowed Moscow to put pressure on
the West to cease testing even while Moscow itself tested, assum-
ing an air of righteousness. And some of Moscow's most reasonable
appearing partial measures were put forward in September 1961 while
the West was attempting to strengthen its defenses in Germany.
2) In Dealings with the Communist Countries. Arms control
policy also functioned in this period as an instrument for Moscow
vis-a-vis the international Communist movement, one that can best
be understood in light of the contrast between Soviet communism's
long perspective on revolution today and the Comintern's naive
exhortations in the 1920's that exposure of "capitalist hypocrisy"
in disarmament negotiations should incite to revolution.
The relevant issues under this heading thus relate not so
much to Moscow's long-range calculations about revolution in the
West but to its more immediate problems of preserving Soviet
influence in Eastern Europe, keeping the Chinese Communists within
the Soviet fold (or, failing that, blunting their challenge to
Moscow's leadership in the Communist movement), and promoting
Soviet influence in the developing countries. All three tasks,
it should be noted, concern more the preservation than the exten-
sion of Soviet power. The first and second tasks, moreover, relate
not only to ideological desiderata but also to the safeguarding
of Moscow's security from threats along its Western and Eastern
frontiers. However, the interest of Soviet state security and the
existence of the regime in Moscow are deeply involved in the main-
tenance of Soviet influence in the international Communist move-
ment and, to a lessening extent, in the movement's expansion.
The years from 1956 to 1962 saw the emergence of profound
threats to Soviet hegemony in that movement, arising in large
part from the manner in which de-Stalinization took place. The
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softer line in Soviet foreign policy had the effect of exacerbating
these dangers by encouraging polycentrism in Eastern Europe and
antagonizing the Chinese. Arms control policy can be seen as
having helped to trigger such dissension within the movement but
it was also a way, no matter how ineffective, of dealing with it.
Moscow's difficulties with Peking, like those in Eastern
Europe, reflected a movement toward autonomous thought and action.
But while the East European regimes sought merely to go their own
way, Peking sought to rival Moscow for leadership in international
communism.
The impact of Sino-Soviet relations exerted a decisive
influence on Soviet arms control policy after 1956. Here we shall
suggest only the political use to which Moscow put its arms control
policy in dealing with the problems arising from its relations
with Peking.
The problem of whether Moscow should aid China in acquiring
nuclear weapons was obviously a delicate one between "fraternal"
parties of such stature and with a long history of discord. A
successful test ban treaty between the existing nuclear powers
might be expanded to include China. Early in 1959 Soviet negotia-
tors in Geneva agreed that the draft test ban's first article
should have a clause permitting accession by other states. Soviet
proposals for a nuclear-free zone in the Far East were a crude
means of exerting pressure against China's nuclear program and
probably infuriated Peking. But at least Moscow could claim that
it was also opposing nuclear proliferation to Germany and other
countries.
The Soviet Union would have liked to perpetuate China's
military and political dependence upon Moscow. This was one
reason why the Soviet Union might not want China to acquire nuclear
weapons but also why Moscow might offer limited aid to Peking in
order to encourage Chinese reliance on Soviet assistance.
China's dependence upon the Soviet Union was reinforced at
the United Nations and at disarmament negotiations where its
interests were ostensibly represented by Soviet delegations.
Moscow occasionally demanded that China be seated at the negotia-
tions and maintained in widely publicized statements that no
agreement could be binding on China without her participation.
In the actual negotiations, however, Soviet diplomats were generally
willing to speculate on the kinds of force levels that China
should accept.
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Perhaps the main political use that disarmament policies
served in Moscow's relations with Peking was to counter the
Chinese challenge to Soviet ideological "revisionism." Soviet
disarmament policy was one source of Chinese displeasure. But
Moscow tried to turn the issue around and use it against Peking
by showing that it was incorrect to insist that Lenin's 1916 dicta
on disarmament should guide Communist policy when capitalism no
longer encircled socialism and when the atomic bomb did not respect
the class principle.
Whether the needs of Soviet state security and Moscow's
role in the Communist movement could be effectively upheld
against the Chinese threat by reliance on arms control and
collaboration with the West was another matter. What arms
controls would be effective--a test ban, a nonproliferation
agreement, GCD with a "nuclear umbrella" for the superpowers?
The more feasible arms controls seemed also the less promising
as ways of keeping China from membership in the nuclear club.
Or should Moscow continue to fight a two-front struggle, hoping
that Soviet military and economic prowess would deter the not-
too-aggressive West and suffice for many years before the
somewhat more aggressive Chinese became a great military power.
These were questions to which Moscow may not have given
a firm answer in 1956-1962. But the evidence suggests that
the Chinese pressure goaded the Soviets increasingly toward
attempts at arms controls and disarmament propaganda which
would impede if not check the Chinese military and ideological
challenge.
Bearing in mind these many uses to which arms control
proposals and propaganda were put, let us consider the Soviet
political interest in comprehensive and partial measures, as the
Kremlin may have judged it.
3) Comprehensive Disarmament. Soviet propaganda for
GCD has apparently aimed at creating a peaceloving image for the
Soviet Union in the West, the developing countries, and perhaps
domestically. The penchant for all-out disarmament may also
have reflected a reaction to criticism from China as well as a
diplomatic tradition going back to the 1920's, an ideological
propensity for total solutions, some lack of sophistication about
the skepticism with which such propaganda is viewed in the West,
and may even have been prompted by the need to come up with a
diplomatic sensation for Khrushchev's 1959 trip to the United
Nations.
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The Soviet regime may have sought the best of all possible
worlds by what Bechhoefer has called a "two-pronged" approach--one
prong seeking the political advantages of advocating an idealistic
program of drastic disarmament, the other working toward partial
measures that might be capable of immediate negotiation.1 If so,
however, the Kremlin seems in this period to have alienated many of
those in the East as well as in the West whom it sought to impress.
If the Soviet regime sought to use its GCD stand with its implicit
opportunities for a propaganda of exposure to minimize Chinese
criticism of Soviet detente policies, the Chinese response was to
attack more virulently "illusions" about the "warless world" before
the overthrow of capitalism. And if the Soviet Government hoped
to use its comprehensive proposals only as a preliminary propaganda
blow before proceeding to more manageable topics, the poorly
thought-through nature of the Soviet GCD proposals could only
engender skepticism among Western leaders endeavoring to
discern Soviet intentions. While the grounds for this skepticism
were partially removed by the McCloy-Zorin agreement in 1961 and,
more important, by modifications in the Soviet program in 1962
including the nuclear umbrella principle, Moscow's reluctance
to spell out the details of such principles still left Western
observers with a most cautious attitude toward Moscow's
policy on GCD.
Perhaps the best audience for Moscow's GCD propaganda was
in the "third world," where the Kremlin could seek to offset
competition from the West and from Peking by utilizing, inter
alia, grandiose promises of the benefits that would result from
great power disarmament. Agreement on Soviet disarmament proposals
would allegedly lead to the elimination of foreign bases and to
the destruction of the qualitative advantage of military power by
which the imperialists still resisted the quantitative strength
of oppressed peoples; and it would halt the nuclear testing that
threatened their health. In addition, Moscow promised what China
could not--at least so plausibly--a huge transfer of its defense
funds to the development programs of the new nations.
These protestations concerning the advantages of peaceful
coexistence and disarmament were qualified by the Soviet position
that the achievement of a disarmed world and the establishment of
peacekeeping forces under the Security Council were in no way to
impede the "struggle of peoples who are struggling for their
Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961), p. 324.
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independence and social progress."
'While at least a perfunctory support of GCD is to be expected
at all negotiations, heavy or exclusive emphasis on GCD has gener-
ally been a signal that Moscow is not ready for serious negotiations
in areas of possible agreement. Such, we conclude, was the situa-
tion in 1961 when Moscow wanted to merge the test ban talks with
GCD negotiations. And such was the situation in 1962 when Soviet
policy drifted, uncertain whether to pursue a hard or soft tack
toward the West.
4) Partial Measures.
a) Regional Arms Controls and Surprise Attack. Arms
control policy has served Soviet purposes in Eastern and Central
Europe in a number of ways. First, Moscow's disengagement proposals
played on European fears of German "revanchism." The various
modifications of the Rapacki Plan, especially in 1958, in ostensible
response to Western objections, cultivated the impression that Moscow
was quite willing to withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe if
only the West would halt its plans for making the Bonn republic
a forward base for another Drang nach Osten. Similarly the Soviet
proposal in 1959 to create a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans
helped to reinforce a sense of political and military dependence
upon Moscow to guard against any threat from NATO forces in Turkey
or Greece.
Second, promotion of disengagement and denuclearized zones
by Polish, Bulgarian, and Rumanian leaders allowed the East
Europeans some semblance of autonomy in the world arena. Poly-
centrism of course was increasing in spite of Moscow. But the
Kremlin could probably have restrained the "people 's democracies"
from making arms control initiatives had it wanted to. The fact
was, however, that Soviet and East European interests seemed to
coincide on regional arms control proposals and it cost the Soviet
Union little to allow Rapacki, Zhivkov, and others to act in con-
cert with Soviet diplonacy. In fact a greater role for the bloc
countries was needed to attain parity of Communist representation
1
Probably, to protect the left flank against Peking, Khrushchev
made clear on January 6, 1961 that wars of national liberation were
still unavoidable, because imperialism would not give way voluntarily.
Even Khrushchev's December 31, 1963 proposal to prohibit the use of
force in international disputes left an escape clause for wars of
national liberation and for China's recovery of Taiwan by whatever
means were needed.
-118-1
with the West, achieved when East European delegations took part
in the 1958 technical talks, the 1960 Ten Nation Committee, and the
ENDC in 1962.
The Soviet posture of favoring a test ban and nonprolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons to West Germany helped to justify Moscow's
refusal to give the bloc countries nuclear weapons or technical
assistance other than for peaceful uses. 1 And, as suggested
earlier, Soviet proposals for nuclear-free zones in the Far East,
Balkans, Baltic, Africa, and other parts of the world offered a
crude means of pressure to halt the spread of nuclear weapons
as well as inhibit nuclear tests by China and the West.
b. Ban on Nuclear Testing. The larger goals of halting
nuclear proliferation and achieving a strategic balance favorable
to the Soviet Union could be promoted by effective diplomatic and
propaganda support for a test ban whether or not an East-West
agreement were reached. In this respect Soviet support of a ban
on nuclear testing had greater potential appeal than the "ban the
bomb" slogan of earlier years because the test ban issue could be
portrayed in a manner that would appeal both to the "masses" and
leaders in the West and the neutralist camp.
The test ban issue offered perhaps the best vehicle for con-
tinuing East-West negotiations on a topic of broad political
interest. Such negotiations could promote detente and weaken
Western advocates of an arms build-up and forward strategy. There
was obviously much support for a test ban in the West, as the 1956
election campaign in the United States suggested and the 1958 mora-
torium on testing demonstrated. A conciliatory Soviet position on
nuclear testing could thus offer a powerful instrument to intervene
in the domestic political process in the West. This theoretical
goal, as it turned out, was far from fulfilled because of the wide
publicity given to Soviet recalcitrance on the issue of control
and on-site inspection. Breaking the test moratorium in 1961 was
especially damaging to Moscow's peaceloving image in the West.
Even the 1961 Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned States offered a mild
rebuke. And the 1961 General Assembly resolution against nuclear
testing was implicitly addressed to Moscow as well as Washington.
1
The Soviet campaign to promote disarmament was generally
popular in Eastern Europe, where economic hardship, dislike of
Soviet occupation, and fear of renewed war combine to produce strong
antimilitaristic tendencies among the population. Popular skepticism
about Soviet motives, however, reinforced the need for plausibility
in Soviet proposals.
-119-
Moscow's 1961 test series nevertheless helped to clarify
the nature of Soviet propaganda objectives. Soviet peace propa-
ganda was combined with the projection of a powerful and even
terrifying image of Soviet military capacity, as demonstrated by
Moscow's announcement that it would explode a multimegaton weapon
in October 1961. The Soviet Union may have felt compelled to
demonstrate again that it was the military equal or superior of
the United States, enabling Soviet peace propaganda to continue
on the basis of negotiating "reasonably" from a position of great
strength.
At the same time that Soviet propaganda for a test ban hoped
to neutralize "aggressive elements" in the West it probably served
to isolate opponents of detente in the Soviet leadership. Khrushchev
and his supporters could cite technical data to argue that a test
ban was in Moscow's strategic and economic interest. They could
draw upon the prestige of Soviet scientists who stressed the health
hazards of further testing. They could also point to the mora-
torium to which the West agreed in 1958 as proof of the possibility
of limited collaboration with the adversary. Finally, Soviet
negotiating behavior demonstrated to hard-liners in Moscow that
the Khrushchev government was not going to agree to a test ban
that permitted extensive or intensive intrusion in Soviet society
or opened to the West important areas of military secrecy.
So far as the resumption of nuclear testing by Moscow in 1961
was concerned, in addition to the military reasons we have mentioned,
the new tests probably offset criticism of Khrushchev's version of
peaceful coexistence from his opponents in Peking and in Moscow,
which intensified after the U-2 affair, the Bay of Pigs, the first
Kennedy military budget, and tension over Berlin in 1961, and
supplied the incidental psychological benefit of demonstrating
Moscow's capacity to build and fire 50-megaton bombs.
3. The Economic Factor.
Moscow's interest in arms control, it was argued in Chapter
II, derived little impetus from 1954 to 1956 from economic
considerations. The Kremlin seems rather to have made excessively
rosy calculations about the future rate of Soviet economic growth
and the savings possible through reliance on advanced military tech-
nology instead -of conventional forces and massive inputs of
personnel. From 1956 to 1962 the grounds of this optimism
faded, one after another, presenting Moscow by 1961 or 1962
with strong economic incentives to reduce military spending,
either directly by East-West agreement or indirectly as a by-
product of international detente.
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The decisive year marking a turning point in the Soviet
economy's ability to sustain the arms race appears to have been
1958. From Stalin's death until 1958 the economic burden
imposed by defense generally fell as defense expenditures
stabilized or declined and economic growth continued at a
rapid rate. Beginning in 1958 and 1959, however, the absolute
magnitude of the Soviet arms effort increased dramatically;
at the same time the rate of Soviet industrial growth began to
fall, thereby heightening the relative burden of defense spending
although its absolute weight remained roughly constant. Further,
by 1961 the political and military worth of an arms race with
the West had itself become questionable, because the United
States was demonstrating that it could outspend and outproduce
the Soviet Union in developing an arsenal capable of a
"graduated response" to most forms of strategic and conventional
warfare.
Thus, the economic incentive since 1958 to reduce defense
spending was reinforced in 1961 by recognition that Moscow could
not for the foreseeable future win any decisive victory in an
arms race with the West. Moreover the burden of defense spending
was impeding Soviet advance in what Khrushchev designated in
1959 as the main arena of East-West competition--economic growth.
The lag in Soviet growth was preventing Moscow from fulfilling
its promises of consumer affluence from becoming the model for
other countries to emulate, and--of lesser importance--from using
foreign aid freely to influence the developing countries. The
reasons for the decline in Soviet growth, to be sure, included
many factors in addition to military expenditures, but if that
one item could be substantially reduced an accelerating effect
might result.
a. Soviet Defense Expenditures. Very critical developments
for Soviet arms policy seem to have taken place in the period
1955-1957 in the realms of both technology and defense spending.
In 1955, the Khrushchev-Bulganin leadership rather ostentatiously
increased the defense budget, in part for political reasons.
Thereafter the official military budget fell off to 1957 and
remained stable until 1961. Both total possible defense
spending and total possible weapons systems development and
procurement also indicate a trough in 1956 and 1957. Yet this
was the very period when the Soviet Union was undertaking the
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research and development that led to the missile achievements
of 1957.
It is unlikely that Soviet expenditures on advanced
weapons development declined in the years 1956 and 1957 after
being increased in 1955: they probably remained stable or
slightly increased. But total defense spending and even
weapons procurement as a whole fell from the 1955 peak because
of sharp cutbacks in military manpower and procurement of
conventional material.
Thus the Soviet Union entered a revolutionary phase in the
development of weapons technology, one that held out prospects
for eventual strategic superiority over the United States, under
the banners of budgetary conservatism. Whether or not sharply
accelerated spending was anticipated for the immediate future is
difficult to determine. But the conservative nature of the
early phase of ICBM development suggests that the original
concentration was purely on prototype development and that the
difficulties of advancing from prototype to operational force
were not adequately appreciated. At the same time one could
argue that the Soviet leadership was unwilling to commit
resources to a program for the development of an operational
system until concrete and, incidentally, politically valuable
test achievements had been registered. In any case, the
Kremlin was probably confident that an economic short cut to
strategic superiority had been found, since missile technology
rendered the manned intercontinental bomber obsolete.
In 1958 and 1959, total defense and space spending rose
very steeply mainly, it appears, as a result of allocations to
advanced weapons development. At this point the principal
objective was probably to translate prototype ICBM development
into an operational capability, a task which may well have
proved more costly and difficult than had been previously
anticipated. At the same time, considerable resources were
probably devoted to expanding IRBM forces already technically
operational. While the Soviet Union succeeded in this period
in covering European targets with intermediate range missiles,
intercontinental striking power grew more slowly than Moscow
had hoped and more slowly than most Western observers thought
to be the case at the time. Rapidly rising weapons development
and procurement outlays outstripped the savings that were
produced by cutbacks in conventional arms production and
military manpower. In short, it became clear in 1958 and 1959
that missile technology was not a cheap road to strategic
superiority, but the Soviet leadership probably continued to
regard as bright the prospects of eventually achieving
superiority. In the meantime, the Soviet Union was profiting
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around the world from the propaganda impact of the missile
gap which was widely thought to favor Moscow.
The planned reduction of Soviet armed forces by one-third
announced by Khrushchev in January 1960 was justified by the
First Secretary on the ground that modern technology permitted
Soviet firepower to be increased even while the number of men
under arms decreased. He indicated, as Soviet spokesmen had
when Soviet manpower was reduced in 1956, that the demobilized
soldiers would make a valuable asset to the nation's productive
capacity. He also made the suggestion (not backed by Soviet
military leaders) that the demobilized men might be trained in a
territorial militia. Such a force, if established, could as in
China be useful for organizing labor for projects in the remote
regions qf the country. 1
In 1961 the Soviet Union announced the first explicit in-
creases in defense spending since 1955, ostensibly as a response
to the accelerated strategic build-up launched by the Kennedy
administration. In relation to the previous official defense
budget, the increases of 1961 and 1962 were quite impressive.
On the "total-possible-spending_ curve, however, they appear
as little more than a continuation of the post-1958 trend. It
is probable that more than the first Kennedy budget (Fiscal
Year 1962) and tension over Berlin in 1961 was behind the
continued increase of Soviet arms spending: Moscow probably
realized that the missile-gap illusion could not last much
longer. The Kremlin probably also perceived sometime in 1960
or 1961 that the imperatives of missile technology would force
the Soviet Union to abandon its initial ICBM programs in favor
of more sophisticated, second-generation systems. All this
worked for continued increases in arms spending; it might be
accurate to say that the Kennedy budget merely provided the
motivation for making these increases public.
b. Defense and Economic Growth. Ascertaining the weight
of defense as a component of Soviet gross national product (GNP)
is one of the more hazardous aspects of national income study
of the Soviet economy. As might be expected, estimates vary
with the methodology employed. Most estimates are consistent,
halter C. Clemens, Jr., "Soviet Disarmament Proposals and
the Cadre-Territorial Army," Orbis, Vol. VII, No. 4 (Winter 1964),
pp. 778-799, and "The Soviet Militia in the Missile Age," Orbis,
Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Spring 1964), pp. 84-105.
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however, in ascribing a decreasing weight to defense as a
component of Soviet GNP over the past decade. It is probably
safe to say that while defense accounted for 15-18 per cent of
Soviet GNP in 1952, the range in 1962 was closer to 10-12 per
cent.
Most indicators point to a gradual trend of deceleration
in the growth rate of Soviet industry from the mid-fifties through
1962 and beyond. Soviet claims show an average annual growth
rate of 13 per cent for the years 1950-1955 and of slightly less
than 10 per cent for 1955-1962. A reliable Western index,
published by Greenslade and Wallace; indicates an average annual
growth rate of 10.1 per cent for the earlier period and 8.7
per cent for the years 1955-1961. More specifically, the
Greenslade-Wallace data show that the growth rate of Soviet
industrial materials production fluctuated between 11.5 and 10
per cent from 1954 to 1958. In 1959 it was 9.9 per cent; then
declined in 1960, 1961 and 1962 to between 5.5 and 6.8 per cent
per year.1
Thus the very dramatic increases in the absolute magnitude
of the defense effort that occurred between 1958 and 1962, owing
to the rapid growth of the Soviet economy over the past decade,
did not reverse but only temporarily arrested the prevailing
trend for defense to decline as a component of GNP. If one could
simply define the economic burden of defense as its percentage
of GNP, this burden was unquestionably less in 1962 than it was
in the early fifties.
In the sense it is employed in this discussion, however,
"economic burden" has other less precise implications to denote
the kind of defense effort which might motivate the Soviet
leadership to pursue certain international policies. The question
we are concerned with addresses itself to the subjective
priorities of the regime; the burden of defense can only be
gauged in relation to the urgency of competing claims upon
available resources; defense as a percentage of GNP does not
convey these subjective connotations of the concept of burden.
Maintenance of a rapid rate of industrial growth was
probably the Soviet government's most urgent economic priority
in the period under review. The policy of concentrating resources
on the growth-oriented branches of industry remained substantially
intact through the past decade in spite of variations in emphasis
See Appendix, Table 5.
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on the "heavy-industry line." Examination of the industrial
growth record with reference to the changing level of defense
spending proves informative in two respects. First, the
performance of industry, in a broad sense, conditioned the
relative burden of alternative claims on resources such as
defense, consumption, housing, and agriculture. If industrial
growth slowed, the claims of other sectors became relatively
more burdensome since industrial growth was an overriding
priority. Second, the defense effort may have exercised a
direct retarding effect on industrial growth by cutting into
resources available for investment and, in the very short run,
by diverting current material supplies and skilled labor away
from civilian machinery production.
Some retardation in growth rate had been expected by
Western economists because of objective economic factors. As
the stock of capital expands the burden of depreciation adds
additional strain on the investment resources of the economy.
The capital output ratio for the economy as a whole had been
increasing as larger percentages of annual investment must be
allocated to such nonproductive targets as housing and adminis-
trative facilities. Sources of rapid increments to the urban
working force were drying up, at least temporarily. While there
were still large areas of Soviet industry where borrowed technology
could fruitfully be applied, the possibilities for gaining sudden
and rather effortless advances in productivity through techno-
logical borrowing became more restricted than in earlier
stages of industrialization and the burden of indigenous non-
military industrial research has increased. Of no mean
importance has been the progressive obsolescence of Soviet
planning and administrative formulae for directing the further
growth of an enormous and already advanced industrial economy.
For these and other reasons, equal percentage increments to
gross industrial output were not as easily achieved in the 1956-
1962 period as formerly. Thus there was a secular trend toward
a declining industrial growth rate independent of the defense
burden. But this trend acted to increase the defense burden in
a subjective sense insofar as allocation of additional resources
to industry would have spurred growth and the regime found the
retardation of growth contrary to its interests.
Moreover, there is a distinct possibility that the higher
defense outlays of recent years, both in magnitude and the
quality of resources they represented, have had a direct retarding
influence on the industrial growth rate, at least in the short
run. In the periods 1951-1952 and 1958-1959, when sudden and
sharp increases in defense spending were observed, the growth
of civilian machinery output showed a distinct retardation,
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undoubtedly because current inputs were diverted to military
production. In the same periods, the portion of investment
going to equipment and instrumentation in the economy as a
whole showed a distinct decline, contrary to the long-range
trend in the Soviet and other industrial economies. The defense
effort was certainly responsible in part for the deceleration
of Soviet industrial investment in recent years and thus must
be assigned some direct causal role in the overall industrial
slowdown. It must be noted, however, that the direct impact of
the defense effort on industrial growth was limited to the
years 1958-1960. Civilian machinery output increased markedly
in 1961 and 1962, suggesting that the defense acceleration
announced in 1961 was very largely a continuation of the post-
1958 trend rather than another sudden spurt.
c. Consumer Goods Production. Despite the ideological ap-
proval of "goulash communism" in the post-Stalin period, levels
of popular consumption were probably the least pressing issue
among the several economic objectives constantly in the minds
of Soviet decision-makers in the 1956-1962 period. The welfare
implications of communism receive heavy stress in ideological
prognoses; but the concrete policy of the present is to maintain
the rapid growth of industry and to solve the agricultural
problem, and thereby to assure an affluent future for the Soviet
people. There have been frequent flurries of attention to
consumer problems in the years since Stalin's death, and in 1957
the regime undertook a massive campaign to solve the housing
problem, one of the sorriest aspects of the Soviet welfare record.
While a great deal of housing construction was undertaken, the
campaign fell far short of meeting Soviet minimum sanitary
standards for urban housing and seems to have expired by 1961.
In 1960, after Khrushchev's visit to the United States,
there were indications that a consumer campaign reminiscent of
Malenkov's "new course" was to be launched. Moscow promised
rapidly to overtake the West both in industrial and consumer
production, and in fact the years 1958-1960 saw a steadily
rising percentage of total state investment going to consumer
industries. In 1961, however, this percentage began to fall and
the traditional emphasis on heavy industry appeared unimpaired,
probably reflecting a decision toward the harder line in foreign
policy from mid-1960 to the Cuban crisis. Between 1950 and
1955 the growth of personal consumption was about 7 per cent
per year. After 1955 improvements were markedly slower, probably
about 4 per cent in 1960, even less in later years as industrial
growth has slowed and agricultural production has stagnated.
-126-
While the welfare concern of Soviet leaders was doubtless
genuine, their ideological predilections and relative immunity
from popular pressures tended to make improvements in the Soviet
standard of living largely a function of industrial and
agricultural progress, which remained the immediate, practical
preoccupations of the regime.
d. Implications for Policy. Soviet optimism about the
course of the arms race seems to have been deflated by 1961.
The absolute costs of the defense effort were probably rising
faster than had been expected, and its detrimental effects
on the economy were now being felt. For example, the expansion
of the petro-chemical industry upon which progress on the agri-
cultural front depended heavily, was undoubtedly jeopardized by
the diversion of quality materials and skilled manpower to
defense production. Operational ICBM forces were coming on the
scene at a somewhat slower pace than had been originally anti-
cipated. Most important, the increased defense efforts of the
United States had transformed the pursuit of superiority into
a race merely to keep the strategic gap from widening. Moreover,
the technology of modern weapons, with its long lead-time factor,
was forcing Soviet planners to make allocations on the basis of
increasingly uncertain future expectations.
The unpleasant reality seemed to be that even strenuous
efforts could not in the foreseeable future purchase Soviet
strategic superiority via technological development. Merely to
acquire a viable posture of minimum deterrence would require
great expense. It appears that both the multimegaton explosions
of 1961 and the Cuban escapade in 1962 were conditioned by
frustration on the missile-production front and were intended
partly to recapture the psychological advantages of the post-
Sputnik period as well as to uncover the key to genuine
strategic superiority.
The relatiorbetween national economic power and war
capacity have long been acknowledged by Soviet spokesmen. The
"1permanently operating factors" doctrine that prevailed from 1942
until 1953 or 1955 emphasized the importance of economic
resources to mobilize and sustain a long, drawn-out war effort.
But the acknowledgment by Soviet strategists since 1955 of the
role of surprise attack in the opening moments of conflict
placed a different accent on the economic capacity needed.
As the Sokolovsky treatise put it in 1962, the criterion
became the ability of technology and industry to provide
powerful and modern peacetime forces-in-being for successfully
meeting the critical early phases of war:
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The ability of the country's economy to mass produce
military equipment, especially missiles, and to
establish superiority over the enemy in modern weapons
are the material prerequisites of victory. The ability
of the economy to assure the maximum power to the Armed
Forces for dealing an annihilatory blow to the aggressor
in the initial period of the war will be decisive for the
outcome of a future war.1
The Soviet economy's ability to match or even keep up with
the West in armaments development and procurement was in grave
doubt by 1961 and 1962, when resources devoted to defense helped to
depress the rate of overall Soviet economic growth--the source
of long-term strength and welfare. From 1956 to 1958, the "economic
burden" of defense had been hardly noticeable; by 1959 it had
become more onerous but seemed justified by its potential
"payoff"; by 1961 however it served to reinforce other factors
also militating for a slowdown in the arms race--either by
arms control or by a detente that altered Western defense
policies.
It should be noted that the economic factor did not seem
to have a bearing on the strong interest which Moscow showed in
certain partial measures prior to 1961. By 1961 the overall
line of Soviet foreign policy was hardening, and the economic
incentives toward a reduction of arms spending could not over-
ride what appeared to be urgent requirements imposed by the
international situation to increase defense spending. Only in
1963--in a period of relaxed tensions--could the economic
incentive become effective in reinforcing other factors militating
for d6tente, arms control, and East-West trade.
4. The Internal Political Situation.
The years from 1955 to 1962 saw several strong challenges
to Khrushchevis leading position in the Kremlin power structure.
In order to analyze the kinds of internal pressures upon the First
Secretary and (after 1958) Premier that may have shaped Soviet
policy toward arms control, and, more broadly, toward the
Western world, a word should be said about the domestic
interests which may condition Soviet moves toward agreements
with the West.
lSoviet Military Strategy, E. ci., p. 314. Emphasis
in original.
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The contending forces include broadly, (1) those forces
most likely to favor disarmament and/or detente and (2) those
most likely to oppose it. Some of the elements in these groups
may consciously collaborate, such as military and industrial
leaders, but others can work without coordination but for a
similar goal, for example, the consumers and scientists in favor
of cuts in the defense budget. During periods of international
tension the demands of the consumers may be delayed. Thus
Khrushchev has explicitly blamed various East-West crises for
the raising of food prices, the deferral of income tax reductions,
and other inconveniences to the Soviet citizenry. In moments of
international conflict the demands of the second group already closer
to the levels of power would naturally carry the more weight, and
during a crisis their support woul: be especially important for
the Party leader to maintain.
It appears likely that the elements in the second group
exerted greatest pressure during times of high international
tension; but that Khrushchev, in general, has preferred--for
reasons of internal and foreign policy--to damp such tension.
If possible, he probably would have wished to help satisfy
the demands of the consumers, assuming that the industrial
growth of heavy industry could be sustained at the sane time.
With this structure in mind let us turn to an analysis of the
consolidation of Khrushchev's power in the 1956-1962 period
and the challenges to it from within, the main ones coming i'i
1957, 1960, and posssibly in 1962.
Although Khrushchev was the most powerful figure in the
Soviet Union by mid-1955, he still had not secured complete
dominance over the party Presidium. When revolution erupted in
Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956, largely as a result of
Khrushchev's secret speech condemning Stalin, his position was
greatly weakened. During the last months of 1956 and -the I
fi.rst months of 1957 Khrushchev's power declined while the
position of Malenkov and Molotov improved somewhat.1
During the first half of 1957, relations between the Soviet
Union and the West were at low ebb, but this had little to do
with Khrushchev's weakened position and was mainly a consequence
of events in Hungary and Egypt. In June 1957, Khrushchev's
obert Conquest, Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R. (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), pp. 292-298; Merle Fainsod,
How Russia is Ruled (rev. ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1963), p. 169.
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opponents united in an attempt to remove him from power. That
this was a "stop Khrushchev" movement and not a coalition
united by agreement on either domestic or foreign policy can
be seen by the fact that Malenkov and Molotov, with their
opposing policies, were able to join forces. Although out-
maneuvered in the Presidium, Khrushchev was able to force his
opponents to allow the Central Committee to make the final
decision. Khrushchev had previously used his position as
First Secretary to pack the Central Committee with his own
supporters, and as a result, five members of the opposition were
removed from the Presidium (Malenkov., Molotov, Kaganovich,
Saburov, and Shepilov) and one demoted to alternate status
(Pervukhin). In their place nine full members were added, all
of whom had close ties to Khrushchev.
Of special interest for Soviet policy toward the West,
the ousted "anti-party group" was denounced for opposing the
"party" policy of peaceful coexistence. However, no sharp
impact could be noted on Soviet arms control policy. Shortly
before the power struggle Khrushchev had agreed to the principle
of inspection of a test ban, and no radical alteration in arms
control policy took place until late August when Moscow
refused to negotiate further in the DCSC.
The defeat of Khrushchev's opposition and their ouster
from the Presidium marked the beginning of a new period in
Soviet politics. Khrushchev's authority was bolstered still
more by the removal of Zhukov in October 1957, Karushchev's
assumption of the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers
in March 1958, and Bulganin's removal from the Presidium in
September of that year.
As Khrushchev consolidated his personal power and
increasingly imposed his will on the Presidium, he relied less
on the Central Coimnittee. After 1957 and up to just before
Khrushchev's ouster the Central Committee declined just as it
had earlier under Stalin. Agendas for the Central Committee
came to be announced in advance, and sessions'given wide-spread
publicity like party congresses instead of being conducted in
private as they were during a tine of more "collective"
leadership. 1
1T. H. Rigby, "Khrushchev and the Resuscitation of the
Central Committee," Australian Outlook., September 1959.
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At the sane time, the policies of the Soviet Union, both
foreign and domes tic, often appeared vacillating and contra-
dictory, indicating indecision at the highest levels. Some
Western analysts expressed the opinion that these changes were
due to the continued existence of strong limitations on
Khrushchev's power.1 Though Grushchev greatly increased his
personal power in 1957, his position was still not entirely
secure at any time until Kis removal in 1964. Even then.,
other members of the Presidium had a certain amount of
independent power and Khrushchev was forced to take this into
account when formulating policy.
At the time of the collapse of the 1960 SumiLt conference, when
mayIV observers in the West speculated that Khrushchev was under
strong pressure from a hostile opposition group, it was being
suggested that Marshal Malinovsky was sent to Paris with
Khrushchev in order to watch his moves. So far as can be
ascertained, however, the high point in military influence
was reached in the morths imr-ediately following the defeat
of the "anti-party group" in June 1957. Zhukov threw his
support to Khrushchev. But with the defeat of the "anti-
party group" and the elevation of a number of his supporters
to full Presidium membersnip, Khrushchev opted -to oust the man
upon whom he had depended, doing so in a series of moves in
October-November 1957.
It appears in retrospect that Khrushchev cultivated the
military from 1955 until 1957 by concessions that, it turned out,
could easily be retracted--the raising of one officer to a high
party post, a temporary increase in defense spending, a relaxation
of Party indoctrination procedures in the armed forces.
Undoubtedly the military favored strong measures to repress
the Hungarian uprising and, generally, to bolster the nation's
defenses in every way. But there is no evidence -that the military
sought to alter Khrushchev's strategy of detente with the West,
although it seems likely it opposed the theory and practice
of "collaboration" with the enemy. The five members of
the "anti-party group" ousted in June 1957 were charged with
opposing the peaceful coexistence line, but Zhukov's subseqaent
denunciation was on other grounds.
Robert Conqaest, "The Struggle Goes On," Problems of
Conmunism, July-August 1960; Carl Linden, "Khrushchev and the
Party Battle," Probles ofComnunism, September-October 1963.Pr~bemsof Crm-u-_asm Octoec 963
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In the autumn of 1957, following the removal of Zhukov, a
new period in party-military relations began. The new Defense
Minister, Malinovsky, never attained membership in the party
Presidium. The military lost much or most of the limited
autonomy and influence over policy it had been able to gain in
the 1953-1957 period. As indicated above, obligatory political
study for officers was reinstituted, the role of political
officers was increased, Party organizations in the armed forces
were expanded in size, and military commanders were once again
required to submit to criticism at Party meetings.1
In this period from 1957 to 1962, party-military relations
were marked by a divergence of opinion on two major issues.
The first of these issues was the continuing conflict over
Party control of the armed forces. Party leaders tended to
believe that the armed forces, like all else in Soviet society,
must be under the close supervision of Party officials. The
military, on the other hand, sought greater autonomy in the
everyday administration of the armed forces, and resented
political controls as a slur on its ability and loyalty.
Friction between Party officials and military officers had
existed since the first days of the Red Army, and there was
no reason to expect that it would be resolved in the fore-
seeable future. But no matter how much the military resented
Party supervision, it was clear that after Zhukov's removal
the military was able to do little to lessen it.
The second overt issue exacerbating party-military
relations in this period was the conflict over the proper size
of the armed forces. In January 1960, Khrushchev made a major
speech on military strategy in which he outlined his views on
atomic warfare and proposed to reduce the armed forces, which
then stood at 3,700,000 men, by 1,200,000 over the next two
years. It is hardly surprising that this was opposed by the
military. The proposed reduction threatened the privileged
positions of many officers. In addition, aside from consider-
ations of self-interest many of the more conservative military
leaders seemed to think that Khrushchev's radical reliance on
military technology was endangering state security and therefore
opposed to the proposed reduction of ground forces. A kind of
compromise resulted: the reductions were begun (only to be
halted in mid-stream during the 1961 Berlin crisis), but
1Fainsod, o2. cit., pp. 485-486.
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Khrushchev's suggestion of transferring demobilized soldiers to
a part-time militia never materialized. In any event it was
rumored that opposition to the proposed force reductions hurtled
two officers into temporary retirement: Konev from his post as
commander of Warsaw Pact forces and Sokolovsky as Commander of
the Soviet General Staff. 1 Both men, however, soon returned to
responsible posts.
The role of the military generally and of Malinovsky at
the Paris Summit in the determination of Khrushchev's foreign
policy has been aptly summarized by Raymond Garthoff:
On the whole, the military leaders, to the extent that
their advice is solicited, continue to display the same
degree of general conservatism as did Zhukov. This con-
servatism has meant an opposition to moves of accommodation
or partial withdrawal (as in their favoring armed interven-
tion to preserve the Hungarian base). It also has meant an
opposition to "adventuristic" aggressiveness which threatens
unnecessarily to risk a general war. Regrettably, Malinovsky
personally is perhaps somewhat less of a moderating influence
in this latter respect than was Zhukov (not as a humani-
tarian or friend of the West, but as a coldly calculating
military planner).
There are no indications of significant restiveness
on the part of the professional military leaders, though
there have been points of friction over various decisions
of the political leadership directly limiting the armed forces.
The reversal in 1961 of the troop cuts begun in 1960 and
the resumption of nuclear testing in 1961 were no doubt wel-
comed by many military leaders. But these were basically
political decisions taken mainly in response to the changing
international situation, and not necessarily in response to
pressures from the military. While the military--even after
Zhukovis ouster--probably exerted a weight to retard or
even reverse movements toward detente, its position was still
subordinate to the party leadership, whose views it had to
carry out, albeit reluctantly and with some foot-dragging.
l~atthew P. Gallagher, "Military Manpower: A Case Study,"
Problems of Communism, May-June 1964, p. 55.
2Garthoff, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
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To sum up, we conclude that Khrushchev's position may
well have been less stable than its outward appearance. He
was probably forced to act in some respects as a broker, trading
off conflicting interests. The impact of support or opposition
from within the Party or the military to Khrushchev's views
constituted a marginal factor that, at moments such as the
summer of 1960, may have combined with other forces to throw
Soviet policy one way or the other. While we doubt that he
was actually "chained" at the Paris Summit Conference following
the U-2 affair, it does seem likely that at least some of his
demeanor was directed toward placating those who might have
been saying, "we warned you."
There is as yet no evidence that some of Khrushchev's
domestic foes were allied with Peking, although their views
might sometimes gain weight by reference to Peking's. If such
evidence comes to light, however, it would reinforce the
contention that Khrushchev did have to cope with powerful
critics whose views never came to public attention during his
administration. And some new light on conflicts within the Kremlin
may one day help to explain the Cuban adventure in 1962.
If the domestic political factor is weighed against the
other determinants of arms control policy in the period its
role seems to have been quite marginal. Soviet foreign policy
generally and arms control policy in particular were basically
a response by the top Kremlin leadership to the international
situation. Possible critics, whether of the "Stalinist" or
liberal variety, could hardly organize any effective opposition,
especially after 1957. Domestic pressures for peace and
consumer prosperity could be catered to when conditions permitted
or deferred on grounds of an international crisis. At the same
time, no "external foe" was needed to legitimize the Khrushchev
government as it had been in the case of Stalin; public
opinion, such as it was, welcomed the relaxation of terror
and promises of goulash communism. And while the Soviet people
welcomed their government's ostensible campaign to ensure peace,
a patriotic response could be counted on if the Kremlin warned
of hostile machinations against the socialist fatherland.
The ideological identification of peace, prosperity, and
revolution as defined between 1956 and 1961 served to justify
whatever twists and turns the Soviet leadership chose in
pursuing its external relations.
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D. The Period in Retrospect
As suggested at the outset of this chapter, Soviet policies
toward the West from 1956 to 1962 could be depicted in terms of
four simplified models. Each of the four hypotheses suggested
could be partially but probably not convincingly supported by
empirical research. First, there was no inexorable movement
toward live-and-let-live, as demonstrated by the Cuban adventure
if not by pressure on Berlin and elsewhere. Second, there was
no unbroken "post-Sputnik offensive," because Moscow made serious
moves toward improvement of East-West relations at many moments
during these years but especially in 1958-1960. Third, there was
no clear alternation of hard and soft modalities, because the two
often operated simultaneously, most obviously, for example, when
pressure began in late 1958 for a German Peace Treaty or again
in 1962, when great ambivalence characterized Soviet policy.
Fourth, it would be most plausible to argue that a hard and soft
line generally functioned simultaneously, but this would beg
important questions concerning the overall thrust of Soviet
policy. This argument would offer a reminder of the tactical
flexibility available to Moscow, but say little of its strategic
objectives.
What emerges is a complicated picture whose basic
ingredients were limited but significant evolution in the
contours of Moscow's negotiating position on disarmament; more
profound alteration in the ideological underpinnings of Soviet
foreign policy generally; and qualitative transformations of some
of the foundations upon which Soviet foreign policy rested, the
implications of which were only hinted at prior to late 1962
and 1963. In looking at these five or six years we form the
impression that the several peaks and valleys of apparent Soviet
interest in arms control did not wholly reveal the variety of
forces at work on Soviet strategy in general. After 1956 Soviet
arms control policy seemed to move in upward or downward directions
until 1962, but without any quantum jump such as that dramatized
on May 10, 1955. Although some of these subsequent trends were
significant in themselves and some might be termed qualitative,
the salient fact about the years from 1956 through 1962 was
that the superstructure of Soviet policy was not adjusting to
changes in its base.
Perhaps then the most significant developments lay in the
changes in that base of Soviet policy toward arms control--in its
military, political, and economic determinants. Moscow's view
of the East-West balance of military power, with the opportunities
and limitations it implied for Soviet foreign policy, seemed to
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undergo dramatic alteration, moving toward and then away from
high optimism. A similar but probably more marginal influence
resulted from the rise and subsequent decline of the Soviet
Union's economic prospects. The most significant factor to enter
into the Kremlin's view toward its relations with the West and
toward arms control arose from the profound challenge--military
as well as political--from Peking. Other elements in the base of
Soviet arms control policy--Moscow's image of heterogeneity in the
West and the Kremlin's confrontation with domestic political
pressures--continued to play an important role as they had in
1954-1956 but, despite fluctuations in the nature and weight of
these two factors, they did not change so radically as the other
determinants.
The most visible impact of these forces was seen in
changes in the Soviet propaganda line toward the West and in the
ideological rationale by which Moscow justified its policies to
critics of peaceful coexistence and the world without arms
espoused by the Kremlin. But the cumulative effect of the military
and other determinants of Soviet foreign policy was not fully demon-
strated until 1962, when, after months of ambivalence and apparent
drift, Moscow pursued first one and then another radical course
designed to improve both its security interests vis-a-vis the
West and its ideological position in the Communist movement.
A prime purpose of virtually all Soviet disarmament pro-
posals lay in the attempt to control the international environment,
usually by appealing to the sober forces in the West to turn their
governments toward accommodation with Soviet positions. In
addition--a new element since 1955--they were also intended to
help fend off China's ideological-political-military threat to
Moscow's position in the international Communist movement and to
Soviet security generally.
At the same time Moscow had a strategic interest in seeing
some arms control proposals enacted. The Soviet GCD program was
not well thought out, and Moscow appears to have calculated its
strategic impact inadequately (although advocacy in 1962 of the
"nuclear umbrella" principle portended a turn toward greater
realism). Some measures in it, however, were very strongly in
the Soviet interest, such as the liquidation of overseas bases,
while propaganda on this point might help to complicate U.S.
retention of those bases. Disengagement in Central Europe, with
safeguards against surprise attack, was probably perceived as
being so strongly in the Kremlin's strategic interest as to justify
the political risks entailed. A cessation of nuclear testing in
all environments and by all powers was surely seen as having great
strategic utility, provided only that the moment was not ripe for
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another round of Soviet tests that could yield long-lasting advan-
tages (as in 1961). Similarly, the establishment of nuclear-
free zones and measures to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and
technology ranked high among Moscow's strategic desiderata,
although the chances for their attainment seemed rather remote.
However, although the only promising area of negotiations re-
mained the test ban, the negotiations from 1956 to 1962 in fact
laid a basis for future progress along a broader range of issues.
The United States-Soviet agreement in 1961 on the principles that
should guide future negotiations represented a considerable narrow-
ing of the gap. These theoretical advances were partially trans-
lated into the GCD treaties both sides introduced in 1962, al-
though the chasm between them still loomed large, especially re-
garding what Moscow termed "inspection over armaments." The
progress toward future agreement on regional arms control in
Central Europe was less perceptible.
In sum, general and complete disarmament was obviously
little more than a long-range possibility and therefore had only
propaganda value for the present. Disengagement may have been
believed possible until 1958 or 1959, by which time Washington,
Bonn, and even Paris came down firmly against it. A nuclear test
ban seemed to have strong support from Western officials beginning
in 1958; but the high price the West demanded in terms of inspec-
tion, its reservations that a ban would depend on progress on
other matters, and the Western proclivity to introduce new scienti-
fic data into the negotiations may have cast doubt upon the West's
ultimate intentions.
The greatest movement toward narrowing East-West differences
came on the test ban issue. Each side seemed to believe the pro-
blem warranted concessions to the other's viewpoint. The West
sought ways to reduce the amount of on-site inspection needed,
and Moscow accepted specific inspection procedures--although
acceptance was sometimes retracted. Technological improvements
promised that national inspection systems could minimize or
eliminate the need for international controls, perhaps even on
underground tests. But although the two sides came tantalizingly
close to agreeing on a moratorium on underground tests and a
treaty banning all others, their respective interests never
coincided in the period.
Finally, a general trend could be observed toward greater
East-West understanding. Both sides also began to do their home-
work more effectively. Soviet writing on disarmament began to
show much greater familiarity with Western strategic thinking,
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especially after 1959. The Pugwash, Dartmouth, and other informal
opportunities for informal discussions appeared to have a visible
impact, with both the "nuclear-umbrella" principle and the "black-
box" system, which Soviet diplomacy espoused in 1962, originating
in such discussions. Although Moscow's new line on the
economic consequences of disarmament for capitalist countries was
politically motivated, the very process of arguing this point
brought Soviet economists to a less dogmatic approach to the
market economy.
Moscow's propaganda treatment of the disarmament issue from
1956 to 1962 generally continued the more restrained and reason-
able appearance it had acquired in 1955, with emphasis less on
exposing or pressuring the capitalist West than on persuading it
that ddtente and disarmament could be in the interest of both sides.
Even at the moments when Soviet propaganda media stumped for
general and complete disarmament, the argument was pitched mainly
to "all sober men" in the West rather than to the "oppressed masses"
who were earlier urged to struggle against their rulers.
The two radically, even qualitatively, new elements that
entered Soviet propaganda around 1959 dated at least from 1956,
but both came into full bloom in 1959, probably in connection
with the worsening state of Sino-Soviet relations.
The first innovation was directed to the West. Peaceful
coexistence and disarmament, the West was now assured, meant money
in the pocket. Disarmament, the Comnunist line averred, would
bring not catastrophe but abundance--even to capitalist economies.
It would also ensure peace, without which other values had no
meaning. Furthermore, as Moscow had long stressed, trade with the
Soviet Union would expand Western markets.
The other innovation concerned ideology as well as propa-
ganda. Opponents of "capitalism" and "imperialism" were now told
that peaceful coexistence and disarmament constituted the best
means for pursuing their objectives. There was no alternative
to peace except war; but peaceful coexistence meant "struggle"
as well as "cooperation." By economic competition socialism
would triumph; disarmament would bring savings that socialist
and developing countries could utilize to better advantage than
capitalist economies. And disarmament would remove the physical
instruments by which the capitalists held back the tide of social
change. Lenin preached this same message, and new documents were
published to demonstrate his view that socialist diplomacy should
try to strengthen the moderate elements in the Western bourgeoisie.
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In this period of transition what relative weighting ought
we to assign to the factors we have identified as possible deter-
minants of Soviet arms control policy? We begin with those that
appear to have exercised a more decisive influence, turning then to
those that exerted an important but more marginal role. In the
first category we would rank Soviet calculations about the East-
West military balance, the opportunities and problems in dealing
with the West, and the prospects of Sino-Soviet relations. Among
the marginal factors we would include the economic burden of de-
fense upon the Soviet economy and the role played by the Russian
opponents and supporters of Khrushchev's policies.
Of all the elements shaping Soviet arms control policy,
military considerations appear to have been the most decisive in
this period, both in moving Soviet policy toward arms control and
in setting limits upon the extent of such movement. This judgment
does not contradict the argument that arms control was first and
foremost a supporting means of Soviet foreign policy rather than of
Soviet military strategy; for the immediate purpose of arms control
policy was to affect the political environment and in that way
indirectly to regulate the strategic situation. But the motivation
behind Moscow's concern to shape the political situation arose
most urgently from the Kremlin's perception of certain military
factors.
Moscow's optimistic assumptions of 1955 and 1956 regarding
the strategic balance were fulfilled in 1957 when the world had
cause to talk of an incipient missile gap favoring the Soviet
Union. Soviet confidence rode high until 1960-1961, when the
United States reversed the alleged missile gap both in theory and
practice. Moscow's propensity to negotiate on disarmament seemed
to follow a "U" curve: from 1955 to 1959-1960, while self-con-
fidence still reigned, the propensity to negotiate seriously was
relatively high. From 1960 to 1961, while confidence waned--for
military and other reasons--Moscow showed less interest in
immediately feasible measures, although it did push GCD. In 1961
it tried to cash in on the last vestiges of the missile gap myth
by renewed pressure on Berlin. It sought to counterbalance the
mounting number of U.S. ICBM's by developing and testing giant
nuclear warheads in September and October of 1961. Another des-
perate attempt to attain both the image and the reality of parity
with the West came when missiles were shipped to Cuba in 1962.
Only after that venture failed did Moscow seem to reconcile itself
to a position of at least temporary strategic inferiority (braced,
however, by a quite credible minimum deterrent) and resume
serious arms control talks with the West.
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While Moscow's view of the overall strategic balance passed
through these stages, the Soviet Union continued as in 1955 to
seem to fear surprise attack, accidental war, catalytic war, and
escalation--especially as a result of forward moves by Bonn or
Peking. Similarly, the Soviet government became seriously concerned
about nuclear proliferation to Germany and China. All these
concerns underlay the mounting Soviet interest in regional arms
control in Central Europe, ground control posts, and a ban on
nuclear testing that might lead to preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons and nuclear technology.
For these reasons it appears that the prime motivation be-
hind Soviet interest in a nuclear test ban was strategic: to
prevent the United States from surpassing or overtaking the Soviet
Union in strategic nuclear weapons; to halt the development of
U.S. tactical weapons and their stationing in Central Europe;
and to prevent before it was too late the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by Bonn and Peking.
Military considerations were also key restraints on Soviet
willingness to sign a test ban. The right moment had to be
found when Soviet security vis-a-vis the West would best be
maintained by a freeze or end to nuclear testing; and--a more
constant concern--a formula had to be found that both prevented
the United States from continuing underground tests and avoided
the necessity of intensive foreign inspection of Soviet nuclear
and other military facilities. Even after the revelations of U-2
reconnaissance, the Soviet Union still prized the military security
that kept its weak as well as strong points from enemy intelligence.
Another military restraint on arms control policy generally
was the apparent opposition of some Soviet marshals to cuts in
Soviet ground, naval, and air forces and their probable, opposition
to steps that might alienate China and blur the image of an evil
capitalist adversary in the West. The role of such opposition,
while marginal in itself, could become decisive when combined with
other pressures working against East-West detente and accommodation
in arms control.
The second decisive influence on arms control policy stemmed
from Moscow's perceptions of the West. Khrushchev assumed that
there were elements in the Western leadership who could be
persuaded or coerced into accepting his version of peaceful
coexistence even if it implied an expansion of the socialist
camp and contraction of the capitalist. The Soviet government,
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as noted, worked out an elaborate justification, quoting from
newly found scripture, for attempting to collaborate and make
compromises with the Western governments even while remaining
ideologically hostile and "struggling" against them.
Did the Kremlin believe its own line about the malleability
of moderate forces in the West? It is difficult to correlate pre-
cisely the emphasis in Soviet media on a heterogeneous adversary
with the emergence of a more conciliatory approach toward Moscow
from different NATO governments. It appears that the Kremlin's
expectations concerning a possible improvement in East-West
relations rose after Dulles death in May 1959 until they were
dashed by the U-2 incident a year later. A period of waiting set
in to see which way the new administration in Washington would
move, but the first Kennedy defense budget, the Bay of Pigs, the
confrontation in Vienna, and the shows of force over Berlin pro-
bably indicated to Moscow that the new government intended to be
firm. In general it appears that Soviet propaganda concerning
the West's disposition to compromise persisted without much regard
for the apparent maintenance at times of a hard line in the NATO
countries.
The Kremlin's continued assertion that Soviet policy could
and should come to terms with moderates in the West ran a much
greater risk for Khrushchev and associates after 1956 due to
Peking's mounting criticism of this approach. The stakes became
higher as Kremlin ideologists promised that peaceful coexistence
meant both struggle and cooperation with the West. If neither
aspect of Soviet policy proved successful, Khrushchev's--in Moscow
as well as in Peking--would be strengthened. The impact of
Moscow's actual and public image of the West upon Soviet disarma-
ment policy was therefore of paramount importance.
However, it appears likely that the Soviet leadership did
in fact become increasingly sophisticated about Western politics.
Whether moderates were presently in the Western saddle or not, the
Kremlin seems to have assumed that they existed, that they could be
strengthened, and that cooperation as well as competition would be
possible with them. This fundamentally optimistic view generally
persisted from 1955 to 1962. But the events of 1960 and 1961 must
have raised serious doubts in Moscow about how close the moderates
were to the levers of power in the West, and Khrushchev said as
much at the October 1961 Party Congress.
The third decisive influence on arms control policy was China,
which had played no visible role in the 1954-1956 shift in Soviet
policy. From 1956 and especially 1959 the state of Sino-Soviet
relations grew steadily more strained. Peking, although it
gave some ostensible support to the Soviet Union's leading
position in the Communist movement in 1956-1957, showed
increasing disdain for the style and content of Soviet domestic
and foreign policy. Disarmament was a particular grievance and
represented the opposite side of another sore spot--Moscow's
refusal, made explicit in 1959, to give China a sample atomic
bomb or technical data. The events of September 1959
sparked an intensified Chinese attack on the "illusions" of those
who talked of a "warless world."
The Soviet Union, while it would have preferred to keep China
within the fold, seemed little restrained by China's criticism.
Shortly after 1957, when Peking has claimed that the Soviet Union
agreed to a pact on a new defense technology with China, Moscow's
diplomats made some of their most far-reaching concessions in the
test ban negotiations. At the same time, concern over China
seems to have spurred the Kremlin's attempts to halt nuclear test-
ing and nuclear proliferation. Moscow's intensive propagation in
1959 of nuclear-free zones correlated positively with China's
charges that Moscow refused in June 1959 to provide her with a
a sample atomic bomb. The Kremlin endeavored to meet the Chinese
ideological challenge in many ways, one of which was to argue more
intensely the possibility and desirability of peaceful coexistence
and disarmament not as a tactic but as a strategy.
Although the main thrust of Chinese criticism functioned to
drive Moscow into more serious efforts at accomodation with the
West, the effect of Peking's challenge to Khrushchev was also to
strengthen his domestic foes who opposed his personal style, his
tendency to cut back conventional forces, and his commitment to
inaugurating goulash communism.
Thus a new element had to be weighed by the Kremlin. The
optimistic expectations of 1955 seem to have made little allowance
for the possibility that Moscow's most powerful ally would threaten
the Soviet position in the international Communist movement and
pose a long-term danger to Soviet security. The Kremlin's decision
to respond to this threat not by appeasement but by efforts to curb
Peking's nuclear program and to rebut its ideological challenge
exerted a decisive influence upon Moscow's arms control policy
from 1956 to 1962. Whatever umbilical cord still joined the two
"fraternal" parties was not severed, however, until 1963. Appar-
ently the hope of keeping China's support somewhat restrained
Soviet arms control policy until Moscow's final decision to sign a
partial test ban treaty.
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An influence that could not be crucial in itself but
which functioned to reinforce the trend of the more decisive
considerations just listed was the mounting cost of the defense
effort relative to the overall functioning of the Soviet economy.
The Kremlin's calculations on both these counts seem to have been
excessively optimistic in 1955 and even as late as 1959. The
absolute cost of the defense effort soared after 1958, at the
same time that general economic growth began to decline. The
slowdown in the overall growth rate was due to a number of factors
one of them being the increased burden imposed by the human and
material resources devoted to defense. Even so, the Twenty-First
Party Congress in 1959 proclaimed that socialism would triumph
over capitalism in economic competition. But Soviet expectations were
still too rosy. -By l9bl-and 19b2 the rate or growth slowed still
more. Moreover, it began to appear in 1960 and 1961 that the
Soviet Union had no imminent prospect of surpassing the United
States militarily let alone in over-all industrial production,
especially if Soviet resources continued to be allocated and used
in their present pattern.
Khrushchev's marshals were arguing for a "balanced" military
structure-, which meant heavy outlays for all kinds of military
forces. Expected savings by concentration on nuclear-rocket
forces would thus be precluded. But the effort to match the
United States in the arms race was becoming an effort just to keep
the strategic balance from widening further to Moscow's
disadvantage, and it was impeding progress toward making the Soviet
Union a model of rapid industrial development and consumer
affluence. When Soviet economists began to talk about the blessings
that disarmament might bring to all economies of the world, they
may well have had the Soviet Union uppermost in mind.
Had there been a prospect of radically increasing Moscow's
bargaining power by greater investment in defense, or had there
been an imminent military threat to Soviet security, the
increased drag that military spending exerted on economic growth
would not have been a serious influence on Soviet strategic
planning. But coming at a time when other pressures militated
increasingly for arms controls with the West, the promise of
economic savings from curtailment of the arms race had increasing
appeal to Soviet policy makers. At least by 1962 but probably
several years earlier the economic factor loomed much higher
among the forces favoring a limitation of armaments than it had
in 1955. Its effect was that of a multiplier that buttressed
and perhaps deepened the influence of the military and political
considerations.
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During this period Khrushchev's world view and his personal
style were the dominant factors in the determination of Soviet
foreign and domestic policy. By comparison with Stalin, he
relied much more on persuasion than coercion. The thaw and
fluidity that entered many aspects of Soviet society after
Stalin's death made it virtually impossible for any one man
or even any central elite to rule by fiat.
Whereas Lenin and Stalin left such matters to their foreign
ministers, Khrushchev apparently took great personal interest in
propagating Moscow's disarmament policy. The main lines of
Soviet disarmament policy probably followed his preferences,
although the details may have been left to functionaries.
The extent to which Khrushchev's preferences could prevail
depended, however, on his ability to cope with forces within
Soviet society that opposed or favored greater moves toward detente
and disarmament. He had to mobilize a certain amount of support
for his views on measures qiuh as arms cnt-rol that c+l+ ld have
far-reaching implications for every facet of Soviet society.
He could generally count on a popular response from the Soviet
public and much of the intelligentsia who wanted peace, prosperity,
and political liberalization. Further, some plant managers and
party leaders may have wanted to free resources from arms for
investment in heavy or light industry and agriculture.
From other groups closer to the levers of power there was
probably general resistance to any lessening of Soviet defense
efforts and to more intimate relations with the capitalist foe.
Many party leaders would oppose any extensive collaboration with
moderates in the West, alienation of China, or political liberal-
ization in the Soviet Union. Military leaders would oppose any
weakening of defenses. Certain plant managers and scientists with
a vested interest in defense production would likewise oppose a
slackening of military investment. The influence of this "second"
group would be combined and multiplied at moments when the West
seemed recalcitrant (demonstrating the infeasibility of detente
and disarmament); at moments when the military balance seemed to
turn sharply in the Soviet Union's favor or in its disfavor; and
at moments when Peking threatened to challenge Moscow's position
because of Soviet revisionism.
Although no precise correlation can be determined between
these domestic influences and fluctuations in arms control policy,
it is probable that these marginal domestic influences on Kremlin
policy, linked with the other four factors that have been
enumerated, helped to bring on a somewhat tougher orientation in
Soviet foreign policy from the U-2 incident in 1960 until the Cuban
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gambit in 1962. But even within the framework of this partial
hardening of the Kremlin's line, as we have noted, some concessions
in the disarmament negotiations continued to be made, and
Khrushchev's ideologists deepened their commitment to the
possibility and desirability of disarmament.
The combination of military, political, and economic forces
shaping Soviet foreign policy in the period under review seemed
on balance to militate strongly for a policy that would function
either to gain a quick-fix by which Soviet power could again try
to match or surpass the West's, or to enter a breathing space
of relaxed tensions with the West that de-emphasized military
competition and political struggle. There was probably strong
support from all the hard-line elements who influence Soviet
policy for attempting the first of these alternatives. Perhaps
some way to achieve their goal would have to be attempted before
serious efforts at the second alternative could be undertaken.
In any case, the success of a detente policy would depend also
upon reciprocity in the West, and although Washington's
intentions to resist Communist expansion were quite manifest
in 1960-1961, the willingness of the Republican and Democratic
leaderships to forego a forward strategy were not yet entirely
clear to the Kremlin. For all these reasons the 1962 Cuban
adventure would be decisive: its failure proved the infeasibility
of the first alternative; its aftermath showed the practicality
of the second.
While the key determinants of Soviet foreign policy
militated increasingly for structural change in arms control
policy as well as in other areas of East-West relations from
1958 to 1962, there was relatively little alteration in fact
in Soviet disarmament policy by comparison with the qualitative
changes of 1954 and 1955. The stage was set for a new round--
of "struggle," of "cooperation," or of some new synthesis of the
two.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SPIRIT OF MOSCOW: DETENTE AND LIMITED ARMS
CONTROL AGREEMENTS, 1962-1964
A. Introduction
This chapter seeks to determine the nature of the Soviet
interest in disarmament and arms control during the last two
years of the Khrushchev regime. In so doing it should provide
an understanding of some of the factors that will condition the
approach of the new Soviet regime to the problem of East-West
security agreements.
The period in question saw agreement between the super-
powers on several partial measures, mostly marginal in
significance compared with the unresolved issues of armaments,
but by no means unimportant. The limited nuclear test ban
treaty, the hot line, the U.N. resolution opposing orbiting of
nuclear weapons, and the tacitly agreed cut-backs in the
production of fissionable materials--these supply a series of
new landmarks on the otherwise barren plain of post-war arms
control negotiations.
B. Manifest Soviet Policies
1. The Negotiations: Style and Substance
a. Moves on the Test Ban and GCD. Shortly before the Cuban
missile crisis erupted, Moscow shifted its position on two central
issues. First, on August 29 and September 3, 1962, after
rejecting two alternative test ban proposals put forward by
the United States on August 27, the Soviet delegate to the
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) announced his
government's willingness to sign a three-environment test ban
with a moratorium on underground testing "while continuing
negotiations on the final prohibitions of such explosions."
A similar proposal had been made by Moscow on November 28, 1961,
but with the provision that inspection over the underground
test moratorium could take place only in the context of a
comprehensive disarmament agreement. Moscow's August 29-
September 3 position seemed no longer to be contingent upon
GCD measures being enacted, but Soviet representative
Kuznestsov clouded the issue on September 5 by reiterating
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Moscow's support for its stand of November 28, 1961. In any event
the Western delegates rejected the new Soviet overture on prin-
ciple because--after Soviet test resumption in 1961--the West
would no longer consent to an unpoliced moratorium.1
The other shift in Moscow's position prior to Cuba took
place during the general debate of the Seventeenth General Assembly.
Foreign Minister Gromyko announced on September 21, 1962:
Taking account of the stand of the Western Powers
the Soviet Government agrees that in the process of
destroying vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons
at the first stage exception be made for a strictly
limited and agreed number of global intercontinental
missiles, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft
missiles of the ground-to-air type which would remain
at the disposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States alone.2
Ostensibly this concession was made to meet the Western demands
for retention of a "nuclear umbrella" during the early stages of
the disarmament program. But during the brief third session
of the ElDC in November and December Soviet spokesmen refused to
clarify the Gromyko pro osal until it was accepted "in
principle" by the West.
The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was not followed
by any immediate or dramatic shifts in Soviet positions on the
test ban, GCD, or collateral measures in either the United Nations
General Assembly or the ENDC. At the General Assembly meeting in
New York the Soviet government continued to attack Western pro-
posals for a partial test ban or a comprehensive ban with on-site
inspection. A more positive chord was sounded on December 5, 1962,
when the United States and Soviet Union announced agreement on
certain measures of cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.
1ENDC/PV.76, August 29, 1962, pp. 14-23; ENDC/PV.79,
September 3, 1962, pp. 72 and 78-80. See also verbatim records
of September 5, 1962.
28nited Nations Document A/PV.ll27, 25 September, 1962,
pp.- 38-40.
3 ENDC/PV.83, November 26, 1962, p. 22. However, on March 27,
1963 the Soviet delegate elucidated for the first time that Mos-
cow would permit inspection of the missile launch pads. ENDC/PV.ll4,
March 27, 1963, pp. 39-40.
The Soviet position on a nuclear test ban was formally
modified for the first time since September when on December 3
and 10, 1962, Moscow publicly espoused the idea of automatic
seismic stations--"two or three" on Soviet territory--to
control an underground test ban. Delivery of the sealed
apparatus for periodic replacement in the Soviet Union would
have to be carried out by Soviet personnel in Soviet aircraft,
but Moscow would be prepared to agree to servicing by foreign
personnel. A short time later, on December 19, Khrushchev
announced Moscow would accept "two to three" on-site inspections
per year for the control of a comprehensive test ban treaty,2
thereby returning to a position first held in 1960. However,
Washington insisted that the minimum number of inspections
acceptable to the United States was between eight and ten.3 The
resulting impasse led Moscow to break off tripartite talks that
went on in New York from January 14 to 31, 1963. On April 1,
1963 the Western powers at the ENDC reduced their demand from
8-10 to 7 on-site inspections,4 but in the following month the
debate degenerated to the point where the Soviet negotiator
declared that it was "a sheer waste of time." 5
b. Limited Agreements and the "Spirit of Moscow." While
the test ban negotiations showed little prospect of success the
ENDC discussions on other arms control items in the spring of
1963 appeared equally inauspicious. The five Communist delega-
tions attacked the Nassau agreement of December 1962, plans for
U.S.-Canadian defense cooperation, the Franco-German treaty of
cooperation of January 1963, and U.S. overseas bases--particularly
lENDC/PV.90, December 10, 1962, pp. 13-27. This idea had
originated at the Tenth Conference on Science and World Affairs
("Pugwash") in London during September 1962. The Soviets subse-
quently made private approaches to the United States on this matter
in October and November at the General Assembly and Geneva. It
was mentioned favorably by Radio Moscow on November 10, (Domestic Ser-
vice, 0025 GMT) and by the Soviet negotiator at the ENDC on
November 13, 1962.
2Documents on Disarmament, 1962, pp. 1239-1242.
3ENDC/74, January 31, 1963.
4ENDC/78, April 1, 1963, in United Nations Document DC/207,
April 12, 1963.
5 ENDC/PV.126, April 29, 1963, p. 24.
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those serving Polaris submarines. A number of Soviet proposals
were aimed directly against these Western positions--a declaration
"On Renunciation of Use of Foreign Territories for Stationing
Strategic Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons,"1 a draft 2nonaggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers,
and a proposal for declaring the Mediterranean a nuclear-free
zone.3
It was against this background of hostile negotiating be-
havior in the ENDC that Moscow was negotiating a direct communica-
tions link with Washington as well as a test ban agreement.
Evidence of progress on the hot line was indicated on April 5, when
the Soviet delegate declared that his government agreed to the
United States proposal "im nediately, without waiting for general
and complete disarmament."'1 While the hot line agreement of
June 20, 1963 was being prepared, private talks on a test ban
treaty were proceeding among unofficial representatives of the
United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain. The Western
governments were able to announce on June 10 the scheduling of
a "high-level" conference of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in Moscow on July 15.5
Khrushchev announced on July 2 that in the forthcoming three-
power talks in Moscow the Soviet government was interested in con-
cluding a partial test ban agreement. Modifying the Soviet
position of August 29-September 3, 1962, Khrushchev dropped the
qualification of an (uninspected) moratorium on underground
testing but now called fer the simultaneous signing of an East-
West nonaggression pact.
ENDC/PV.147, June 21, 1963, p. 49.
2ENDC/77, February 20, 1963, in United Nations Document
DC/207, April 12, 1963.
3ENDC/PV.139, May 31, 1963, pp. 21-22.
4ENDC/PV.ll8, April 5, 1963, p. 52.
5Great Britain, Further Documents Relating to the Conference
of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (London, 1963), p. 7
(Cmd. paper 2184).
ENDC/ll2, August 22, 1963, in United Nations Document
DC/207, April 12, 1963.
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While circumstantial evidence suggests that Khrushchev had
opted for a test ban agreement even before his July 2 statement,
and may have recognized that a partial ban held the greatest
prospects of success on both sides, it was not yet entirely
clear that the nonaggression pact issue might not be used by the
Soviet leadership to scuttle agreement at the last minute,
especially as Sino-Soviet negotiations were also in progress
in Moscow. Khrushchev publicly confined himself to the "hope"
that a nonaggression pact would emerge from the test ban
negotiations.2 The three-power negotiations began in Moscow on
July 15 as scheduled, and after the first day Moscow let the non-
aggression pact issue drop to the background, although it was
clear that the final communique would have to make some mention
of it. The negotiations thereafter were friendly and business-
like. The main problems were the withdrawal clause and the ques-
tion of depositories for the treaty. These were solved with
relatively little difficulty, strong Soviet resistance to the
former being overcome by a circumlocution. On Jul 25 the treaty
was initialed and on August 5, 1963 it was signed.
The impression of detente generated by the limited test ban
treaty pervaded the brief fifth session of the ENDC, which met
through the month of August, but there were no basic changes of
position on the part of either the Soviet Union or the West.
Moscow continued to plead the case for a nonaggression pact and
GCD. But Soviet negotiators also advanced the various collateral
measures proposed by Khrushchev in his speech of July 19,
including a cut in military budgets, a reduction of forces in
both Germanies and measures to prevent surprise attack.
,Moscow ceased jamming the Voice of America broadcasts in
May and June 1963 and signed the hot line agreement on June 20, 1963,
as indicated above. Khrushchev publicly commended President Kennedy's
American University speech of June 10 in Pravda of June 15, 1963;
further, in June 1963, the Soviet publication New Times singled out
the fact that Secretary of State Rusk on May 29, 1963 had supported
the proposal of a group of United States Senators for a partial ban
as being in the interest of both countries. New Times, No. 23,
1963, p. 32 (Russian edition, June 7, 1963).
2ENDC/ll3, August 23, 1963, in United Nations Document DC/208
September 5, 1963.
3ENDC/l00/Rev. 1, July 30, 1963, in United Nations Document
DC/208, September 5, 1963.
4ENDC/PV.152, August 16, 1963, p. 38.
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New Soviet moves were, however, made at the Eighteenth
General Assembly meeting in New York in the fall of 1963. On
September 19 Mr. Gromyko further modified the Soviet position on
a "nuclear umbrella," conceding that a limited number of nuclear
missiles might be retained through the end of the disarmament
process. In addition the Soviet Government at the same time
reversed the position it had taken on June 20, 1963 in the ENDC
and assented to a joint Soviet-American agreement not to orbit
nuclear weapons in space.1 Subsequent U.S.-Soviet agreement
in principle on this matter was endorsed by U.N. General Assembly
resolution on October 17, 1964, calling upon all states to
refrain from orbiting nuclear weapons in space.2
Other signs of limited movement in Soviet positions on arms
control in this period were evident as the year 1963 drew to a
close. At the International Atomic Energy Agency Conference in
Vienna the Soviet Union accepted some safeguards to ensure that
fissionable fuel and reactors were not used for military purposes
by aid recipients, and at the United Nations the Soviet Union
joined the United States in an agreement on certain legal
principles governing the exploration and use of outer space. 3
In fact the latter agreement, which was approved by the U.N. Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on November 22, failed
to contain several Soviet principles--such as the prohibition of
nongovernmental activities in space--which had been objectionable
to the United States. On December 13 Mr. Khrushchev announced a
unilateral reduction in the Soviet military budget and the
possibility of a cutback in Soviet armed forces. And on
December 31, 1963 he addressed a letter to all heads of state
urging an agreement on the peaceful settlement of territorial
disputes--a proposal of q estionable value but obviously aimed
at least in part at China.
Another East-West agreement came on April 20, 1964, when--
after an unpublicized plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in
'Pravda, September 20, 1963.
2
United Nations, General Assembly Official Records, Eighteenth
Session Annexes, Agenda Item 26. See also New Times, No. 41, 1963, p. 32.
3Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1963
(New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by
Harper and Row, 1964).
Pravda, January 4, 1964.
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February--private negotiations among Washington, London, and Moscow
led to unilateral pledges by the three governments to cut back
production of fissionable materials.
c. Hardening of the Line in the ENDC, In the ENDC session
that commenced on January 21, 1964., however, Soviet negotiators
vigorously rejected the new United States proposals for a freeze
on strategic delivery vehicles and for a reduction of Soviet and
American strategic bomber forces. Instead Moscow laid major
emphasis on GCD (including its concession of September 1963 on the
"nuclear umbrella"), the destruction of all bombers, reciprocal
budgetary reductions, and a nonaggression pact. Moscow argued
that the United States proposal on the nondissemination of nuclear
weapons could not be taken seriously until the NATO Multilateral
Force (MLF) project was abandoned; the Kremlin also refused to
dissociate from other partial measures the proposal of ground
control posts against surprise attack. By March 1, 1964 Mr.
Gromyko was publicly charging 1the West with responsibility for the
lack of progress at the ENDC, and an undertone of recrimination
continued to be evident in Soviet statements until the end of the
session on April 28.
We might sum up the period from September 1962 to mid-1964
as one of extraordinary movement toward agreements on the fringes
of the disarmament problem. However, the Soviet approach to
East-West agreements for arms control and disarmament reflected a
notable duality between public and private negotiating posture.
Publicly Soviet representatives continued in the negotiations to
pursue lines of conduct that often seemed to undermine the possibil-
ity of agreement, while privately Moscow proceeded toward specific
understandings with the United States.
2. The Propaganda and Ideology of Disarmament
Soviet propaganda treatment of the arms control and disarma-
ment issue, in common with Soviet negotiating behavior in the ENDC,
seems generally to have been antagonistic to the West even when
private talks between Moscow and Washington were proceeding favor-
ably. The outstanding exceptions to this rule arose in connection
with the test ban and the understanding not to orbit nuclear
weapons in space, when Moscow exhibited definite propaganda
restraint.
1lIzvestia, March 2, 1964.
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The limited shift in Soviet policy on the test ban issue
on August 29-September 3, 1962, at the ENDC was described by
Pravda on the following day as "opening the way to agreement."
New Times on September 8, 1962 described the move in similar
terms. The Soviet willingness to agree to a limited test ban
cum moratorium was affirmed by Khrushchev in a speech on
October 1, 1962.1 The possible significance of the Soviet
move of August 29-September 3 is suggested also by a subsequent
Chinese charge that the Soviet Union notified Peking on August 25,
1962, that it had agreed to a U.S. proposal to refrain from trans-
ferring nuclear weapons and technical information concerning their
manufacture to non-nuclear powers and that non-nuclear powers
should refrain from seeking to buy or produce atomic weapons.2
In the aftermath of the Cuban episode Soviet propaganda
stressed the opportunities for U.S.-Soviet agreement on the test
ban and other arms control measures as a result of Soviet con-
cessions. Indeed the same day that Khrushchev announced that
Russia's missiles were being withdrawn from Cuba Moscow stated
the U.S. and Soviet positions on a test ban were "close." 3 The
Soviet proposals for "black box" controls and, later, for three
on-site inspections were emphasized, as was the nuclear umbrella
offer of September 1962. However the West's negative response
to these proposals and W shington's plans for a NATO nuclear force
were sharply criticized.
Moscow's propaganda increasingly noted that within the United
States government there were opponents of any compromise. In
breaking off the private three-power talks in New York on January 31,
1963 on the grounds that the West was not "showing good will,"
Moscow, citing Edward Teller and Nelson Rockefeller, emphasized
that the United States administration was under "strong pressure"
not to conclude a test ban agreement.5 The American test resumption
soon thereafter was assailed as an attempt to poison the atmosphere
at Geneva, and it was implied that this move was due to pressure
from the "right."6  3
1Pravda, October 2, 1962.
2See Peking Review, No. 33, August 16, 1963.
3TASS in English to Europe, October 28, 1962, 1611 GMT.
4TASS in English to Europe, December 4, 1962, 1748 GMT.
5Editorial, "Transferred to Geneva," New Times, No. 6,
February 13, 1963.
6 Editorial, "Nevada and Geneva," ibid., No. 7, February 20, 1963.
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While the ground was being prepared for the partial test ban
treaty in private talks among the three powers, the Soviet propa-
ganda line on the ENDC was basically antagonistic. The tendency
in the period December 1962 to February 1963 to imply that the
Kennedy administration did not have a free hand in negotiating a
test ban was subordinated in March and April to an antagonistic
propaganda attacking "aggressive" Western moves outside the nego-
tiating forum. The good faith of the Western negotiators in Geneva
was questioned in charges of "procrastination." Although Soviet
propaganda obliquely indicated that Washington might favor a test
banl Moscow generally stressed the West's refusal to consider
"constructive" Soviet proposals at the ENDC. Particular attention
was given to the negative Western response to the Soviet proposal
of a nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranean, again with the expli-
cit references to Polaris and to possible MLF deployment.
A less hostile approach to the West characterized Soviet pro-
paganda from June to October 1963. After Khrushchev's favorable
comments of June 15, 1963 on President Kennedy's American Univer-
sity speech of June 10 and Khrushchev's proposal of a partial
test ban at Berlin on July 2, Soviet statements began to play
down United States "aggressiveness" and instead indicated a
recognition that the governments with which they were negotia-
ting were under pressure from "militarist 'ultras' and the big
war monopolies" not to enter into agreements or move toward a
de'tente. The signing of the hot line agreement was termed a
"bright spot" in the work of the ENDC and proof of Moscow's
good will in seeking agreements with the West. 3
With the initialing of the test ban treaty on July 25, 1963
and the subsequent debate on the issue in the United States, Soviet
propaganda emphasized two main themes: The agreement furthered a
relaxation of tensions and created favorable conditions for the
Editorial, "Vicious Circle," New Times, No. 15,
April 17, 1963. On this occasion Moscow noted that "influential
elements" were exerting pressure on the Kennedy administration
not to sign a test ban.
2See, for example, "The Test Ban Talks," New Times, No. 29,
July 1963.
31zvestia. June 22, 1963.
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solution of other East-West problems, 1 and it "exposed" the
"reactionar" groups in the West that were most opposed to agree-
ments and detente. By contrast Soviet media said relatively
little about the majority of "sober-moderate" individuals and
groups that supported the partial test ban. The treaty was seen
as a means of "tying the hands" of those in the West who were most
vociferous in their opposition to the "socialist" states, 2 while
at the same time the "forces of peace" had been strengthened.
In this connection Soviet commentators emphasized that American
political leaders were showing an increasing understanding of
the need for policies of coexistence rather than policies of
force. This view complemented the other main Soviet propaganda
line to the effect that a start had been made toward a relaxation
of tensions and the step-by-step negotiation of other outstanding
East-West problems.
Soviet domestic propaganda on the test ban made the point
that the relaxing effect of the test ban on the international
situation inhibited the formation of new multilateral NATO or
European nuclear forces. 3 It was also asserted that the Soviet
negotiating proposals that accompanied the test ban had provoked
See, for example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian,
July 26, 1963, 1400 GMT; TASS in Russian to Europe, July 29,
1963, 0310 GMT; TA.SS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963,
1900 GMT; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 5, 1963,
0600 GMT; and TASS in English to Europe, August 5, 1963,
1619 GMT.
2Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, April 18, 1963,
1400 GMT.
"Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 12, 1963,
1900 GMT; Krasnaia zvezda, August 16, 1963.
4 On July 26 in a Pravda interview Khrushchev proposed that
further efforts be devoted above all to the conclusion of a non-
aggression pact; as additional measures he proposed the freezing
or reduction of military budgets, implementation of measures to
prevent surprise attack, reduction in the numbers of foreign troops
in East and West Germany, and a Soviet-Western exchange of troop
representatives between forces stationed in Germany. Moscow
Domestic Service in Russian, July 26, 1963, 1400 GMT.
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"ia tense struggle" among the NATO powers. Noting the line-up of
the NATO members on the issue of a nonaggression pact, Moscow
added that this struggle was "tgoing on not only inside NATO but
in every Atlantic country."2 The Federal Republic of Germany was
consistently portrayed as the chief obstruction to further East-
West agreement and on occasion as "blackmailing" the United States
to this end.3 Fre.ch opposition to further East-West agreements
was also stressed.
Perhaps most interesting, however, was the Soviet propaganda
treatment of the resumption of underground testing by the United
States almost immediately after the limited test ban was signed.
It is understood that Soviet news agencies were directed not
to publish a statement by Professor J. D. Bernal, president of
the World Peace Council, charging that the United States test
resumption was "an affront to humanity" and "a direct blow
against the spirit of the agreement." Soviet media appear to
have continued the moratorium on propaganda opposing the United
States underground test until October 12, 1963, when in a
broadcast to Italy the tests were criticized by Mos ow as not
being in the spirit of the limited test ban treaty.
As in the Bernal case, Radio Moscow played down the fact
that the United States government did not feel ready to push for
a treaty on banning bombs in or it, although it would agree to a
U.N. resolution to that effect. Soviet propaganda on the
iMoscow Domestic Service in Russian, September 1, 1963,
14oo GMT.
2
Ibid. The division on a nonaggression pact at the NATO
Council session in Paris late in August 1963 was reported as follows:
the United States, Britain, Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, Denmark,
and Italy for the pact; the Netherlands, Portugal, and Iceland for
it but with reservations; France, West Germany, Greece, and Turkey
opposed to the pact and even to East-West talks about it.
3See, for example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian,
September 1, 1963, 1400 GMT.
4See, for example, Moscow in English to eastern North America,
August 12, 1963, 0030 GMT.
5Moscow in Italian to Italy, October 12, 1963, 1900 GMT.
6See Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, October 10, 1963,
0600 GMT. TASS in English to Europe, October 17, 1963, 1759 GMT.
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resolution indicated it had been received with "indignation" and
"disappointment" by Senator Goldwater and "the most aggressive-
minded elements of U.S. military quarters."i
On October 21, 1963, as talks on East-West problems contin-
ued between Washington and Moscow and as Khrushchev continued to
seek to convene a conference of the international Communist move-
ment to excommunicate the Chinese, TASS released the first major
threat to the West since the test ban was signed--a warning that
the NATO talks begun on October 11 to set up the MLF could obstruct
progress toward further East-West agreements.2 TASS emphasized that
the Western powers could not verbally oppose the spread of nuclear
weapons while in practice seeking to supply them to the Bundeswehr.
This slight hardening of the line was also reflected in new
activity by the Communist peace fronts, which had been dormant
since the "World Congress of Women" in Moscow in June 1963. Thus
Khrushchev's October 25 warning against allowing the detente to
lead to the "moral and spiritual demobilization of the forces of
disarmament" 3 was followed by "Peace Week" (November 17-24) in
France and the Warsaw session of the World Peace Council (Novem-
ber 28-December 1). The latter called for renewed mass actions,
emphasizing a comprehensive test ban, opposition to nuclear proli-
feration including the MLF, nuclear-free zones, and the mobili-
zation of "pressure" on the ENDC to progress toward a GCD treaty.
Khrushchev's December 13 announcements of a cut in the Soviet
military budget and a possible unilateral force reduction were
characterized by Soviet media as tension-reducing moves designed
to influence the MLF discussions at the Paris NATO Ministerial
Council session of December 16 and 17. Khrushchev by the end of
the year was speaking in terms of agreements by "mutual example."
As the ENDC resumed in January 1964, Moscow proposed a
series of partial measures that were advertised as facilitating
GCD. By March, as the Soviet Union began again to seek support
for a world Communist conference and as the ENDC settled down to
TASS in English to Europe, October 19, 1963, 1433 GMT.
2TASS in English to Europe, October 21, 1963, 1213 GMT.
3 Observer, "Moscow Programme," New Times, No. 44, November 4,
1963.3
4Mikhail Kotov, "The Widening Peace Front," New Times, No. 50,
December 18, 1963.
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unproductive discussion, Mr. Gromyko attacked the West for barring
all progress in Geneva while Radio Moscow asserted that the Soviet
draft GCD treat was "the only plan" that could form the basis
of negotiation.
On April 20, 1964 the joint declaration of intent to reduce
production of fissionable materials was announced and characterized
by the Soviets as "a major new step toward easing international
tension."2 No further agreements, formal or informal, took place
in the arms control area during the remainder of the period
before Khrushchev was deposed, and Soviet propaganda continued
to stress Western obstruction in the ENDC,.
C. Factors Conditioning Soviet Policy
By mid-1961 the optimistic outlook that underlay the shift in
Soviet arms control policy in 1954-1956 had been profoundly eroded.
Despite Soviet advances in rocketry, the West had held fast and
had gone on to outstrip the Soviet Union in numbers of ICBM's.
Despite the enticements and threats that emanated from Moscow, the
NATO alliance had shown considerable cohesion, even allowing for
de Gaulle's independent course. By contrast the one-time Soviet
"bloc" had fallen into a state of severe disarray, with polycentrism
in Eastern Europe and a profound rift in Asia. Despite Soviet
blandishments, the emerging nations remained part of a "third"
and not a Soviet world. Finally, fulfilling Western but not Soviet
forecasts, the rate of Soviet economic growth began seriously to
falter--in part because of the arms race--after 1958. Had the
attempt to emplace Soviet missiles in Cuba succeeded, at least
the military picture would have been more to Moscow's liking, and
perhaps the other problems enumerated would also have been favorably
affected. The failure of the Cuban gambit therefore resulted in
a serious narrowing of the foreign policy alternatives open to
the Kremlin.
The same factors that induced a shift in Soviet arms control
policy after Cuba also set limits on how far that policy might go:
the problem of present Soviet strategic inferiority and the outlook
for some new technological or territorial breakthrough; the
presence of what Moscow termed "sober" and "aggressive" forces
in the West; the unremitting pressure from Peking for a stiffer
1ioscow in German to Germany, March 10, 1964, 1245 GMT.
2 Pravda, April 23, 1964.
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line toward "imperialism"; the extent to which the Soviet
economy could sustain arms competition with the United States
and benefit from a slackening of defense expenditures; and
finally, the balance of power and opinion among the Kremlin
leadership. Taking each of these problems in turn we shall see
their interaction and impact upon the Soviet approach to arms
control after Cuba.
1. The Military-Strategic Outlook
We found considerable evidence, both in terms of the Soviet
strategic position at the time and in terms of the prospective
ICBM capability, that in the 1955 period military considerations
strongly influenced Soviet arms control policy, apart from the
general recognition of the altered nature of strategy, due to
nuclear weapons, that underlay a basic reappraisal of the future.
We found that in the 1957-1962 years the Soviet propensity to
negotiate fluctuated with the confidence the Soviet leaders derived
from their strategic power: with high confidence they tended to
negotiate more earnestly; with waning confidence their interest in
negotiation seemed to fall off; and with gathering acceptance of
at least temporary strategic inferiority they began to take
negotiations more seriously again. What data regarding the
military position was central to Soviet policy in 1962-1964.,
and what can we conclude about its relevance to Soviet arms
control policy in this period?
a. Strategic Forces in Being. Chart IV.1 shows the approxi-
mate gross strategic force levels for the United States and the
Soviet Union as of August 17, 1964. Charts 111.1-111.4 showed
the development of Soviet and United States ICBM forces, long-
range bombers, land-based MRBM/IRBM forces, and medium-range
bombers since 1950.
As Charts 111.1-111.4 indicated, the variety and quantity of
Soviet strategic delivery vehicles increased substantially over
the eight-year period since 1955. Although the notion of the
"missile gap," diligently fostered by Moscow, had been exploded
by 1961, it was nonetheless true in the post-"gap" period of
the early. and mid-1960's that the Soviet Union had the unquestioned
capacity to deliver nuclear weapons on target in the United States.
By 1963 the Soviet strategic force was built primarily on
ballistic missiles (ICBM's, IRBM's, MRBMrs), secondarily on
missile-carrying submarines, 1 and third, to a much smaller
1See Table 111.2.
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degree, on strategic aircraft armed with air-to-surface missiles. 1
The approximate numbers of all these f rces in 1963 are displayed
in Chart IV.l. As has been indicated, the Soviet MRBM/IRBM
force has grown slowly, and a site-hardening program may be
required to make this force a credible deterrent.
b. Strategic Weapons in Development. Moscow appeared in
the mid-1960's to have a number of options in the further develop-
ment of offensive weapons systems. These included the following
in particular:
Improvement and enlargement of the Soviet ICBM force by
deploying a larger number of hardened second-generation
ICBM's or by developing an ICBM delivery system for the
high-yield warheads under testing since 1961.
Modernization and enlargement of the ballistic missile-
firing submarine fleet.
Statements of American officials show little concern over a
Soviet weapons-in-space program or any significant development
and deployment of an anti-ICBM system. Consequently, given the
slow but steady rise reported in Soviet ICBM and submarine-
launched weapons, it is assumed here that improvements and
numerical increases in the latter systems represent the most
likely course of action for the Soviet Union during the next
few years. Consequently, although drastic technological
innovation in the weapons field is unlikely, it is certain
that the Soviet Union's strategic deliverable megatonnage,
invulnerability, and flexibility will increase throughout the
1960's, particularly if their missile-submarine capability is
improved and expanded.
c. Implications for Policy. How then were these facts of
the military-strategic outlook translated into policy during the
period of our concern?
Clearly because of its strategic inferiority Moscow sought
to gain maximum political advantage from the military force it had
or might have. Thus the bold but relatively sophisticated Soviet
political use of military force as seen in the performance of
1Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before
House Armed Services Committee, January 30, 1963. See also Marshal
V. D. Sokolovsky, ed., Soviet Military Strategy (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 309.
2See Charts 111.3 and 111.4.
Soviet space rockets, the Soviet 61-megaton nuclear blast in Octo-
ber 1961, and Khrushchev's various claims about a "fantastic new
weapon," a "global rocket," and a 100-megaton bomb--seems to have
been designed in large part to amplify the concern of American
leaders for United States vulnerability in the event that modern
weapons should be used; this aim emerges rather clearly from
Khrushchev's speeches of the period.
After the decisive failure at Cuba and the resultant
resignation to military-strategic inferiority, other factors bear-
ing on Soviet security grew in importance. For one thing there
was an intensified interest in averting any continued deterioration
of the Soviet strategic position. This concern implied policy
moves to inhibit further increases in United States nuclear
strength, the consolidation of the NATO alliance through the
multilateral nuclear force (MLF), and the spread of nuclear
weapons to West Germany. It also implied steps to deter
Chinese progress toward a strategic capability. Moreover, barring
a successful strategem on the Cuban model or a technological
breakthrough, the necessity to live with decisive United States
strategic superiority made certain forms of arms control a more
palatable policy alternative for Moscow. Thus, in modifying
the relationship with the chief adversary by means of both detente
and limited arms control measures Moscow could hope to alter by
political means a strategic balance that had shifted steadily
to Russia's disadvantage.
Here we shall consider the extent to which Soviet strategic
interests would have been served by the propagation and/or signing
of comprehensive and partial disarmament measures advocated by
Moscow after Cuba.
1) Comprehensive Disarmament. The modification of the
Soviet GCD program (first in 1962 and then again in 1963) to
allow for a strictly limited number of nuclear delivery systems
to be retained by the Soviet Union and United States through the
disarmament process meant that--were the basic plan implemented--
the United States would have been brought down to the same level
of missile systems as Russia, while all other aspirants for the
nuclear club would be excluded from membership. Thus, the one
country stronger than Russia would be made weaker while the Soviet
ISee, for example, his speeches of March 16, 1962; December 12,
1962; and January 16, 1963. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian,
March 16, 1962, 1500 GMT; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian,
December 12, 1962, 1405 GMT; and New Times, No. 4., January 30,
1963 (supplement).
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advantage over all other states--including China and Germany--
would be frozen. Moscow thus appeared to move closer to the U.S.
idea of "stabilized deterrence" long criticized by Soviet spokesmen.
It can also be speculated that the aggravation of the Sino-Soviet
relationship in 1962-1963 prompted the Soviets to require the
retention of a deterrent force to offset Chinese manpower superiority.
Finally, Soviet inability to rely upon Chinese conventional support
against the West probably increased the incentives to retain a
nuclear deterrent to the end of the final stage of disarmament.
The Soviet view of a disarmed world was modified again
in July 1964 when Khrushchev suggested that an international
peacekeeping force be established under the Security Council
from contingents provided by neutralist, Western, and Communist
powers--excluding the five permanent members of the Security
Council. 1 While this move was part of Moscow's attempt to
reinforce its position in the United Nations financial crisis,
it also indicated a mounting concern to limit violence in the
emerging nations. Like the nuclear umbrella, the U.N. force
could be used by but not against the two superpowers.
Although neither of these modifications in the Soviet stand
made GCD appear more than a remote possibility, both of them
probably reflected greater realism in the Soviet strategic outlook.
In a manner that was reminiscent of the injection of the ground
control proposal into the disarmament package of 1955,
Moscow may have aimed at controlling the immediate situation by
communicating to the United States a Soviet interest in moves to
stabilize the military environment to mutual advantage.
2) Partial Measures. The four limited arms controls
into which Moscow entered in 1963-1964 were essentially preventive
in nature, and did not seem to upset either the existing military
balance or the strategic R&D plans of either side. Nonetheless,
they did mark a change in the strategic relationship of the two
chief adversaries, and signified some willingness on both sides
to refrain from undertaking destabilizing developments of the
arms race.
a) The Limited Nuclear Test Ban. Soviet atmospheric
testing in 1961 and 1962 apparently yielded Moscow significant
advances in nuclear warhead design, to the extent that the Soviet
government could later assert with some degree of credibility
that it possessed "all the necessary requisites for maintaining
The New York Times, July 5, 1964, section IV, p. 9.
-163-
our defense potential at the proper level that is or may be
required by the situation."i Although Moscow was willing
indirectly to acknowledge that the United States possessed the
advantage in underground testing,2 the Soviet leadership apparently
decided that underground testing offered only marginal gains at
relatively high cost. As for further atmospheric testing, a key
objective here would have been to develop ABM systems. Quite
apart from the practicality and expense of an all-out competition
in active defense with the United States, Moscow may have believed
as of 1963 that it possessed the advantage in high-yield warheads
which made it advisable to forestall the potentially adverse
effects of additional American testing, such as refinements in the
penetrability and reliability of United States ICBM's.
b) The Hot Line. The Soviet interest in this measure
would seem to have arisen in part from the realization after Cuba
of the need for a rapid and reliable form of communication in
crisis management with the United States. Here Moscow seems to
have been moved by a desire to stabilize the military environ-
ment by providing a safeguard against the possibility of accidental
war.
c) The Understanding Not to Orbit Nuclear Weapons in
Space. While this measure did not provide for inspection and was
thus open to evasion, it marked in common with the test ban a
Soviet interest in closing off possible avenues of weapons
development. As in the case of ABM's, the orbiting of nuclear
weapons would introduce an element of instability into the military-
strategic picture the precise effects of which would be difficult
to calculate. Confronted with the uncertainties and cost of
such a program, Moscow may have perceived an interest in not
provoking and possibly inhibiting United States moves in this
direction. Moreover the informal nature of the measure made it
possible for Moscow to pursue such objectives without the cost
of inspection and with freedom of action to proceed with an
orbiting program if circumstances required.
d) The Parallel Announcement of Intent to Reduce
Fissionable Materials Production. In common with the previous
measure the parallel announcement of a cutback in fissionable
materials production did not create formal restraints on Moscow.
1Soviet Statement of August 21, 1963 in reply to Chinese
Government Statement of August 15, 1963; TASS in English to Europe,
August 20, 1963, 2122 GMT.
2 Moscow in English to Britain, November 14, 1962, 2000 GMT.
-164-
As in the case of the limited test ban, a central Soviet interest
in this measure was probably to inhibit the development of ABM
systems, given that the production of high-yield warheads necessary
for anti-missiles would require substantial supplies of
fissionable materials. Moscow's primary interest here was
probably to exert a restraining influence on further increments
in United States strategic strength.
Soviet willingness to enter into the test ban, bombs-in-
orbit, and nuclear production cutback agreements suggested a
judgment that Moscow's military strength was sufficient to back
its foreign policies in conditions of detente and that no
technological breakthrough was imminent for either side.
2. The External Political Situation
Forcing Moscow as it did to Live with an adverse strategic
balance, the failure at Cuba destroyed the basis of a further
political-military offensive against the Western alliance.
On the other hand, the responsiveness of the Kennedy administration
to the conciliatory element in the post-Cuba Soviet policy line
and the existence of mounting centrifugal forces in NATO offered
Moscow increasingly good reasons to seek a d6tente and even certain
agreements with the West. However, the view to the West also
conditioned the Soviet approach to arms controls by an awareness
that the balance of forces within NATO made all but the most
limited East-West agreements improbable. These constraints and
opportunities emerging from the outlook to the West were matched
by conflicting influences on Soviet policy arising from the
conflict with China. Khrushchev's apparent readiness to rupture
relations with the Chinese rather than make the domestic
and foreign policy changes demanded by Peking seems to have
prompted him toward an accommodation with the West. However,
in seeking to free his hands to deal with the situation on the
East, Khrushchev also made himself more vulnerable to criticism
from orthodox Communists. Thus the external political situation
exerted a contradictory effect on Soviet interests in arms
control and disarmament.
a. The View to the West. The appearance in 1959 of esoteric
Lenin documents stressing an instrumental use of the disarmament-
peace issue both to split Western elites and to strengthen the
less anti-Soviet elements within them, and the amplification of
these materials in 1962 and 1964 coincided with Soviet policy
statements on the theme that it was "not a matter of indifference"
whether Moscow had to deal with aggressive and uncompromising
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Western leaders or with those who took a somewhat more moderate
approach to East-West relations. 1 This approach to the West was
also accompanied by a rising tendency to distinguish between the
attitudes toward the Soviet Union of various groups and indi-
viduals in the Western capitals.
In looking to Washington after the Cuban missile crisis,
Soviet statements suggested that Moscow perceived a sharp struggle
in progress between conflicting leadership groups, and indeed
Khrushchev described the resolution of the Cuban crisis in terms of
Soviet manipulation of exploitable differences within the top
United States leadership:
Among the ruling circles of the United States there are
politicians whom one rightly calls mad. . . .Is it not clear
that if we had adopted an uncompromising position it would
only have helped the camp of the rabid ones to utilize the
situation to inflict a blow against Cuba and to unleash a
world war? For the sake of justice, it should be observed
that among the leading circles of the United States,
there are also people who evaluate the situation more
soberly. . . .
Khrushchev also chose to emphasize the entirely novel "sobering"
effect which this brush with thermonuclear war had had on both
the United States leadership and the American people generally.
Whereas at the Twenty-Second Congress in October 1961 he had
advanced the line that the United States elite was not yet
sufficiently "reasonable" in its understanding of the foreign
policy consequences of modern weapons developments, he began
after the Cuban crisis to advertise that there were those in
the United States government who now seemed to understand what
lIn addition to Kuusinen's 1960 Lenin Anniversary Address,
(Pravda, April 23, 1960), see Khrushchev's speech of January 6,
1961 (World Marxist Review, No. 1, 1961), Ponomarev's speech
of April 23, 1963 (in Pravda of that date), and N. Inozemtsev,
"Nadezhdy i trevogi amerikantsev," Pravda, December 25, 1963.
Speech of December 12 to the Supreme Soviet (emphasis added).
Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, December 12, 1962, 1405 GMT. See
also Kuusinents address at the Eighth Hungarian Party Congress on
November 21, 1962, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, November 22,
1962, 0920 GMT. For evidence of a similar view of Western leadership
restraint shortly before Cuba see N. S. Khrushchev, "Nasushchnye
voprosy razvitiia mirovoi sotsia-isti-cheskoi sistemy," Kommunist,
No. 12 (August), 1962. Passed to press August 24, 1962.
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was at stake.
At the same time Khrushchev made clear his belief that
President Kennedy was not entirely a free agent as far as East-West
security agreements were concerned, noting that "the Soviet Government
takes into account the complexity and many-sidedness of the problems
facing various states, displays the necessary restraint, and adheres
to constructive views. But we strongly emphasize that there are
problems of first priority whose solution brooks no procrastina-
tion. . . .t2 As indicated earlier, this perception of the
political situation in Washington continued to appear intermittently
in Soviet views on the West in the months prior to the initialling
of the limited test ban treaty on July 25, 1963. By that time,
however, Khrushchev had gone out of his way to comment favorably
on President Kennedy's American University speech of June 10,3
and Pravda had come out with a new and very clear statement of
the need to distinguish between various groups in Western capitals:
In our time, in connection with the possible conse-
quences of thermonuclear war, there has been a marked
intensification of the struggle between two tendencies
among the bourgeoisie: the aggressive adventuristic
tendency and the moderate-sober one. After all, world
war has become essentially unthinkable for the
imperialist aggressor. . . .Communists and all the
progressive forces are interested in strengthening
the moderate-sober tendency in bourgeois policy,
which is dictated by an understanding of the point-
lessness of thermonuclear war. . . . The problem is,
while not allowing war to be unleashed, at the same
time to use the existing situation to the maximum n
the interests of the struggle for world socialism.
1Compare speech of October 17, 1961 (CDSP, Vol. XII, No. 41,
1961) with that of December 12, 1962 (Moscow Domestic Service in
Russian, December 12, 1962, 1405 GMT).
2Speech of December 12, 1962, loc. cit. See also Khrushchev's
letter of December 19, 1962 to President Kennedy concerning the test
ban (Pravda, January 21, 1963)-
3Pravda, June 15, 1963.
4
F. Burlatskii, "Konkretnyi analiz--vazhneishee trebovanie
leninizma," Pravda, July 25, 1963 (Emphasis added).
During the U.S. Senate debate and hearings on ratification
of the limited test ban the Soviet media provided a great deal of
evidence that Moscow perceived sharp distinctions between the
"reasonable" individuals supporting the treaty and the various
"madmen" that were said to be at work in the United States
political system. This distinction was voiced again by
Khrushchev in December 1963, soon after the Soviet-American
expression of intent not to orbit nuclear weapons in space, at
the moment when he announced a reduction in the Soviet military
budget and a possible troop cut:
I would like to believe that the sensible forces in the
United States, those who think realistically and realize
the responsibility of their country for the fate of the
world, will show the will and find the means to rebuff
the aggressive militaristic circles, the "madmen," and
thereby bar a dangerous development of events which would
inevitably involve both the United States and other countries.
As Khrushchev spoke favorably of President Johnson, Secretary
Rusk and Senator Fulbright early in 1964, a new group of Lenin
documents was released almost simultaneously with the announcement
of the Soviet, American, nd British intent to reduce production
of fissionable materials. These new materials sanctioned more
clearly than ever before Soviet policies designed to enhance
the influence of the "sensible forces" in the United States
leadership.'
The preceding evidence clearly associates Moscow's differ-
entiated view of the chief Western adversary with an instrumental
use of the arms control and disarmament issue throughout 1962-1964.
Before proceeding to detail the implications for policy, however,
we are bound to ask whether Khrushchev stressed the existence
of manipulable differences in the West because he believed they
existed and should be used as a rationalization to persuade
hard-liners in the Kremlin to go along with East-West agreements
that would enhance Soviet security. The distinction is an
important one, for a primarily manipulative and disruptive approach
to arms control would indicate the transient nature of agreements,
lSpeech to Central Committee plenum, December 13, 1963. Moscow
Domestic Service in Russian, December 15, 1963, 0700 GMT (Emphasis
added). See also N. Inozemtsev, "Nadezhdy i trevogi amerikantsev,"
loc. cit.
2Pravda and Izvestia, April 12, 1964; Pravda, April 22, 1964.
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whereas an attempt to rationalize a direct security or economic
interest would suggest a somewhat more substantial basis for
Soviet interest in agreements.
First of all, it is unlikely that Moscow perceived the
existence of individuals and groups in Washington that consistently
represented "reasonable" and "aggressive" "forces" and "tendencies"
in the United States political system. The Soviet leaders presumably
had the wit to recognize that on specific issues individuals would
vary in their willingness to compromise--as one member of the so-
called "Executive Committee" of the National Security Council
observed after the American decisions had been taken on the Cuban
missile crisis, rather than "hawks" and "doves," there were only
"'dawks' and 'hoves'." The fact that Soviet references to United
States "aggressive circles" often cited individuals who were
clearly on the margins of the American political system suggested
that Moscow had come to the understanding that its difficulties
with the United States sprang from considerably more informal
and elusive influences at work in American politics than suggested
by the phrase "the aggressive circles of U.S. imperialism."
Gromyko, for instance, implied that some United States political
leaders took an anti-Soviet line because their "political
careers' were built on anticommunism.1
Nonetheless, in surveying the long-term development of
Washington's approach to the Soviet Union it is likely that the
Soviet leaders in 1962-1964 recognized that certain individuals
tended to represent those political processes or tendencies that
Moscow sought to encourage or inhibit as the case may have been.
Thus Gromyko presumably saw Secretary of State Rusk as a
reasonable man in comparison with Secretary Dulles. Khrushchev
doubtless recognized that aggressive and uncompromising Soviet
policies toward the West and in the "third world" would tend to
revive the influence of those in the United States who continued
to think like Mr. Dulles. Accordingly, the Soviet leaders may
have expected--although they were unlikely to have been wholly
united on this point--that President Johnson and his advisers
would continue to act with a degree of "reason" and restraint
as the Soviet ddtente posture gradually deprived the American
decision-making process of reasons to do otherwise.
ISpeech of December 13, 1962 to the Supreme Soviet. TASS in
English to Europe, December 13, 1962, 1645 GMT.
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There is thus likely to have been a certain ambivalence in
the Soviet approach to dealing with the United States leadership
on arms control in 1962-1964. Some Soviet leaders, possibly those
of less conservative mind, may have regarded the manipulative use
of the arms control issue as secondary to the direct satisfaction
of Soviet security interests by means of agreements. Other
members of the Soviet elite, on the other hand, may have seen
the instrumental value of arms control to split and weaken the
adversary momentarily as the primary advantage of the limited
agreements of the period. Still others presumably rejected the
notion that significant distinctions could be drawn between
Western leadership groups, and were opposed to concessions and
agreements with what they regarded as a consistently aggressive
adversary.
Khrushchev's justification for arms control concessions and
agreements in terms of their political utility seems to have served
a rationalizing function against orthodox Communist criticism.
At the same time differentiation between various influences at
work in United States decision-making allowed Moscow to adopt a
more realistic policy based on the recognition that, however much
the two United States presidents were interested in certain
limited measures that were also of interest to Moscow, they also
had to carry with them a good proportion of the "American
Establishment" -- top-level administration officials, Congress,
the Pentagon, the government bureaucracy, the opinion-making
and politically active financial interests.
To round out this picture of the Soviet view of the West,
we may note that before the Cuban crisis Khrushchev is likely
to have recognized that a political struggle was developing in
West Germany as Adenauer's retirement drew nearer. To paraphrase
the esoteric Leninist line of this period, referred to above, it
could not have been "a matter of indifference" to Khrushchev
whether he had to deal with Strauss and others, who were rumored
to favor independent German possession of strategic nuclear
weapons, or with Erhard and Schroeder, who tended to take a
somewhat more moderate line. Khrushchev may have reasoned that
under conditions of ddtente and the reduction of the "Soviet
threat" the Erhard-Schroeder tendency would become more influential.
In addition to the desirability of a foreign policy posture
calculated to influence the political balance of forces within the
United States and West German leaderships Moscow was also confronted
by mid-1962 with the development of significant differences between
the major NATO allies. Differences between France and the United
States had gathered momentum after 1958, and had intensified in
1962 as Washington began to press the initial version of its
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proposal for a MLF. Differences within NATO were also manifested
in the Franco-German treaty of cooperation of January 1963 and,
in the same month, the French veto of British participation in the
European Economic Community. At the same time, there were indi-
cations of Anglo-French differences on the "special relationship,"
specifically concerning the Skybolt missile, which was cancelled
at Nassau in December 1962.
In addition to potentially manipulable differences within
the various Western leadership groups, Moscow is likely to have
perceived exploitable differences of interest and opinion between
the NATO governments. However, apart from the limitations which
the German problem and the French nuclear program placed on
Western interests in arms contol agreements, the extent to which
Moscow could attune its policies to the openings in the West
was significantly influenced by Chinese opposition to Khrushchev's
foreign policy line.
b. The View to the East. Broadly speaking the interaction
between the Sino-Soviet conflict and the Soviet approach to East-
West relations might be characterized as follows: As antagonisms
with China intensified, pressure was exerted on Khrushchev to
secure his Western front, essentially by taking a more conciliatory
approach to the United States. But of course as Khrushchev sought
to lower tensions with the West, Chinese attacks on his policy
of restraint only served further to inflame the Sino-Soviet
relationship. Regarding East-West security agreements in
particular, it is less clear what effects the Sino-Soviet
rift might have had on the attitudes of Soviet leaders. Those
who were of a slightly more conservative cast of mind may have
considered East-West agreements inappropriate before a sustained
attempt--undoubtedly involving a harder policy line toward the
West--had been made to heal the breach. Others, possibly Khrushchev
among them, may have viewed arms control agreements as a way of
intensifying Chinese alienation and thus reducing effective
Chinese political pressure.
To throw light on some of the restraints which China placed
on Soviet relations with the West, it may be useful to consider
the possible effects on Soviet policy of Chinese and Albanian
attacks on Khrushchev's key proposition that Moscow's foreign
relations should be oriented to the promotion of "sober-moderate"
thinking in Western "ruling circles."
Following the Twenty-Second Party Congress in October 1961
Albania stepped up its criticism of Khrushchev's approach to the
West, charging that the Soviet premier had "almost completely
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halted the struggle to unmask American imperialism, hoping, it
seems, that in this way the im erialist government of the United
States would become peaceful." Similar attacks on Khrushchev's
policies continued throughout 1962, with special exception being
taken to his August 1962 statement on economic integration referred
to above. Here again the Albanian Party criticized the alleged
belief of the Khrushchev group that in following an "opportunist"
line of conciliation toward the Western governments they would
make them "peaceable" and "sensible" and thus create conditions
for a rapprochement.2
The Soviet response to these and also to more veiled accusa-
tions from the Chinese following the Cuban crisis and the Sino-
Indian conflict was to reject the allegation that it had "hopes
of persuading imperialism," countering that, owing to changes in
the balance of power, "imperialism" had ceased to be the dominant
force in determining the course of international events.3 This
seemed to be a reasonably safe line to take. But, as we have seen,
Khrushchev accompanied it with references in December 1962 and
June 1963 to responsible political leaders in the West and to
the desirability of mutual compromises with Western governments.
As the test ban agreement drew near, the Soviets began to reply
'Editorial, "A Year of Historic Proofs," Z1n i Popullit.
December 6, 1961; in William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-
Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 273-274.
2
Editorial, "Modern Revisionism to the Aid of the Basic
Strategy of American Imperialism," Zeri i Popullit, September 19
and 20, 1962, in ibid., pp. 366-369. See also,,editorial, "Whom
do N. Khrushchev's Views and Actions Serve?" Zeri i Popullit, iZ
March 2, 1962, and "Enver Hoxha's Speech to his constituents," Zeri
i Popullit, May 31, 1962. Both statements are in Griffith,
2P2. cit., pp. 321-323 and 347-348.
oris Ponomarev, "The Victorious Banner of World Communists,"
Pravda, November 18, 1962; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian,
November 18, 1962, 0600 GMT. Kuusinen, however, emphasized Khru-
shchev's "force of persuasion" in the settlement of the Cuban
missile crisis; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, November 22,
1962, 0920 GMT. See also, Khrushchev's speech of December 12, 1962;
Moscow Domestic Service, December 12, 1962, 1405 GMT.
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to Chinese criticisms more directly. Noting on July 14, 1963 that
China had criticized Khrushchev's view that President Kennedy
"had displayed a certain amount of good sense, a reasonable
approach in the course of the Cuban crisis," Moscow now asked,
"do they seriously think that all bourgeois governments are
completely devoid of reason in all their affairs?" 2
By April 1964, with the publication of the new Lenin materials
on Genoa, Khrushchev seemed to be actually defending President
Kennedy against Chinese attack. Asserting that the representatives
of the United States had "not been deprived of good sense when it is
a question of life or death for their state," he referred to
President Kennedy's American University speech and added: "I have
been criticized for praising this speech of Kennedy's. But we must
not take a primitive approach to events, we must not feel that we
are clever and all our opponents are fools." 3 In the same spirit
he made favorable comments aout President Johnson, Secretary
Rusk, and Senator Fulbright.
Whatever benefits Khrushchev might have been reaping from
his policies, the Chinese, by dint of personal attacks on him for
his relations with the adversary, had maneuvered him into the
tactically weak position of appearing to defend "U.S. imperialism"
against doctrinally pure arguments advanced by another Communist
party. In so doing the Chinese were seeking not so much a revision
of Khrushchev's view of the Western adversaries as a change in
Soviet policies for dealing with the West. For as we have seen,
the thesis of the existence of "sober forces" in the West and
Khrushchev's advocacy of an instrumental use of disarmament and
'Editorial, "The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us,"
Renmin Ribao, December 31, 1962, in Peking Review, No. 1, January 4,
1963; "More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us--
Some Important Problems of Leninism in the Contemporary World,"
Peking Review, Nos. 10-11, March 15, 1963; and editorial, "A
Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the U.S.A.,"
Renmin Ribao, March 8, 1963, in ibid.
2 pravda. July 14, 1963. To this the Chinese offered the
impeccable reply: "There is no reason that can transcend class."
"Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace--Comment.
(5)," Peking Review, No. 47, November 22, 1963.
3
"Rech' tovarishcha N. S. Krushcheva," Pravda, April 7, 1963.
Ibid. See also, "0 nekotorykh storonakh partiinoi zhizni v
kompartii kitaia," Pravda, April 28, 1964.
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arms control served as a rationalization for the very modifications
and restraints in Soviet foreign relations to which Peking objected.
In order to attenuate the atmosphere of two-camp struggle and
to promote a degree of "sober-moderate" thinking in American
policy-making, the Soviet Union seems to have found it expedient
to avoid heavy doses of"anti-imperialist" propaganda. Further,
Moscow limited the extent of its material support to "national-
liberation" movements in the third world, for Communist-aided
violence in the underdeveloped countries--like hard-line "anti-
imperialist" propaganda--could revive the perceived Communist
threat for the West and help to reconstitute anti-Soviet
sentiments within Western elites. In so doing it would tend to
neutralize any "demobilizing" effects that Moscow might have
achieved as a result of its detente-negotiation policies. A
final external area of restraint was to be found in Western
Europe. By May 1964 the efforts to lower the Communist threat
and the imposition of curbs on the "revolutionary" activities
of Communist parties in the developed countries had reached the
point where collaboration with the leadership of Europe's
socialist parties became an instrument if not a goal of Moscow's
policy.1
On these various aspects of the Soviet approach to the West
the Chinese leaders clashed with Khrushchev. In practical terms
Khrushchev could not have it both ways, conciliating Western
governments while pressing an antagonistic "anti-imperialist"
line in the rest of the world, since the latter course would
serve to alienate Western leadership groups, to reunite them in
opposition to the Soviet threat, and to throw Khrushchev back
onto the military-political and economic problems that had
driven him to seek a limited accommodation with the West in the
first place. Although Khrushchev opted to break with Peking
rather than to persist in a vain offensive against the West,
Chinese attacks on Khrushchev personally evidently sought to
mobilize internal opposition in the CPSU to his foreign policy
line. Thus the pressure from the East may nevertheless have
restrained any tendency on Khrushchev's part to come to terms with
the West on security agreements.
c. Implications for Policy. From the foregoing it is
apparent that the makers of Soviet decisions on arms control and
disarmament continued to find themselves in a political situation
"Marxism-Leninism as International Doctrine of the Communists
of All Countries," Pravda, May 10, 11, and 12, 1964, in CDSP, Vol. XVI,No. 19 (June 3, 1964).
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of some uncertainty in 1962-1964. While in looking to the West
Moscow perceived certain basic interests in agreement, the
Kremlin presumably recognized that the political situation in
the various Western capitals severely restricted the areas in
which the Soviet interest in arms control could be satisfied.
And while ideological pressure from Peking may have been
responsible for some of the restraint in Khrushchev's approach
to East-West security agreements, the growth of an antagonistic
China eventually possessing a credible nuclear capability and
vying with Moscow for influence in the "third world" strengthened
his interest in coming to terms with the West.
In opting for a rather sobered relationship with the West
after Cuba Khrushchev found that the need to revise Soviet
positions so as to expand the areas of possible agreement
heightened his vulnerability to attacks from defenders of
Communist orthodoxy. This was particularly so when Moscow
sought support for a world Communist conference with the
apparent purpose of ostracizing Peking. This was a factor
which may have contributed to the slight hardening of the Soviet
line toward the West in October 1963 and more emphatically in
March 1964. As we have suggested although China was unable to
prevent Khrushchev from entering into the limited agreements
of the period, pressure from the East may still have had some
inhibiting effect. On the other hand, it is not inconceivable
that Khrushchev regarded the arms controls of 1963-1964 with their
highly political overtones as a means of creating an international
climate in which the Chinese foreign policy line would appear
anachronistic.
Given these influences from Peking and the West narrowing
the scope of possible agreement, Khrushchev sought to turn to
Soviet advantage the opportunities available in the West. In
adopting an increasingly conciliatory stance toward Washington
after Cuba, he endeavored to diminish the Western sense of
a Soviet threat and to neutralize United States leadership opinion
which favored a line of unyielding antagonism to Moscow. The
Kremlin's interest in influencing the American decision-making
process by means of arms control policy was strikingly demonstrated,
for example, by Soviet propaganda restraint first on United States
underground testing after the limited ban was signed, and
subsequently on the manner in which both sides ultimately
declared their intent not to orbit nuclear weapons in space.
A TASS broadcast of August 30, 1963 reported a commentary
in Krasnaia zvezda to the effect that the Pentagon "curiously"
was presenting the new program of underground testing as "an
attempt to strengthen the positions of the supporters of the test
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ban treaty," since the test resumption was aimed "to meet the
demands of certain Senators for guaranteeing the security of
the United States when the treaty becomes operational."1 Several
days later Pravda made a similar observation.2 This Soviet
action and, more positively, the cancellation of the Bernal
condemnation (referred to above in Part B), which would have
injected a note of antagonism into the international climate,
indicated Moscow's wish not to complicate the President's
effort to deal with internal interests that were opposed to
the agreement.
Similarly, the Soviet willingness to accept without public
comment an "expression of intent" not to orbit nuclear weapons
in space when an "agreement in principle" had presumably already
been achieved (See Part B), also suggests that a strong interest
existed in cultivating a moderate attitude within the United
States government to East-West relations. But in this connection
one may speculate that the outcome of the no-weapons-in-orbit
agreement might have hardened internal Soviet opposition to
further Soviet-American understandings, and was thus perhaps
a factor contributing to the slightly more conservative foreign
policy line that began to appear in October 1963.
The political aim of the measures achieved was to deepen
the sense of East-West relaxation desired by Khrushchev in dealing
with the Western alliance as a whole. In particular, the reduction
of the apparent Soviet threat could have been expected to further
the disarray within NATO, especially in the deterioration of
relations between the United States and France, which seemed to
have a momentum of its own. In addition to creating a c]imate
of opinion inimical to the establishment of the MLF, a detente
might complicate French efforts to develop its force de frappe,
and would amplify sentiment in Britain favoring abandonment
of the independent British deterrent.
In the light of this general Soviet approach to arms control
and disarmament in the period we can proceed to consider separately
Moscow's political interest in comprehensive and parital measures,
including those on which agreement was not reached.
TASS in English to Europe, August 30, 1963, 0618 GMT.
2Pravda dispatch from Washington as reported by TASS in
English to Europe, September 3, 1963, 1624 GMT.
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1) Comprehensive Disarmament. It seems reasonable to
su gest--and the Soviet c.ommentator Valentin S. Zorin has all but done
so --that the Soviet propaganda campaign on GCD, which continued
intermittently throughout the 1962-1964 period, was closely related
to the Soviet interest in cultivating Western leadership groups.
Soviet commitment to the "struggle" for GCD via the Communist
front organizations, and indeed the generally rather recriminatory
Soviet propaganda line on the Geneva negotiations, served as a
cover, albeit an imperfect one, against orthodox Communist
criticism of Moscow's moves for a d6tente and limited agreements with
the West. Certainly without its advocacy of GCD the Kremlin would
have been harder put to defend its moves on partial measures during
the 1962-1964 period.
In addition, Moscow had an interest in GCD as a useful political
backdrop for Soviet negotiating moves on less far-reaching measures
that were of more immediate significance to both the United States
and the Soviet Union, and the negotiation of GCD also offered the
Kremlin a means of introducing new measures into the dialogue with
the United States. The nuclear umbrella was a case in point, since
in introducing the concept into the discussion of GCD Moscow -
sought to communicate an immediate common interest to American
leadership. Thus while GCD did not hold ready appeal for influential
opinion in the West it could provide Moscow with a direct means of
influencing the atmosphere in which the implications of limited
arms control agreements were discussed by the various Western
leaderships.
On a more routine level Soviet sponsorship of GCD served the
various Moscow-oriented peaqe movements as a tool to mobilize
support for Soviet policies in the West. Similarly, it was
emphasized by Soviet propagandists to promote the image of a
progressive and peace-loving Soviet Union to the populations
of the developed and underdeveloped countries alike. In connection
with the latter Moscow sought to gain influence by championing
the cause of increased economic assistance as a result of
disarmament.
2) Partial Measures. Aside from foreclosing certain moves
in the arms race, the effect of the limited test ban treaty on the
Soviet strategic situation seems to have been largely political.
V. S. Zorin, "Problemy razoruzheniia i manevry Pekina,"
Izvestia, June 30, 1964; and V. S. Zorin, "Marksizm-Leninizm i problema
razoruzheniia," Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia,
No. 9, 1963.
-177-
The agreement served to lower the military threat from the United
States, and thus of course to reduce the Soviet strategic disadvantage.
While it could have little direct military relevance for China, the
test ban did raise political obstacles to Peking's nuclear program.
Even more to the point perhaps, the agreement served Soviet
strategic interests by dividing the United States from France and
inhibiting West German development of a nuclear capability either
independently or by transfer from the United States. Similarly,
by lowering the level of East-West tension the limited test ban
had the effect of undermining Western efforts to create a strategic
threat to Moscow in the form of the MILF.
The political as well as the military objectives behind the
other limited agreements of 1963-1964 have been discussed above.
We think Moscow also had strong political reasons to advocate, if
not sign, other measures that it proposed in this period. Thus,
negotiation of a non-aggression pact would promote Soviet interests
in the light of differences among the NATO allies on this point;
agreement on this measure would lower the perceived Soviet threat
and deepen the relaxation of tensions for similar disruptive
purposes.
Similarly, stabilizing moves in Central Europe such as
measures to prevent surprise attack, the gradual removal of foreign
troops from both Germanies, and the exchange of troop represent-
atives among foreign forces stationed in both Germanies would
help to solidify the status quo in this region while avoiding
the greater risks of the Rapacki plan as such, especially for
the Ulbricht regime. In achieving these limited but relaxing
measures Moscow would satisfy its interest in obstructing West
German acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Other Soviet proposals of partial measures in this period
seemed to be primarily of agitational interest to Moscow. The
call for the prohibition of stationing of nuclear delivery vehicles
or servicing facilities on foreign territories was clearly aimed
at raising popular opposition in Western Europe and the
Mediterranean to the deployment of United States Polaris sub-
marines. Similarly, the traditional demand for the abandonment
of foreign bases was aimed at destabilizing American missile and
bomber facilities abroad. In view of its appeal to the "third
world" agitation of this proposal also served to counter
Chinese attacks on the Soviet coexistence line in the various
Communist front organizations.
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3. The Economic Factor
a. Soviet Defense Expenditures. After 1957, estimated
military expenditures started rapidly to increase: by 1962
defense outlays were about 40 per cent higher than in 1957
(see Chart IV.2). In 1960 and 1961 an attempt may have been
made to stabilize defense outlays but it was abandoned perhaps
in response to the first Kennedy budget. The principal cause
of this observed increase in spending was undoubtedly the
accelerated effort in the development of rocket technology in
general; ICBM's received great and increasing emphasis,
while IRBM's and tactical missiles probably retained an
important place in the Soviet advanced-weapons program.
Antimissile technology may also have played an increasing
role in escalating the costs. The development of advanced air-
craft, while de-emphasized in Soviet military doctrine, in all
likelihood continued to play a role throughout the current period
although one of decreasing importance. The proportion of total
defense outlays devoted to the procurement of conventional equip-
ment for the ground forces was certainly much lower in the 1958-
1963 period than in earlier years although the Soviet Union con-
tinued to devote some attention to the improvement of its
conventional armaments. In the 1962-1963 period the commanding
objectives of the Soviet defense effort were probably (a) to develop
and place in serial production a second-generation ICBM system, an
effort begun before first-generation systems became fully available;
and (b) to advance the development of a missile-submarine capability.
Very little can be said about trends in total defense out-
lays in 1963 and 1964 on the basis of data yet available. If the
published defense budget is any indication, total spending may
have stabilized in 1963 and perhaps even declined slightly in 1964.
b. Economic Impact of the Soviet Arms Effort. The impact
of the defense effort in the Soviet economy is very difficult to
measure. Despite the dramatic increase, the weight of the defense
expenditure as a share of GNP was probably lower in 1962 than in
1955 or 1952. A 10-12 per cent range appears reasonable for 1962
when hidden spending above the published budgetary level is taken
into account.
Apart from its relation to GNP, however, the "burden of
defense" should be evaluated by its effect on the rate of economic
growth generally and in terms of real resources denied to other
sectors of the economy. In 1961-1963 a broad deceleration from
the rapid growth rates of the mid-1950's was apparent in most
Chart M. 2
Estimated Soviet Defense and Space Expenditures, 1950- 1965
A. Godaire's total possible defense and space expenditures. J.G. Godaire, "The Claim of the Soviet
Military Establishment," in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Dimensions of
Soviet Economic Power. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 39 -40.
B. C plus science outlays.
C. Official reported defense spending.
D. Godaire's cost of military manpower.
E. "Becker's" cost of military manpower.
F1-F2 Becker's military manpower costs in 1958 and 1965. Abraham Becker, Soviet National Income
and Product in 1965; The Goals of the Seven Year Plan, RAND Memorandum RM-3520 - PR
(Santa Monica, 1963), p. 19 .
Gi-G 2 Becker's military manpower costs, plus other defense (budget), plus science, plus remainder,
including statistical discrepancy, in 1958 and 1965. Ibid.
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sectors. In industry--the priority sector for the Soviet economy--
the slowdown was marked.1 In agriculture, after the bumper harvest
of 1958 a series of mediocre years followed and finally the
catastrophe of 1963. It appears to have been increasingly
recognized, especially in 1963, that better and stable harvests
were dependent upon irrigation and the expansion of the chemical
industry and thus required the allocation of additional investment
resources. In regard to consumption the regime's policy was to
allow moderate improvement to follow the growth rate of the economy
as a whole. With the general economic slowdown, growth of
consumption appeared almost to have ceased, consumer goods output
rising only 5 per cent in 1963.
Although the broad slowdown in the Soviet economy may have
been in part a product of trends unrelated to defense production,
since growth is one of the most urgent priorities of the Soviet
regime we may speculate that the need to divert valuable
resources to armaments, even though the percentage of GNP devoted
to defense may have declined, has become increasingly burdensome.
It is likely that the need to allocate increasing resources to
arms has been at least partially responsible for the stagnation
of other sectors of the economy. Clearly the channeling of
engineering and other trained personnel to the arms effort has
tended to restrain civilian technological progress and inhibit the
maintenance of existing plants. Military production has also cut
into civilian machinery production; this in turn has hampered
investment, which is increasingly dependent upon the supply of
new machinery. In 1963 the machinery supply component of Soviet
investment plans was not mentioned in plan-fulfillment data,
suggesting a large margin of underfulfillment. Similarly it is
likely that expansion of the chemical industry, a priority since
1958, was restrained by the Soviet arms effort.
1See TASS report in the New York Times, October 21, 1964.
The Greenslade-Wallace index shows an annual average growth rate
of aggregate civilian industrial output of 10.7 per cent for the
years 1957/1954 but only 6.7 per cent for 1962/1959. The official
Soviet index, which includes military output and is inconsistent
in other ways with most Western indexes, shows an annual rate of
industrial growth of 11 per cent for the years 1955-1957 and only
9.5 per cent for 1960-1962. Soviet figures on plan fulfillment
in 1963 claim a growth rate for that year of 8.5 per cent. See
Rush V. Greenslade and Phyllis Wallace, "Industrial Production in
the USSR," in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power (Washington: 1962), and
Narodnoe khoziastvo SSSR 1962, p. 119.
Further evidence that the arms burden was felt to be placing
pressure on the Soviet economy was suggested by the appearance in
March 1962 of statements in the Soviet media implying that Presi-
dent Kennedy had intensified the United States commitment to the
arms race. Such statements were apparently made to justify
divertin "considerable funds" from Soviet economic development
to arms.
By April 1964 Khrushchev, for political reasons that will be
considered later, pointed explicitly to an inhibiting effect of
military expenditures on Soviet agriculture and consumer goods
production:
Doesn't the need to support the defense might of the USSR at
the present-day level hinder the raising of the well-being of
the people? With all straightforwardness I reply: Yes, it
hinders it. Rockets and cannons--these are not meat, not
milk, not butter, not bread, and not hasha. If it were
not necessary constantly to strengthen the might of the
Soviet armed forces, we could sharply raise the living
standard of our people, make it in the very near future
the highest of the world.2
More precise relations between armaments and the overall
deceleration of the Soviet growth rate are not easily determined.
It is probably accurate to suggest, however, that the burden of
military expenditures on the economy has in general increased in
recent years and has consequently impinged increasingly on other
goals of the Soviet leadership. In short, there can be little
doubt (a) that the Soviet arms effort since the late 1950's has
inhibited the capacity of the regime to counteract trends that were
causing deceleration of the economic growth rate, and (b) that
reduction or at least stabilization of arms expenditures would
have some favorable effects on growth.
c. Implications for Policy. There is evidence to suggest that
the reduction in the Soviet growth rate and conflicting demands on
scarce resources have generated internal conflicts on foreign
1Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, March 11, 1962, 1400 GMT;
and election speech of A. Kosygin on March 14, Moscow Domestic
Service in Russian, March 14, 1962.
2N. S. Khrushchev, "O mire i mirnom sosushchestvovanii,"
Kommunist, No. 7, May 1964.
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policy. It is useful to consider the possible relations
between Khrushchev's efforts to deal with domestic economic
problems and the foreign policies of detente and limited arms
control that he pursued in the period under consideration.
By 1962 Khrushchev's attitude on resource allocation was to some
extent consumer oriented.1 In this respect he differed from "someI
comrades" who had "an appetite for metals that could only unbalance
the economy." 2 Given the very low probability that the adverse
strategic balance could be easily reversed, and given his propen-
sity to resist major increases in resource allocation to armaments,
it was not surprising that Khrushchev in March and April 1962
proposed an intensified Soviet commitment to policies seeking to
exploit differences within Western elites. By June-July 1962,
following the major food-price riots near Rostov on June 1 and the
decision, apparently made in the summer of 1962, to place Soviet
missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev with seeming reluctance affirmed
that Soviet arms expenditures would have to be continued at the
expense of investment in animal husbandry and consumer goods.3
Subsequently the thaw in the Soviet policy line immediately after
Cuba, with its emphasis on rapprochement with the "sober-moderate"
tendencies in the American leadership, was definitely associated
with renewed but apparently unsuccessful move on Khrushchev's
part to stress the domestic consumer economy. For the moment,
however, he succeeded in a major reorganization of the party
and in making further gestures toward a test ban agreement.
Rather than accelerate a very costly arms race in which the
lead of the opponent was considerable, Khrushchev apparently chose
in the immediate post-Cuban relaxation with the West to moderate
1 See Carl Linden, "Khrushchev and the Party Battle," Problems
of Communism, Vol. XII, No. 5 (May 1963)-
2Speech of January 6, 1961 (Pravda, January 21, 1961).
3Speech to Cuban students in Russia, June 3, 1962 (Pravda,
June 4) and speech at Grivita Rosie Plant in Ramania, June 19,
1962 (Pravda, June 20), both cited in Problems of Communism, Vol. XII,
No. 6 (June 1963), and Pravda, July 6, 1962 (speech to military
academy graduates).
4Although Khrushchev affirmed the primacy of heavy industry
at the November 1962 plenum, it was not without complaints about
those who cried "steel, steel." Linden, lc. cit.
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the arms race, to stabilize--if not to reduce--Soviet arms expendi-
tures, and to promote the growth of the consumer economy. This
last objective was reflected in a renewed emphasis on the theme
that the economic achievements of the Soviet Union represented its
greatest contribution to the "world revolutionary process."
in the following months Khrushchev was evidently forced to
reTreat on his line of limited rapprochement with the United States
and on his domestic economic program. As we noted earlier, follow-
ing the Soviet test ban concessions of November and December 1962
Moscow canceled the three-power test ban talks at the end of January
1963. In his election speech of February 27, 1963 Khrushchev
pleaded with his electors to "give us time" in providing consumer
goods and openly stated that the "enormous funds" required for the
Soviet military program "reduces and cannot help but reduce the
people's possibilities of obtaining direct benefits."1 The trend
of events against Khrushchev seemed to be strengthened in March
1963, when the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR
(VSNK1) was established. The creation of this organization recen-
tralized planning and evidently neutralized some of the advantages
Khrushchev gained through the November 1962 party reform.2 The
chairman of the Supreme Council, Dimitri Ustinov, previously for
-coe two decades had been directing Soviet armament industries.
As the East-West detente deepened following the signing
of the limited test ban treaty and the understanding not to
or'it nuclear weapons, Khrushchev sought to return to the defense
of his domestic economic line. At the December 1963 plenum
heavy emphasis was placed on an ambitious program for the develop-
ment of the chemical industry, and a cut in the Soviet military
budget was announced. And at the open plenum of February 1964
Khrushchev attempted to argue the point that growth in the chemical
industry and agriculture would strengthen Soviet defense capability.
Pravda, February 28, 1963. See Pravda, January 7, 1963
editorial comment on the defense burden: "Bearing such a burden
is no easy matter; the Soviet people are quite often obliged to
deny themselves necessities."
2Leon Smolenski and Peter Wiles, "The Soviet Planning Pendu-
lum," Problems of Communism, Vol. XII, No. 6, 1963.
3Speech of February 14, 1964 to Central Committee plenum, Pravda,
February 15, 1964. Khrushchev used an elliptical technique in making
his point by referring to Western views that "the Soviet Union has
been forced to reduce its arms and armed forces because of diffi-
culties in economic development. Attempts are also being made to
propound the theory that the Soviet Union is incapable of simultaneously
developing its economy and strengthening its defenses. . . ."
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Toward the end of April 1964, as has been indicated, Khrushchev
came more directly to the point in opposing the maintenance of high
levels of Soviet military spending. Having asserted that "certain
ruling parties and leaders of the biggest capitalist states" were
coming to recognize that force could not be used to settle inter-
national disputes, Khrushchev made it clear that the Soviet defense
budget stood in the way of his plans for the development of agri-
culture and light industry.1 This statement, which we have
cited above, appeared in the Party's theoretical journal shortly
after the publication of new esoteric documents advocating a
foreign policy of compromise and the joint announcement of
intent to reduce the production of fissionable materials.
In the following months, as the East-West detente continued,
Khrushchev gave increasing emphasis to consumer goods. Shortly
before he was removed he called upon Soviet economic planners to
place "the satisfaction of the growing material and spiritual
requirements of men at the forefront in working out the long-term
plan for developing our economy." 2 This may well have been inter-
preted by the heavy industry and military interests as an open bid
for popular support for a Malenkovite "new course" in economic
policy.
It seems reasonable to conclude that during the period under
review the pressure of the arms burden on the Soviet economy was a
contributing factor in Khrushchev's pursuit of both detente and
perhaps even a long-term attenuation of the conflict with the
United States. In seeking a ddtente Khrushchev evidently sought
to reduce the military threat to the Soviet Union from the West;
in reducing the military threat he must have hoped to be in a
stronger position to press for among other things a reduction of
the Soviet military budget and thus eventually a more rapid ex-
pansion of the civilian economy.
In addition to such budgetary relief as might follow
from a detente with the West, Khrushchev's apparent desire to
avoid increasing the burden of Soviet military spending seems
to have been directly related to three of the four arms controls
achieved in 1963-1964. As we have seen, the limited test ban,
the statement of intent not to orbit nuclear weapons in space,
and the joint announcement of readiness to reduce fissionable
'Khrushchev, "0 mire i mirnom sosushchestvovanii, " 1oc. cit.
2Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, October 2, 1964,3
o6oo GMT.
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materials production reflected an interest in foreclosing new
and costly developments in the arms race. Insofar as these
measures succeeded in closing off the remaining major avenues
of weapons development for East and West, their effect over
time may give some satisfaction to the Soviet desire for relief
from the economic burden.
4. The Internal Political Situation
While in recent years there had been a tendency on the part
of Western observers to regard Khrushchev's position as unassail-
able, his abrupt removal suggested that significant independent
political power resided in the institutions that he formally con-
trolled. One can speculate on the possible parallel between the
internal political struggle of 1954 and 1955, which led to Malen-
kov's downfall, and the circumstances in which Khrushchev operated
in 1962-1964. As we have seen, both men were committed to
unsuccessful domestic policies tending to stress light industry
and some increase in consumer investment. But where Malenkov
failed to secure the kind of detente that in his view the "new
course" and the external political situation required, Khrushchev
made some progress in the form of arms control agreements.
Without stretching the point, the parallel might be kept in
mind both in looking back for the sources of internal oppo-
sition to Khrushchev's foreign policy line and in attempting
to calculate their effect on his ability to enter into
agreements.
a. Possible Sources of Opposition to East-West Security
Agreements. As we have pointed out, Khrushchev throughout this
period seems to have been engaged in a running battle with the
so-called "metal eaters"--the proponents of continued emphasis
on investment in heavy industry--and the representatives of the
armaments industry and possibly some of the military establishments
as well. These groups were essentially technocratic and "statist"
and, in the opinion of some, dominated the economy with the
exception of agriculture. 1
In this connection it may be significant that the fall of
Khrushchev was presaged by the publication in Pravda of a letter
indicating that the Ministry of Finance had refused to comply with
the decentralized planning decisions and the introduction of
1lSmolenski and Wiles, "The Soviet Planning Pendulum," loc. cit.
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profit-based accounting.1 Moreover, shortly before the appearance
of Khrushchev's "new course" statement on October 2, 1964, the
Soviet military press apparently expressed an opposing view. 2
Accordingly part of the military establishment, if the events of
1954 and 1955 are any indication of a characteristic attitude to
a "new course" for the Soviet economy, may have combined in some
manner with the technocrats before Khrushchev's removal in
actively resisting his attempted modifications in domestic and
foreign policy.
In opposing Khrushchev's economic moves the "statist"
opposition as a whole may have sought to inhibit or restrain his
accompanying efforts to establish a modus vivendi with the
United States. In this they presumably reasoned that the
greater the apparent reduction of the external "threat,"
the more easily the internal economic changes desired by
Khrushchev could be effected. It may reasonably be assumed
that Khrushchev's opponents believed significant shifts in Soviet
resource allocation would institute the moral and physical dis-
armament of the Soviet Union in the face of what they perceived to
be an essentially unchanged and aggressive United States.
In this context, it was not wholly surprising that the
Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Malinovsky, implicitly attacked
the Khrushchevian theme that "sober-moderate" groups were emerging
in the United States leadership and condemned proponents of "paci-
fism" and the "abstract negation of war" within the Soviet Union.
These remarks were made at difficult moments for Khrushchev
(February 1963 and 1964) when, as has been suggested, he was under
strong pressure to desist in his moves to reduce allocations to
defense.
1Christian Science Monitor, October 16, 1964.
2Ibid.
3Speeches of February 22, 1963 (Pravda, February 23, 1963)
and February 7, 1964 (Krasnaia zvezda, February 9, 1964). On the
former occasion, Malinovsky emphasized that "time has,,taught the
imperialists nothing," and warned: "It must not be naively supposed
that the imperialists have laid down their arms. The events we are
witnessing today show that not everyone has yet learned to assess
soberly the balance of forces that has taken shape on the inter-
national scene. .
In February 1963 Khrushchev seems also to have been engaged
in a struggle with Frol Kozlov, a powerful figure in the party
Presidium and Secretariat, who apparently tended to favor
sustained investment in heavy industry.1 Kozlov's disappearance
from the political scene in April 1963 due to a stroke may have
assisted Khrushchev in moving for a test ban agreement.2 In
February 1964 Khrushchev clearly acknowledged that he differed
with members of the party on matters of foreign policy:
We must not deny the paramount importance of economic con-
struction in the socialist countries and oppose it to the
class struggle against imperialism. To do this is to
confuse different concepts.3
The implication seemed to be that certain party members regarded
the foreign affairs corollaries of Khrushchev's economic program
as contrary to correct foreign policies oriented to the struggle
against "imperialism."
In view of the report that it was Suslov who delivered the
main attack on Khrushchev in October 1964 we can guess that he
was one of those who tended to oppose Khrushchev's line of
conciliation and limited agreements with the United States.
Quite apart from concern for the practical problems of Sino-
Soviet and international Communist relations that continued to
rise throughout the 1962-1964 period, Suslov was no doubt
voicing a more widespread sentiment in the CPSU to the effect
that Khrushchev's policies of elite manipulation were unpalatable.
The fact that there is a tendency throughout the international
Communist movement to view coexistence in a tactical and
instrumental light4 underscores the likelihood that opposition
'Linden, loc. cit.
2estimony of Marshall Shulman, Hearings before the Committee
on Foreign Relations, United States Senate on Executive M, 88th
Congress, 1st Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1963), p. 795.
3 Speech of February 14, 1964; Pravda. February 15, 1964.
4 See, for example Ezio Santarelli in "The Debate in the
Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the PCI on
the XXII CPSU Congress," L'Unita., November 12, 1961. Document
given in Alexander Dallin et al., eds., Diversity in International
Communism: A Documentary Record, 1961-1963 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1963), p. 422.
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within the Soviet Communist Party may have been substantial where
"permanent arms control agreements with the United States were
concerned.
In addition to probable internal opposition to prolonged
detente and Soviet fraternization with the adversary, resistance
may also have been focused on Khrushchev's efforts to restrain the
"anti-imperialist" propaganda along with his use of tactics of
"national liberation." The fact that the Bernal condemnation
of United States underground testing after the partial test ban
was transmitted and then rescinded further indicates the existence
of differences of opinion, since Bernal could hardly issue and
then broadcast such a statement on his own initiative. Similarly
the tendency--perhaps most clearly associated with Mikoyanl-.-to
emphasize Soviet arms shipments to new states and to assert that
Soviet general disarmament proposals would not disarm the new
states, suggests that continuing concern existed within Soviet
leadership over the issue of armed national-liberation (although
Mikoyan could well have been attempting to cover the left flank
against Chinese criticism). Reported Soviet arms shipments to
Congolese rebels after Khrushchev's removal, also strongly implied
the existence of internal opposition to his relative restraint
on the national liberation issue.
Above all, opposition to Khrushchev's approach to East-West
relations must be interpreted in terms of relations with China
and the connected problem of the erosion of Soviet control in
Eastern Europe and over the nonruling parties. It was crystal
clear that energetic pursuit of the Khrushchev line on coexistence
and arms agreements served to sustain Sino-Soviet antagonisms, to
create conditions favoring the further disintegration of Soviet
influence in the bloc, and to aggravate the divisions within the
international movement. Given Khrushchev's apparent inability
to cope with these problems in 1963-1964, it would hardly have
been surprising for some Soviet state and party officials to
have altered their attitudes from preferring a detente that was
at best left unconsolidated, toward definite resistance to arms
control agreements.
See, for example, speeches of March 14, 1962 and July 2,
1964; TASS in English to Europe, March 14, 1962, 1957 GMT, and
Pravda, July 3, 1964.
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b. The Influence on Policy of Internal Differences. In the
light of the potential forms of opposition to Khrushchev, the con-
tinued publication in 1962-1964 of archival materials on the 1922
Soviet disarmament and peace proposals at Genoa seems to have
reflected an effort on Khrushchev's part to legitimize and
broaden consensus for his innovations in relations with the West.
In March and April 1962 those who were less well informed about
the nature of the Genoa documents were asked to accept them as
evidence of literal commitment on Lenin's part to the pursuit of
disarmament agreements and the kind of coexistence being sought
by Khrushchev. This was at a time when Khrushchev seemed to be
attacking Kozlov's base in Leningrad by associating himself per-
sonally with an effort to unseat Spiridinov (one of Kozlov's
associates) from the Secretariat of the Central Committee.1 The
success of this move in April, accompanied by the return of Kiri-
lenko to the Presidium, may have eventually given Khrushchev
sufficient influence to take steps on the test ban and possibly
on the spread of nuclear weapons in August and September 1962,
while at the same time preparing the Cuban missile venture.
The November reform of the party also seemed to mark a further
advance for Khrushchev.
However, this progress was apparently not made without loss
of political bargaining power. Although Khrushchev retained some
latitude in foreign policy, criticisms of anti-Stalinism appeared
early in November; the November plenum emphasized the priority of
heavy industry; and Khrushchev himself led a new assault on
freedom in literature and the arts. By March 1963 Khrushchev had
announced that advances in consumer goods production were to be
postponed in favor of defense and heavy industry, the establishment
of the VSNKh had centralized some of the organizational advances
of the November 1962 party reform, and the internal climate seemed
generally less favorable for East-West arms control agreements.
Nonetheless private talks on a test ban continued, an agreement
on satellite cooperation was signed with the United States on
March 20, and on April 5 the proposal for a direct communication
link with Washington was accepted in principle.
In April 1963 the internal political picture apparently
improved for Khrushchev and with it the prospects for arms control
agreement. On April 8 Pravda in a routine advance printing of
the May Day slogans failed to note that Yugoslavia was "building
socialism." Shortly afterwards Kozlov disappeared from public
Linden, loc. cit.
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view, reportedly due to illness, and on April 11 Pravda set the May
Day slogans right. The implied reassertion of the moderate line
in foreign affairs was soon followed by Khrushchev's criticism of
what had in effect been Kozlov's demand for increased investment
in heavy machine building equipment.
Further, Ponomorev, normally associated with a conservative
line on foreign affairs owing to his primary concern for interna-
tional communism, on the Lenin Anniversar called for "sensible
agreements" with the moderate Westerners. In May a further
agreement was signed with the United States (on cooperation in
the peaceful uses of atomic energy), and in June a further strength-
ening of Khrushchev's position was reflected in the appointment of
Brezhnev and Podgorny to the Secretariat of the Central Committee.
Khrushchev seemed to have sufficient leverage to rebuff the Chinese
and to enter into the test ban agreement with the United States.
It is to be noted, however, that he preferred to avoid concessions
on inspection.
With the signing of the test ban Khrushchev proposed several
partial measures that he considered susceptible to East-West agree-
ment. 2 From the internal standpoint he probably stood to gain from
any one of them since all were essentially political undertakings
without direct impact on Soviet force levels. Most attractive
would have been a nonaggression pact or a military budget freeze:
The latter would presumably have given Khrushchev some support in
the internal political struggle, and the former, by strengthening
the detente, might have had a favorable effect on his domestic
economic policies. As it was, however, Khrushchev emerged with
an understanding not to orbit nuclear weapons in space, which
could have helped Khrushchev directly only in restraining those
who favored offensive Soviet military use of space.
In the meanwhile Sino-Soviet relations had continued to
deteriorate, and the Soviet harvest had proven catastrophic.
lPravda April 23, 1963. The World Marxist Review also re-
turned to this line for the first time since the Khrushchev statement
of August 1962 on economic integration. Santiago Carillo, "Some
International Problems of the Day," World Marxist Review, No. 5
(April), 1963.
2As indicated, these included a nonaggression pact; a freeze
on military budgets; measures to prevent surprise attack; a cut
in foreign troops stationed in both Germanies; and an exchange of
troop representatives among the foreign forces in both Germanies.
It is noteworthy that at the ENDC in August the Soviet negotiator
tied the control post proposal to progress on other measures.
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Thus as Khrushchev began to move in October 1963 for a conference
of the Communist parties, the balance of internal political forces
may have begun once again to swing against Khrushchev. Although
the effort to convene a conference soon ended in failure,
Khrushchev's line on the chemical industry and agriculture was
emphasized in December, when he announced a cut in the military
budget and a possible Soviet force reduction.
By 1964 Khrushchev was speaking of East-West arms control
agreements in terms of "the policy of mutual example." This
approach may have been in deference to what he considered to be
President Johnson's political position, but it also suggested
certain restraints on Khrushchev's ability to enter into formal
agreements. No doubt those responsible for the Soviet armaments
industry, some of the military and the advocates of the primacy
of heavy industry had to some degree been alienated by the
budgetary cut and by Khrushchev 's accompanying demand for
substantially increased investment in chemicals. 1 The party
conservatives may have become concerned by Peking's aggravation
of the Sino-Soviet differences to the point of border
disturbances and by Khrushchev's failure to cope successfully
with the situation. Those responsible for agriculture were
doubtless perturbed by the disastrous harvest of 1963. Thus,
by the time of the February 1964 plenum and the renewed commitment
of the CPSU to an international Communist conference of
excommunication, Khrushchev was again pleading for resources
for light industry and agriculture and for a foreign policy line
of conciliation toward the West.
In these circumstances Khrushchev's decision to proceed
with publication of the Genoa materials, his participation in the
joint announcement of intent to reduce fissionable materials
production, and his intensified commitment to consumer welfare
at home, suggested that by April 1964 he may already have been
proceeding toward political isolation. Even if Kuusinen had not
died in May, depriving Khrushchev of needed support in both
Presidium and Secretariat, it seems doubtful that Khrushchev
could have surmounted both his internal opponents and the
sharpening external pressure from China and entered into major
arms control agreements with the West.
In view of the many constant factors in the international
and Soviet domestic scenes one should not expect Khrushchev's
removal to mean the wholesale repudiation of his policies. What
1See Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 149-152.
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might be expected, however, is the pursuit of a somewhat more
contradictory set of external policies. Where Khrushchev seemed
to seek the conciliation of the West even at the expense of other
policies, the new regime may seek a detente to conciliate the
West while taking a stronger "anti-imperialist" line in relations
with the rest of the world. For reasons that have already been
considered, this would be an essentially unworkable policy, and
when Moscow pursues unworkable policies one may expect to find
continued internal differences within the Soviet leadership.
D. The Soviet Interest in Agreements and Detente
In surveying the Soviet approach toward armL control and
disarmament in the 1962-1964 period, it is evident that Soviet
policy entered a new "round" of efforts to relax East-West ten-
sion and to see whether the United States and the Soviet Union
could establish a less dangerous modus vivendi. The evidence
we have been able to assemble leads to several broad conclusions
about Soviet policy during this period: (1) that Khrushchev and
his associates may have had a qualified interest in agreements
over and above those that were reached in 1963 and 1964; (2) that
they showed signs of interest in arms control agreements even
prior to the Cuban venture; and (3) that they were possibly,
although not certainly, interested in a long-term attenuation
of the conflict with the United States. Although from the
vantage point of the last months of 1964 the most recent "round"
does not appear to have been terminated, Khrushchev's removal
suggests that the Soviet interest in arms control and disarmament
throughout the 1962-1964 period was shaped by a contradictory
process in which the factors that moved Moscow in the direction
of ddtente and limited arms control agreements with the United
States were opposed by factors representing a line Soviet
policy could not cross.
Of the factors we analysed, next to the fluctuation of inter-
nal differences on foreign policy, the Soviet perception of the
adverse military balance and what to do about it seems to have been
the most important factor conditioning the conduct of the Soviet
leadership in 1962-1964. When it came time to translate the
implications of the strategic balance into foreign policy,
however, the military factor could not be divorced from the
economic determinants of Soviet behavior and the limitations that
they imposed on Soviet choices. Thus, while considering the
strategic balance to be of fundamental importance in determining
Soviet conduct on the arms control and disarmament issue, it was
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only slightly more significant than the economic factor. Next
we would rank the political opportunities and constraints that
the West placed before Moscow, and finally the political and
potential military pressures that China mobilized against
Khrushchev.
The desire to achieve short-term political gains from a
manipulation of the international atmosphere apparently did not
predominate in the Soviet pursuit of a detente and of limited
arms control agreements during Khrushchev's last two years in
the Kremlin, and Soviet policy toward arms control in this period
may have been based more firmly on enduring national interests
than were the previous, possibly "tactical," Soviet attempts to
achieve a ddtente in 1955 and in 1959-1960. The precise extent
to which Soviet policy in 1962-1964 was based on long-lived and
less escapable conditioning factors, however, was a function of
the distribution of power within the Soviet leadership, which
in turn was influenced by the other conditioning factors we have
mentioned. Khrushchev, for instance, presumably found it more
difficult to deal with internal resistance to his domestic economic
policies and to his interest in further limited arms control agree-
ments with the United States after the partial test ban treaty,
when the failure of the Soviet harvest in 1963 was forcing him
simultaneously to negotiate an enormous purchase of wheat from
the chief adversary. Under such circumstances the internal
opposition to Khrushchev's policy line may have had some success
in advancing alternative policies. In view of the close inter-
action of the various groups of factors on Soviet decision-making,
our comments on internal differences on foreign policy and on the
relative weighting of the factors as a whole follow a consideration
of the other sets of factors that influenced Soviet choices.
By mid-1962 the Soviet leaders were confronted with the
prospect of virtually permanent strategic inferiority and of a
faltering Soviet growth rate that seemed to require some form of
reallocation of resource priorities to the detriment of heavy
industry and defense. Here were two problems of long-term signif-
icance that Soviet investment and output could not simultaneously
resolve, and that may have given the Soviet interest in an East-West
detente a long-lasting character. These factors were accompanied
by strong political pressure from the Chinese; the advent of a
United States administration that was possibly more interested
than its predecessors in seeking out new and more stable
relations with Moscow; and a growing disunity among the NATO
powers.
Basically there were three alternatives for Soviet policy
as a result of these factors. Moscow could seek to rectify the
military balance by entering into a costly arms race with a
wealthier opponent, which would require problems of Soviet economic
growth to be given second place, and a more antagonistic Soviet
posture toward the West in order to justify domestic sacrifice,
which in turn would serve to blunt Chinese hostility if not to
reduce it altogether. Alternatively, Moscow could seek to alter
the political character of the strategic confrontation so as to
mitigate the Western military advantage. The effort to achieve a
detente and possible limited agreements to consolidate the reduc-
tion of the threat from the West would presumably in turn strengthen
the resolve of the Kennedy administration to reciprocate in seeking
new East-West relations; it would, however, involve a repudiation
of the Soviet association with the Chinese Communists, and thus
to some extent a repudiation of "conservative" communism in Soviet
domestic and foreign policy generally.
Finally, Moscow could seek to circumvent the problem of
Soviet strategic and economic deficiencies by attempting to gain
an immediate increment in Soviet strategic power by the redeploy-
ment of existing forces. If successful, the internal pressure for
sustained levels of Soviet military expenditures would presumably
slacken and thereby allow some redirection of resources to lagging
sectors of the Soviet economy, particularly agriculture; in rela-
tions with the West, however, restraint would have been recommended
in view of the detrimental effect on the Soviet economy of the
reinforced United States commitment to the arms race that might
be expected to follow. Thus while a sudden shift in the military
balance in Moscow's favor could be expected to blunt "conservative"
criticism at home and from the Chinese, Moscow would have had
strong interests not to proceed to a new bout of cold war, possibly
focusing on Berlin, but to negotiate and possibly make significant
concessions in a settlement of East-West problems.
In Cuba the Soviet leaders sought the third alternative.
With the test ban and the accompanying East-West security agree-
ments Khrushchev pursued the second alternative. And with Khrushchev's
removal the Soviet leaders seemed to shift slightly in the direction
favored by the proponents of the first alternative, although how
far and with what constancy remains to be seen.
The failure in Cuba underscored the improbability of either
offsetting United States strategic superiority or gaining political
advantage of that sort from Soviet military strength. Cuba may
thus have legitimized some of the pressure Khrushchev exerted
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for reallocation of Soviet resources away from defense. At
the same time the rise in United States missile strength in 1961
and 1962 and the advertisement of the military balance by the
Kennedy administration served to emphasize the depressing effects
of Soviet military and economic weakness on a continued foreign
policy offensive. The failure in Cuba moreover sharpened the
significance of opportunities offered by the political situation
in the West. The psychological impact of the Cuban confrontation
seemed to favor a positive American response to a Soviet endeavor
to stabilize East-West relations so as to avoid similar clashes
in the future. Similarly the growth of centrifugal tendencies
within NATO, in part the result of Khrushchev's efforts over the
years to reduce the appearance of a blatant Soviet "threat"
to the Westrose in importance in the Soviet perspective after
Cuba, conditioning Soviet policy to the pursuit of a relatively
deep East-West detente that would allow full play to the dis-
agreements among the various Soviet adversaries in the West.
From Khrushchev's point of view, seeking relief from both
strategic adversity and economic scarcity, Soviet interest in a
detente might have been relatively enduring. For only over
time could a relaxation of East-West tensions blunt the threaten-
ing edge of Western strategic superiority. Only over time could
a stabilization and possibly then a mutual reduction of military
budgets be promoted in the hope of gradually achieving a measure
of reallocation of Soviet resources to the chemical and light
industries generally.
Apart from an interest in a detente, however, military, econo-
mic, and foreign political factors may also have inclined Khrushchev
toward specific and limited East-West security agreements. Apart
from seeking to achieve a more profound detente by virtue of
agreements, Khrushchev evidently had definite military and economic
interests in limiting the further development of the arms race.
Apart from the obstacles that the partial test ban agreement
placed in the way of increases in the strategic capability
of Soviet adversaries in West Germany and China, its effect,
together with the other Soviet-American agreements of the period,
was to suggest a reciprocated interest in cutting off very expensive
developments in the arms race, both defensively in the case of the
antimissile missile, and offensively in prohibiting the emplacement
of nuclear weapons in space. In view of the relatively limited
prospects for the future development of the arms race, the limited
agreements that were reached in 1963 and 1964 presumably reflected
a Soviet interest both in a gradual reduction of military budgets
and in maintaining an international political environment suitable
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to this end. But from Khrushchev's point of view the few partial
measures that were achieved probably represented the maximum that
was politically possible in the way of East-West agreements during
the 1962-1964 period, despite the pressure on him to produce
results once he had made the option for a turn to the West.
Turning now to consider the internal differences over foreign
policy, it is clear that the declining Soviet growth rate, Khru-
shchevrs inability to cope with the agricultural problem, and par-
ticularly the 1963 harvest must have stiffened internal opposition
to his foreign policy line within the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's
opposition, insofar as it was readily definable--we may cite the
party and state officials concerned with heavy industry, elements
of the Soviet military establishment, the arms industry, and
senior party members concerned with ideological affairs--presumably
tended to feel uncomfortable in a detente and to resist or inhibit
policies to prolong it, inclining specially against East-West
agreements. These groups and individuals evidently resisted Soviet
concessions to reduce the external "threat" from the West as assis-
ting the realization of Khrushchev's resource reallocation programs;
they may have found the restraints and compromises involved in
Khrushchev's policies of elite manipulation unpalatable, and they
objected to a prolonged East-West detente and Soviet fraternization
with the chief adversary. International inspection would be very
difficult for them to tolerate. They probably considered East-West
arms control agreements inappropriate because of their aggravating
effect on Sino-Soviet relations and on Soviet efforts to cope with
dissidence in Eastern Europe and with differences within interna-
tional communism more broadly. These groups were presumably rela-
tively receptive both to the Chinese attacks on Khrushchev personally
and to Chinese criticism of the domestic and foreign policy
programs Khrushchev was pursuing.
In retrospect it seems that Khrushchev prevailed over this
varied internal opposition to the extent of entering into the test
ban agreement and in rebuffing the Chinese in the negotiations that
took place in Moscow at the same time. Khrushchev may have gained
this latitude by the sudden illness of Kozlov in April, following
rectification of the May Day slogans referred to above. By October
1963, however, Khrushchev seems to have consumed a good deal of
the political capital he had gained in April. Internal opposition
to his foreign policy line may have mounted following the rapproche-
ment with the United States, the sharp increase in the bitterness
of Sino-Soviet relations following the test ban, and Khrushchevrs
inability to cope with the Chinese by means of a conference on their
excommunication that he sought to convene in September-November 1963.
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By the end of the year the need to obtain wheat from the United
VI States had compounded Khrushchev's problems to the extent that in
February 1964 he seemed to be under severe pressure not to cut the
Soviet military budget as he had begun to in December 1963, and
therefore not to proceed with investment in the chemical industry
and agriculture as he clearly desired. Nonetheless Khrushchev
evidently preserved sufficient strength to enter into the reciprocal
cutback in fissionable materials production, this being his last
major move in the arms control field before October 1964.
As the new regime has shown signs of seeking to resolve
the conflict with China, we may assume that the internal distri-
bution of forces within the Soviet leadership has hardened for
the time being to exclude arms control agreements with the West,
at least until efforts have been made to resolve the conflict
with China. At the same time the economic, military, and foreign
political factors in relations with the West will continue to
influence the Soviet leaders in the direction of an accommodation
with the West.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
A. The Decade in Retrospect
The ten years ending with the limited test ban agreement of
1963 and Khrushchev's ouster a year later constitute a distinctive
chapter in the evolution of both Soviet foreign policy and Soviet
interest in arms control and disarmament. The ascendancy of
Khrushchev by 1955 coincided with a number of epochal developments
affecting the basic outlook of Soviet foreign policy: the end of
the West's nuclear monopoly and the imminence of both the missile
and space ages; accumulated Stalin-fatigue in the Soviet Union;
a U.S. President devoted to creating a new "spirit" in East-
West relations; new vacuums in the "third world"; and the
beginnings of the Sino-Soviet rift. The composition of the
United Nations was about to be irrevocably altered; and under
the monolithic facade of international communism there were
surging eddies of polycentrism that would swell into a current
of rebellion against Soviet hegemony. But of all the forces
creating an environment for wholesale changes in Soviet policy
the most significant was the growing conviction on both sides
that general thermonuclear war was not to be permitted.
These opportunities and problems in the international field
registered a sharp impact upon Soviet foreign relations in general
and on Soviet arms control policy in particular. For at least two
years--1954 to late in 1956--the mood was one of rising expectations,
of experimentation, and of optimism. The expectations derived
primarily from the Kremlin's calculation that Moscow had achieved
something like atomic parity with the West, and that with an all-
out research and production effort on ICBM's the military balance
would soon shift further to Soviet advantage. The willingness to
experiment grew out of recognition of the danger of surprise
nuclear attack, stimulating in turn an interest in measures that
would prevent both central war and limited wars that could escalate,
and measures that would avert nuclear proliferation. The optimism
showed in Moscow's confidence that it could pursue a political and
economic offensive aimed at expanding the "zone of peace" and con-
tracting the capitalist camp while avoiding general war. In all
this Moscow displayed little or no awareness of the rifts soon to
arise within the Communist camp.
The whole tone of Soviet policy toward arms control and
disarmament shifted in 1954-1956 along with the rest of Soviet foreign
policy. The move was away from heavy-handed "exposure" tactics of
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the Stalin era to the cultivation of a "reasonable" and conciliatory
appearance in the style and substance of Soviet disarmament proposals
and propaganda; toward accommodation with Western positions and the
adoption of partial-measures approaches instead of the "ban the bomb"
slogans of the late-Stalin period.
At a minimum it appeared that the shift in arms control policy
was aimed at undermining the West's will and ability to maintain its
defenses. But the increased feasibility and realism in Soviet policy
suggested there might also be a qualified but growing Soviet
interest in enacting certain measures that might reduce the danger
of surprise attack, impede German rearmament, and freeze research
and development of nuclear weapons at a moment favorable to the
Soviet Union. From 1957 to 1960, even after the world began to
talk of a "missile gap" in Moscow's favor, the manifest Soviet
interest in various partial measures, particularly a cessation
or ban on nuclear testing, continued.
1955 was a time when multiple opportunities seemed to be
opening up for influencing events to conform to the revised desires
and expectations of Soviet leaders. But even by 1956 the limits
to their prospects were beginning to appear. By 1959 a sense of
reality was returning and, as the decade matured, a protracted
morning-after set in. 1955 may have marked a sharp decline in the
paranoia so long characteristic of the Soviet outlook; but it left
a dualism in that outlook that bordered on the schizoid.
The reasons were several. One was that by the very nature of
the situation the desires and expectations of the Soviet leaders
were essentially contradictory, and each had the effect of setting
in action a countervailing force. Even in inner Soviet reasoning
one senses internal tensions. For every reasonable measure of
agreement with the adversary to warm up the atmosphere, save
money, or forfend the threat of later annihilation there was always
a new argument against appearing weak, or a danger on a new flank,
a new difficulty raised by the enemy, or a new temptation to
exploit.
From 1954 to 1961 the Soviet Union thus endeavored to relax
tensions with the West even while seeking to bury it by economic
and political competition. It tried to keep China within the Soviet
fold even while refusing it nuclear weapons and on occasion restrain-
ing Peking's military and foreign policy. It endeavored to avoid a
showdown with either Washington or Peking while maintaining and in-
creasing Soviet influence to the east and to the west and to the
south as well. Detente with the West was the logical policy ex-
pression of the renewed "peaceful coexistence" doctrine, implying
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"struggle" short of major war while the zone of Communist influence
expanded. But detente contributed to erosion of the leading strings
from Moscow to the satellite capitals both in the east and west.
Agreements that controlled China's force levels or inhibited its
capacity to test nuclear weapons were desirable from the standpoint
of Russian national security; but disarmament propaganda had the
effect of further alienating an increasingly militant Peking.
If in 1955 d6tente was paramount, the opening opportunity to
leapfrog the northerntier of U.S. treaty states and penetrate into
the African vacuum at the same point in time was close to being
paramount. If in 1959 and 1960 the spirit of Camp David and the
GCD line were highly functional to Soviet strategy, the chance to
consolidate a new client state 90 miles off the coast of Florida
was too good to miss. If in 1961 Moscow's touted missile lead
proved to be by and large non-existent, nevertheless the exigencies
of keeping East Germany in camp required the most serious risks to
be run in Berlin that year.
Arms control policy had a greater or lesser role to play in
all these operations, either neutralizing forces inimical to
Moscow or in cultivating sentiment favorable to the Soviet govern-
ment. Indeed, disarmament in some form may have been the logical
policy expression of the new appreciation of the non-utility of
general nuclear war. But it ran afoul of accumulated suspicion of
the West, the tempting political uses of the threat of force, the
powerful military factions in the Soviet Union, and the extra-
ordinary functional difficulty in arriving at formulas that
satisfied both the Western need for reassurance and the Soviet wish
for secrecy. If in 1962 the more sophisticated Soviet leaders had
marked, absorbed, and digested the contemporary American school of
strategy featuring minimum deterrence and the arms control doctrine,
the chance to drastically revise the strategic equation with an
end-run via Cuba proved too tempting.
But the narrowing of alternatives open to the Soviets was not
just a product of their own schizoid view of things. From 1956 to
1961 the bases of Soviet optimism were undermined one after another
by events not of their om immediate making. First, the Polish up-
risings and then the Hungarian revolution of 1956 shook the founda-
tions both of the empire gathered by Stalin and of Moscow's leader-
ship in international communism. Following these shocks came a more
profound threat--ideological, political, and even military--from
Peking, creating for Moscow even as early as 1957 the classic spectre
of a two-front struggle. The Western front was proving unyielding in
the face of Soviet pressure on Berlin, and the military and economic
power of the West during the rest of the 1950's grew stronger and more
integrated despite the autonomous course steered by Paris after 1958.
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Undoubtedly Moscow marked well the new and potentially
disastrous political fissures opening in NATO as the 60's began.
But the overriding reality was that by 1960 Washington was about
to reverse such missile gap as there may have been and this at
a time when a downturn in the Soviet economy made the relative
weight of military expenditures more onerous. Finally, the
attempted leap into the "third world" had reaped little fruit:
the emerging nations appeared as little susceptible to Soviet
as to Western influence. As for arms control and disarmament,
failure of the 1955 approach, Western disinterest in disengagement,
and the start of the ICBM and space races all reinforced the
growing sense of the unreality of the debate, culminating in
Khrushchev's 1959-1960 initiative in proposing sweeping general
disarmament. The 1958 technical talks and the moratorium on
testing seemed vastly overshadowed.
By 1961 and 1962 the Soviet government thus seemed to be
faced with some new choices to make. Given its narrowing alter-
natives, what policy course could it realistically pursue? Could
it seek accommodation with both Peking and the West? Should it
concentrate on internal or external development? And what arms
control measures, if any, remained relevant to its still-changing
strategic and political circumstances? The 1961 joint principles
statement represented surprising consensus. But other pressures
within the Kremlin seemed to militate for short-cuts to redressing
the strategic balance vis-a-vis the West, first by the testing
of a 61-megaton bomb in 1961 and then by the Cuban missile gamble
in 1962. It must have seemed that only from a position of power
would the problems on both eastern and western fronts prove
more amenable to solution on Soviet terms. While Soviet diplomacy
stalled for time, Moscow's apparent interest in partial disarmament
measures seemed to decline as the Kremlin increasingly returned to
the propaganda of general and complete disarmament.
The failure of the 1962 Cuban venture to yield an improved
bargaining position for the Soviets again narrowed the alternatives
but this time seemed to indicate with new clarity the desirability
of at least a temporary accommodation with the West. This option
was made the more feasible by Washington's apparent willingness to
forego a more aggressive strategy designed to exploit the Soviet
retreat; by the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations; and by the
economic difficulties that pressed hard on Russia in 1963.
In 1963 many of the essential conditions for serious Soviet
interest in arms control agreements in fact came together. Moscow
possessed a minimum deterrent braced with some 50-megaton bombs,
but had no prospect of attaining superiority over the United States.
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Washington indicated its willingness to collaborate with Moscow
to keep the peace and control the arms race. No rapprochement
seemed possible with China. A success for "peaceful coexistence"
could help Khrushchev internally. Economic incentives were strong
to lower defense spending by such moves as a ban on nuclear testing,
keeping the arms race from outer space, and slowing the production
of fissionable materials.
The Khrushchev decade had begun with Moscow confident that it
was riding a tide of history and would soon vanquish capitalism in
political and economic competition. It ended with Moscow apparently
pleased just to stabilize the military-political situation with the
West and cut losses within the international Communist movement,
accepting, at least up to Khrushchev's removal, the consequences of
the defection of China.
B. Soviet Interest in Arms Control
To draw specific conclusions regarding Soviet interests in
arms control during the Khrushchev decade, we have to return to
the assumptions with which we began this analysis. With those
assumptions as a starting point, we analyzed in depth several
forces that we felt underlay Soviet interests in arms control.
Broadly speaking, we looked at the changes over time in the
strategic-military situation, in the external political outlook, and
in the economic and the internal leadership situations. Our
findings center chiefly on these factors and their interaction as
determinants of Soviet interest--or disinterest--in arms control
measures in the decade under study.
A few explanatory words should be said about these factors
and the relationship between them. Although we have treated them
in similar fashion, and even have ventured to rank-order them in
accordance with our estimate of their relative saliency as deter-
minants, they are not in fact completely comparable. The first
three factors--military, external political, and economic--repre-
sent both objective situations with which Soviet leaders must deal
and policy goals for which arms controls might be instrumental
or functional as appropriate means. This pertains particularly
clearly to the first and second factors.
The desire for military security represents a constant and
fixed goal of the Soviet Union; Soviet policy must adapt to and
try to influence the military-strategic balance that prevails at
any given time. It seems apparent to us that arms control and dis-
armament measures take their primary meaning from the way in which
they serve the security goal by altering the military situation.
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Apart from their value in serving the political end of detente
in foreign policy, the changes in Soviet arms control policies in
1954-1956 appeared to constitute the beginnings of a trend toward
greater feasibility and realism and, more basically, of an aware-
ness that adversaries could share a common interest in limiting
their military competition and containing possible military con-
frontations. Thus it is our judgment that of the several deter-
minants the military-strategic factor stands out as the primary
force accounting for continuity and change in Soviet arms control
interests during the Khrushchev decade.
The second factor likewise represents a fundamental objective
of Soviet policy: the manipulation of the external political
environment to serve the broad ends of Soviet strategy. Arms
control policy in the period was a flexible means of attaining
political objectives, whether through propaganda that would psycho-
logically disarm others or through measures to improve Soviet
political prospects by actually affecting the military dispositions
of others. Arms control and disarmament policy was in the period
a potent support for the strategy of detente vis-a-vis the West;
there disarmament was presented as a way of ensuring peace and
prosperity. To the Communist world it was justified in these
terms and also as the best means of advancing the cause of revolu-
tion--but by peaceful means. Soviet arms control and disarmament
policies were thus aimed at inhibiting the arms race, controlling
international tension, preventing Western unity, dealing with the
mounting challenge from China, and winning support for Soviet
policy in Eastern Europe and in the underdeveloped countries.
The economic factor enjoys a more distant but still functional
relationship with arms control policy. Significant arms reductions
can obviously have a direct feedback effect upon the domestic
economy. But for the period in question we would rate as con-
siderably lower in importance than the other factors any incentive
that may have been supplied for serious arms controls by the
slowly mounting drag of military expenditures upon the Soviet
economy. The economic situation may be said to have probably con-
stituted a marginal incentive to ddtente and arms control,
especially after 1961. We have made the point that the notion
of Soviet defense costs as 'burdensome' requires correction to
account for the totalitarian ability to mobilize, force
sacrifices, and suppress demand.
The fourth factor, that of political struggles among the
Soviet leadership, is of a different order. The first three
factors are normally treated as though they represented an objective
reality somehow independent of the perceptions of the Soviet
leaders. This would be a valid approach if one could assume that
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the leaders all perceived reality in the same way. But since the
Soviet elite has in the past decade demonstrably not been monolithic
in its view of things, the operation of the other factors must be
qualified by a specific examination of the internal political con-
troversies in the USSR . The internal power struggle has therefore
to be considered as a separate influence on arms control policies
even though from a purely logical standpoint it is not parallel
with the other factors considered. We believe that the manner in
which the contending Soviet elites perceived the world situation
and attempted to act upon it on occasion exerted a strong influence
upon the specific arms control policies followed.
One more thing must be said about the four factors and the
way in which we have treated them. For the period under review--
1954 -1964--we believe these four make sense as determinants of
Soviet interest in arms control and disarmament measures. It
might even be inferred from our analysis that one could predict
the future course of Soviet arms control policy by analyzing the
particular configuration of determinants in 1954-1964 under the
assumption that a similar constellation of factors at a future
time might produce comparable results in terms of Soviet interest
in certain types of arms control or disarmament. That may
be true. But the warning is self-evident: the way these particular
factors interacted in this period will not necessarily recur.
With these caveats in mind as well as our summary rank-ordering
of the factors operative in 1954-1964, we now proceed to more detailed
conclusions about their significance for Soviet interests in arms
control and disarmament.
1. The Strategic Situation
Of the four main factors we have studied, the military-strategic
factor best accounts for both the stability and the fluctuations in
Soviet policy toward arms control. Moscow's deep concern to avoid
central war and its acquisition of a credible minimum deterrent
generally account for the fixed elements among Soviet interests and
policies on arms control, while the changing balance between Soviet
and U.S. strategic forces appears to have been the key factor in
inducing the shifts in Soviet arms control policies throughout
the decade.
Two factors of the kind the Soviets like to call "permanently
operating" shaped Moscow's evaluation of the changing military
balance: the recognition of the potential destruction nuclear war
could inflict; and Soviet acquisition of an effective minimum
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deterrent to create a functioning balance of terror--mutual deterrence.
Neither of these strategic constants operated in Stalin's time.
Both were characteristic of a new realism in Soviet strategic
thinking, a coming to grips with the restraints as well as the
opportunities of the atomic age. This realism spilled over into
Soviet arms control thinking as well, most significantly in the
realization that in certain circumstances security might be served
by limited agreements with the adversary over and above propaganda
alone. Some of the purely military elements in the picture were
these:
a. The Disutility of War. The first of these two factors to
become constants in the Kremlin's outlook was the belated recogni-
tion in 1954-1956, in Soviet military thought, of the decisive role
that surprise nuclear attack could play in modern war. Despite
occasional bravura assertions that only capitalism would perish
in a nuclear exchange, Soviet political thinking also acknowledged
an awareness that central war under modern conditions would destroy
Communist as well as capitalist society. Since a nuclear first-
strike could be decisive to the whole course of the war and not
just to a single operation, it behooved Kremlin policy to make
greater efforts to control the military-political environment
so that the West did not attack the Soviet Union on grounds
either that it was weak or that it was soon to overtake and
bury the capitalist system. It therefore served Soviet interests
to pursue a political-military line that both lowered manifest
danger to the West and raised the threat of crushing retribution.
The first aim could be partially effected by a reasonable
posture in arms control negotiations, while the second led
Moscow to maintain an impressive military machine, which the
Kremlin warned could pre-empt Western plans for aggression.
As for limited war, the Soviet government appeared genuinely
concerned that such a war might escalate or that another power
such as Germany or China might by catalytic action involve
the great powers in a direct confrontation. It thus may not
have wished to give carte blanche in the Formosa Strait, and
declared Soviet neutrality in the Sino-Indian border clashes
in 1959. Such concerns seem in part to have underlain a whole
series of Soviet arms control proposals, from ground control
posts to symbolic acts such as a nonaggression pact or a ban
on the use of nuclear weapons. In part but not entirely for
propaganda purposes, Soviet theory also belittled the chances
of containing a war fought with "tactical" nuclear weapons.
(The political motivations for all these moves are discussed
below).
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Throughout the decade Soviet policy makers generally sought
to avoid or at least keep under control conflicts that could lead
to war. Soviet interests were to be promoted primarily by
political and economic competition, thereby making a virtue of
the necessity of avoiding war. While Moscow occasionally showed
its big stick, it tended to speak softly. At times the Kremlin
dealt out threats and ultimata, but only in Berlin and Cuba in
1961 and 1962 did Moscow approach the brink--and then only when
desperate to redress its diminishing bargaining power, and in the
process evidently making a serious miscalculation of the probable
U.S. response under President Kennedy. In order to avoid great
power confrontations Moscow tended to limit its actual support
to national liberation movements far below the level suggested
by its propaganda. The objective of controlling East-West
tensions to avoid war was served generally by the very existence
of arms control negotiations. More specifically, it was served
by cultivating personal contacts with Western leaders and--
eventually-by a direct communications link with Washington.
b. Mutual Deterrence. A second "permanently operating"
factor in Moscow's strategic outlook was the confidence that the
Soviet state, for the first time since 1917, possessed the means
decisively to deter attack upon it. The potential destruction
that could be wrought by surprise nuclear attack had changed the
"laws of war," but the equally striking fact was that in 1953-1955
the Soviet Union developed hydrogen as well as nuclear bombs plus
the means to deliver them to Europe, to SAC bases around Russia,
andat least on one-way missions--to the United States itself.
Throughout the decade the actual number of U.S. bombers and ICBM's
capable of striking the Soviet Union far outnumbered the Russian
strategic delivery vehicles that could reach the United States,
but the Soviet government possessed a credible minimum deterrent
from about 1954, the magnitude of which was vastly exaggerated in
the Western and Soviet press at least until 1961. Further, a very
large number of Soviet medium-range bombers andjlater, missiles
held Western Europe hostage. Not by accident the concept
"deterrence" is rendered in Russian as "terrorization."
Soviet confidence that the West did not plan or want war was
reinforced by personal contacts with Western leaders and visits
to Western countries.
Feeling relatively secure against calculated attack by a
nuclear power, and basking in the bright haze of the "bomber gap"
and "missile gap" legends, the Soviet government shed much of the
paranoia of Stalinist times. At the least Moscow's new deterrent
allayed long-standing fears arising from Russian vulnerability.
But it also raised Moscow's political strategy to a new level of
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importance because there was now a diminished belief that the West
would respond to Moscow's political-economic offensive by military
intervention--at least not by attack upon Soviet territory.
Depending on how "minimum" the Soviet deterrent appeared to
the West, the Kremlin could also press for political concessions.
Furthermore in disarmament negotiations the Soviet Union could
consider dispensing with arms--present or potential--not considered
essential to preserve the Soviet minimum deterrent, provided of
course that the West reciprocated or had already eliminated such
equipment. Moscow could now approach the negotiations with a quid
pro quo to match Western concessions, in contrast to the wholly
negative Soviet stance when confronted with the Baruch Plan in
1946. Finally, Moscow's realization that both sides acknowledged
an effective balance of terror helped Khrushchev to revise Lenin's
1916 dictum that disarmament was neither possible nor desirable
so long as capitalism endured; peaceful coexistence was now
dictated by "life itself."
c. The Strategic Balance. Interacting with the Kremlin's
acknowledgment of mutual deterrence in East-West relations, the
changing nature of the military balance precipitated certain
specific Soviet interests in achieving some concrete forms of arms
control. We judge that the Kremlin's interest in achieving such
measures was relatively high from 1955 to 1960, low from 1960 to
1962, and highest in 1962-1964. In the first period the seem-
ingly high Soviet interest in arms control appears to have been
based upon an expectation of significant improved relative
strength and the bargaining power this would carry with it vis-
a-vis the West. The low point occurred when Moscow's military
and political advantages were being rapidly undermined and the
Kremlin leadership sought by desperate measures to regain them.
But when after the Cuban debacle Moscow had resigned itself for
the time being to reliance on a minimum deterrent much smaller
than U.S. strategic might, the Soviet interest in arms control
measures reached a high point in the decade under study.
Closer analysis of this pattern reveals more concretely the
strategic rationale behind Soviet interests at different times.
From 1954 to 1960 Soviet strategic expectations were high, even
though the United States far outnumbered the Soviet Union in
strategic delivery vehicles--mainly bombers. It appears that
for a time in late 1959 and early 1960 Moscow may have had
a slight lead in the number of ICBM's on launchers. In any event
the Soviet Union was far ahead of the United States from 1957
through 1964 in the development of powerful boosters capable of
shooting large payloads into space. The Kremlin obviously in-
tended to exploit this situation in political bargaining; but
-208-
Soviet interest was also evidenced in advocacy of the kinds of
arms controls its diplomacy championed from 1955 to 1960--re-
ductions of conventional forces and a nuclear test ban. Given
secondary attention but nonetheless reflective of strategic
interests were measures regarding bases and calling for
disengagement in Central Europe.
The first step in implementing that strategic interest
was reduction in conventional forces. A large infantry was no
longer necessary to hold Europe hostage, and Soviet armed forces
were unilaterally cut from over 5 million to just over 3 million
men from 1955 to 1961. The Soviet bases in Austria, Porkkala-Udd,
and Port Arthur were eliminated in 1955. By 1960 Khrushchev
went further: he talked of the obsolescence of surface naval
vessels and bombers as well as of large ground forces and
pointed to the economies their reduction would allow while at
the same time Soviet fire-power actually increased due to nuclear
technology. Soviet official statements in 1956 and 1960 also
noted the economy's need for the manpower resources resulting
from demobilization. In 1960 a fifth branch of the armed forces
was formed--the Strategic Rocket Forces. Khrushchev's "atomic
fetishism," as the Chinese called it, was only partially checked
by the influence of more conservative marshals who insisted
that "balanced" forces be maintained, armed of course with the
latest weapons.
From 1955 to 1960 Moscow often called on the West to
reciprocate in the reduction of armed forces (and the elimination
of foreign bases), and Soviet disarmament proposals stressed such
measures. The point most stressed by Soviet propaganda about
Moscow's May 10, 1955 proposal was its endorsement of Western-
proposed force levels of 1 to 1.5 million men for the United States,
Soviet Union, and China. Such a measure would have forced greater
reductions upon Moscow than upon Washington, but it would have
effectively forced U.S. troops to withdraw to a "Fortress America"
by the end of 1957. (Complete nuclear disarmament was to begin
in mid-1957 and be completed at the end of the year.)
In the same vein, perhaps because of Moscow's imminent space
triumphs, the Soviet proposals of March 27, 1956 dealt exclusively
with conventional force reductions, plus the banning of hydrogen
bomb tests (just before London planned its first tests) and the
prohibition of nuclear weapons in Central Europe. Beginning at
the 1955 Summit Conference Moscow also espoused a ceiling of
200,000 men for states other than the big five--a move clearly
aimed at thwarting plans for a German Bundeswehr of 500,000 men.
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The second principal arms control measure flowing directly
frnm Soviet strategic interests was to halt nuclear testing and
the spread of nuclear weapons. By the time Moscow completed its
March 1958 test series the Kremlin seems to have concluded that a
moratorium on further testing would help to keep what it considered
to be its lead in strategic rocketry and prevent refinement of U.S.
tactical nuclear weapons. Since the Soviet Union could shoot
larger payloads into space, Moscow was concerned to prevent war-
head miniaturization by the United States. A test cessation would
also slow the development of small, "clean," mobile bombs for use
in limited war. So long as this strategic situation prevailed
it was in Moscow's interest to accept a test ban that had these
desired effects provided excessive international inspection on
Soviet territory were not required.
As to the third set of measures reflecting strategic interests,
Moscow endeavored also to keep U.S. weapons from being stationed in
other countries and to prevent nuclear spread, especially to
Germany and China. In 1955 and 1956, while SAC bases were still a
vivid threat to Soviet security, Moscow advocated control posts
in air fields and other designated locations, but--in this pre-
Sputnik period--said nothing about missile launchers. And the
Soviet concern to reduce the general danger of war, economize
on conventional forces, drive the United States out of Europe,
prevent German rearmament, and capitalize on Soviet medium-range
and long-range rockets was reflected by Moscow's almost constant
advocacy of disengagement and the denuclearization of Central
Europe together with inspection and ground control posts.
The threat posed by China to Soviet strategic interests seems
to have been of special concern to Moscow. In the short run China
might involve Russia in a war with the West or, at the least, under-
mine Soviet efforts for detente, as in 1958-1959. In the long run
there was the possibility of territorial disputes and, more important,
the prospect of great conventional and nuclear Chinese military power.
Moscow tried to keep Peking militarily dependent upon a Soviet nuclear
shield based in the Soviet Union and from 1957 to 1959 placated
Chinese nuclear aspirations by some kinds of long-term aid in
developing a new defense technology.
In June 1950, according to Chinese sources, Moscow flatly
refused to provide a sample atomic bomb or technical data required
to produce one. Soviet proposals for a nuclear-free zone in the
Far East and Moscow's espousal of peaceful coexistence as the
highest form of international class struggle were both aimed in
part, although with little prospect of success, at inhibiting
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China's military pretensions. There is reason to speculate, but
as yet no firm evidence that--as charged by Peking--Khrushchev
may have sought in 1962 or 1963 to impose with the West a nonpro-
liferation agreement upon China. France's acquisition of a
nuclear capability seemed less threatening and more inevitable,
but Moscow did what it could to promote nuclear-free zones where
France planned to test.
By 1961 most of the bases for the optimistic calculations
that underlay the shift in Soviet arms control policy in 1955
had been undermined or proved illusory. The salient strategic
factor was that while Moscow still possessed a credible minimum
deterrent, its political bargaining position was seriously eroded
by a sharp and mounting U.S. lead in the production of ICBM's, a
lead that was publicized as establishing a real missile gap but
this time in Russia's disfavor. The Soviet response could have
been to negotiate more earnestly on arms control in order to check
the U.S. lead; but Moscow opted instead to kill the test ban talks
by trying to link them with GCD, and to resume nuclear testing in
the atmosphere. If the Soviet Union could not produce more
missiles than the United States, it chose to test larger warheads
than Washington considered a sound military investment.
Regardless of military utility, the up to 61-megaton tests were fully
exploited by Moscow to terrorize public opinion and in this way
to add to the power base on which Soviet diplomacy rested.
After Moscow's tests had been completed, a year of drift and
ambivalence in Soviet foreign policy ensued, a year in which the
Kremlin appeared unsure whether to strive again for a bold move
to enhance its power position or for some accommodation with the
West including agreements on arms control. Apparently content
with the results of its own nuclear tests, the Kremlin moved in
November 1961 and again in September 1962 to ban all nuclear
tests with at least a moratorium on underground testing. But
Moscow was willing to pay little for such a ban and rejected
the principle of even limited on-site inspection until the winter
of 1962. The lack of commitment to immediately feasible partial
measures was manifested by Moscow's emphasis on GCD in the
Eighteen Nation talks in 1962. The Soviet GCD program, however,
was made increasingly realistic by a number of modifications,
notably Gromyko's endorsement in September 1962 of the principle
of retaining nuclear weapons in the disarming process.
But while Soviet disarmament policy stalled for time, the
strategic imbalance tilted still more to Russia's disfavor,
and the Kremlin decided on another bold move to improve its
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psychological and strategic position against the West: the
emplacement of missiles in Cuba, which ended in humiliating
retreat.
The point of maximum arms control activity came after Cuba.
The limited arms control agreements of 1963-1964--the hot line,
the partial test ban, the ban on bombs in orbit, the pledge to
slow fissionable material production--followed the Soviet failure
dramatically to modify the strategic equation via the Caribbean,
and all reflected a desire to freeze or at least slow down a race
in armaments in which the West was rapidly outpacing the Soviet
Union.
The hot line may in part have reflected Moscow's desire to reduce
the danger of inadvertent war. Soviet leaders declared that if either
side were to benefit from the test ban it would be the Soviet Union
since it held the lead in testing huge warheads. Although the
Soviet Union could not presently hope to match the United States
in ICBM's, to freeze the number of strategic delivery vehicles
on each side as Washington proposed early in 1964 would rule out
all prospect of parity. What the Soviet Union could accept would
be a reduction of forces on both sides toward a common level--the
idea of a nuclear umbrella, which Moscow agreed in September 1963
be maintained until the very end of the process of general and
complete disarmament. The idea of relying upon a minimum deterrent
of the same size as Washington's had become increasingly attractive
for Moscow in a world where the United States outproduced the
Soviet Union and where Peking and the NATO allies threatened to
obtain nuclear forces of their own. However, the interests of
both sides would probably require that a minimum nuclear deterrent
possessed by Moscow and Washington be accompanied by a nonpro-
liferation agreement accepted by or imposed on the rest of the
world.
Because of Moscow's interest in avoiding war and its confidence--
at least in 1955-1959--in a "peaceful victory for communism," there
may have been more than propaganda in its espousal of general and
complete disarmament. In theory disarmament was an appropriate
adjunct to the pursuit of the "peaceful offensive" under the
changed "objective conditions." However, if implemented it would
have deprived the Soviet Union of the extraordinary bargaining
power it obtained from the political uses of nuclear weapons through
threats, deterrence, and implied actions. Moreover serious
disarmament might have had the effect of vitiating Communist
elan in many countries.
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In any case, there is little evidence that Moscow has
regarded GCD as a feasible projgram actually to carry out in the
foreseeable future. All that can be said aibout it is that with
a nuclear umbrella sustained throughout the process some version
of GCD, no matter how utopian it seems today, is no longer
unthinkable in terms of Soviet security interests.
The major limitations to Soviet interest in arms control
were, like the inducements, also military in nature. As long as
Moscow enjoyed a lead in the research and development of rockets,
the Soviet Union wanted to keep both its strengths and weaknesses
veiled by military secrecy. Therefore it rejected aerial
inspection except with heavy qualifications and turned down any
other form of "inspection over armaments." Further, Soviet
production of fissionable materials was behind that of the
United States, and Moscow refused to tie a test ban to a nuclear
production cut-off; only by 1964 was Moscow apparently ready to
announce a slow-down in the production of fissionable materials.
2. External Political Perspectives
The opportunities and constraints which the Soviet leaders
perceived as they looked to the east, to the west, and to the
south, exerted a powerful influence on their evaluation of both
the military and the political uses of the disarmament issue.
The Kremlin's perception of the political environment provided
above all the basic sense of the possible and the desirable that
gave direct guidance to Soviet arms control policy.
The roles that policy toward Western, Communist, and non-
aligned states played in the shaping of Soviet arms control interests
cannot be directly compared with each other since the arms control
problem arose primarily in relations with the West. However,
because the Soviet Union was engaged in a two-front campaign and
was facing tremendous political and even military challenges from
Peking, an opportunity or difficulty on the Western front became
doubly significant. The role of the southern front--the "third
world"--was marginal but canaot be ignored.
a. The View to the West. A profound change took place in
the Kremlin's political perspective in 1954-1956 that conditioned
Soviet interests in arms control throughout the remainder of the
Khrushchev decade. Soviet policy toward the West from 1954 to
1964 thus endeavored to avoid the mistakes of Stalin's hard line
and to capitalize on the opportunities it had previously under-
rated. Since the West's political and military unity (including
German participation in NATO and the WEU) had been spurred by an
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apparent threat from Moscow, the Kremlin now sought generally to
reverse this trend by lowering the threat and stressing the
advantages of accormmodation with the new Soviet line. Whereas
Stalin's policies often tended to treat the Western elites as a
homogeneous antagonist, the Khrushchev regime rkecognized diversity
within and between the NATO governments and sought to cultivate
and exploit these differences, using as a key instrument a
more reasonable stance on arms control and disarmament.
A central Soviet objective in arms control policy was to
strengthen moderate, "sober" forces in the West who could move
their governments away from an arms build-up and a forward
stretegy and toward accommodation with the Soviet Union.
Disarmament propaganda, concessions, and eventually agreements
were used instrumentally to isolate the "hards" and strengthen
the "softs" in the West, particularly in the United States. Such
measures were also used to create propaganda that would put
pressure on U.S. overseas base policy, U.S. reliance on
nuclear weapons, German rearmament, and other aspects of Western
military planning. Proposals for disengagement helped to
foster anti-German sentiment in Britain and France. Advocacy of
a nuclear test ban helped to stir differences between Washington
and London on the one hand and Paris on the other because of the
latter's lag in nuclear testing. Working in the opposite direction,
Moscow's proposal in June 1960 to abolish all nuclear delivery
systems in the first stage of GCD was evidently calculated to be
welcome in Paris but not in London or Washington, thereby
increasing friction among them.
Khrushchev staked much of his entire foreign policy upon
the calculation that "moderates" existed in the West and that their
hand could be strengthened; this premise had to be defended
against critics in Moscow as well as in Peking. Khrushchev may
have been chastened several times in the decade by the apparent
stiffening of Western policy (as in late 1955, mid-1960, and
1961), but he seemed to assume that a more moderate orientation
would eventually prevail.
The "permanently operating factor" in Moscow's view of
the external political situation since 1955 has, we believe, been
the premise that some kind of accommodation with moderate forces
in the West is both desirable and possible. From 1955 to about 1960
this orientation was q.ualified by the Kremlin's belief that the
influence of international communism, guided by the socialist
fatherland, would gradually expand while the sphere of capitalism
contracted. As Peking posed a more intense threat from 1959 to
1962 and as the "third world" showed by 1961 its resistance to
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Soviet penetration, the narrowing of alternatives and the impact
of reality intensified for Soviet decision-makers. First in
theory, after 1959, and then also in practice, after the
abortive quick-fix attempt in Cuba, Moscow's interest in working
with moderate forces in the West took on an aspect of collaboration
as well as struggle, increasing rather than restraining the Soviet
interest in partial measures of arms control and arrangements to
preserve peace and the political status quo.
b. The View to the East. Whereas there was diversity in the
West that could be subject to Soviet political manipulation, Peking
presented to Soviet policy a more monolithic front which generally
opposed Khrushchev's efforts toward peaceful coexistence and arms
control agreements with the West. That opposition ran squarely
athwart Moscow's potent interest in maximizing its position of
leadership in the international Communist movement, initially by
keeping China within the Soviet camp and, as this failed, in
keeping ahead of Peking both in the international Communist movement
and in influencing the "gray zones". A third set of Soviet inter-
ests derived from the military desideratum of preventing Chinese
moves that could involve Russia in a war, which in turn involved
keeping China from acquiring nuclear weapons. Clearly, depending
on the priority accorded to one or another of these basic interests,
the effect of China could be either to restrain or accelerate
Moscow's posture of accommodation with the West.
Moscow at first, from 1956 to 1959, endeavored to mollify
Peking's political and. military aspirations by adding tough
phrases to Communist pronouncements on East-West relations and by
offering some assistance in developing nuclear strength. No doubt
many Soviet party and military officials found their own reasons
to oppose detente and arms control reinforced by the realization
that such an orientation was alienating Peking. Even after 1959
a faint hope of rapprochement with the world's most populous
nation may have exerted some drag on Soviet policy, if only because
it added to other conservative pressures for restraint in moving
toward coexistence.
The net result of China's military and political threat was,
however, in effect to push Moscow steadily westward, to increase its
interest in arriving at a test ban and other agreements to impede
proliferation, and to defend in ever stronger terms the thesis
that "a world without arms is a world without war." By mid-1959
the die was cast as Moscow tried to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons to China and to rebut forcefully its ideological critique.
Even after the U-2 incident and the Paris Summit debacle in 1960
Moscow gave no quarter to Chinese orthodoxy. At Bucharest in
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June and in Moscow later on in the year Khrushchev assailed dogmatic
insistence that imperialism remained unchanged. The deterioration
of Sino-Soviet relations in late 1962 and the evident abandonment
of Soviet hopes of mending the breach probably helped remove the
last inhibitions in Moscow to moves toward detente and arms control
with the West. The 1963 "Treaty of Moscow" was then used against
Peking--even in propaganda to the "third world"--likening the
Chinese opponents of the test ban to "madmen" such as Goldwater
and Adenauer.
Just as Moscow seemed willing to sacrifice political interests
in relations with China in order to pursue de'tente--and appropriate
arms control agreements--with the West, so the Kremlin may have
even been willing to risk the probable loss of considerable political
control in Eastern Europe in exchange for the high-priority strategic
desideratum of neutralizing Germany. But even here there were
potential political payoffs. An incidental benefit of favoring
German neutralization was its popularity in Eastern Europe.
Rapackils proposals, for example, gave a semblance of autonomy
to Polish foreign policy, and their rejection by the West
deepened Eastern Europe's sense of dependence upon the Soviet
Union. Even more important, the Soviet campaign for disarmament
probably won some favor for Moscow among the war-weary peoples
of Eastern Europe.
c. The View to the South. The influence of the "third world"
upon Soviet arms control policies was also guite marginal and
indirect during the decade. Virtually no Soviet security interests
have been at stake in these areas, except perhaps that of complicating
the maintenance of Western bases or the carrying out of French nuclear
testing. The major relationship of this zone to Soviet arms control
interest emerged in 1954-1955 when Moscow decided that opportunities
for penetration in Africa and Asia could fruitfully be exploited to
accelerate the departure of Western colonialism and to win a
foothold for communism. The Soviet decision to move into this "gray
zone," partly by arms shipments but mainly by political and
economic means, increased the importance of desensitizing the West
by a conciliatory disarmament posture. The object of winning favor
for Soviet policy added to Moscow's reasons for posing as the
champion of a test ban, a nuclear-free Africa, the liquidation of
Western bases, and the supporter of national independence, (although
in 1961 the Soviet government ignored the sentiments of the non-
aligned nations meeting at Belgrade and the U.N. resolution
appealing to Moscow not to test its giant bombs).
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Since 1961 the task of Soviet propaganda has been to persuade
the nonaligned nations that the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence
is more in their interest than either the bellicose ways favored by
Peking, or Western "neo-colonialism." To strengthen its revolution-
ary image the Soviet Union continues to qualify its support for a
warless world and the renunciation of force by insisting on the
unavoidability and justness of wars of national liberation. In
practice, however, Moscow has sought to impose a broad-front
policy on the Communist parties in the "third world," and has
shown some restraint even in exploiting unstable situations in
the new states as in the Congo in 1960-1961 and Laos in 1961-1962.
All of this feeds back to the image Moscow wishes to convey to
the West, and specifically to the possibility of continued arms
control agreements.
3. The Economic Factor.
Our analysis of the decade corroborates the supposition
that a powerful centralized government would probably never allow
internal economic pressures to dissuade it from policies
considered essential to state security. The interaction of
economic incentives to seek a reduction of defense expenditures
and Soviet policies on arms control demonstrates that such
incentives could have an impact on Moscow's negotiating posture
only at a time when the Kremlin felt secure from imminent external
attack or at a time when it had no prospect of a significant
strategic gain from greater investments in defense.
The "economic burden of defense" as defined in this paper
does not appear in 1954-1956 to have been a strong force
motivating the Kremlin to seek a reduction of defense expenditures.
Moscow's general sense that it could triumph in economic
competition with the West was, however, an important premise of
the softer turn in Soviet foreign policy generally, one which
tended to persist even after the optimistic expectations underlying
it had cause to falter.
Some economic incentives to reduce military spending existed
even in 1955-1958, when Soviet economic growth was continuing at
a high rate. Moscow was confronted with a number of scarcities
in agriculture, housing, light industry, and in manpower, which
could be alleviated by the transfer of human and material
resources from defense. These economic factors helped to rein-
force Moscow's military interests in reduction of conventional
ground forces and the limitation of nuclear testing. More
important, an atmosphere of East-West detente was absolutely
essential if Soviet military posture were to rely upon a minimum
deterrent of prototype bombers and first-generation missiles
instead of striving immediately to mass-produce these weapons.
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From 1958 to 1961 the economic incentives to cut defense
spending increased as the Soviet economy's oveinLl growth rate
became slower at a time when the investment required for military
and space technological development was soaring. The party's
pronouncements in 1959 that Soviet production would soon overtake
that of the United States in many areas added to the pressures
to keep economic growth at a high rate. By 1961, however, it
appeared that Russia's efforts to overtake the United States
militarily as well as economically had landed the Soviet Union
on a treadmill; the chances for keeping up with, much less sur-
passing, the West seemed dim indeed. The United States was
producing large numbers of ICBM's and other advanced equipment,
and the EuroPean economies showed strong prospects of integration
and dynamic growth that contrasted sharply with the situation in
the Comecon countries.
By 1961 therefore Moscow had even stronger economic as
well as military reasons to seek a stabilization of the arms race;
but it was precisely in 1961 and 1962 that the Soviet government
increased its military spending, raised food prices, and took a
more intransigent stand on arms control negotiations. This seems
powerful evidence that economic incentives by themselves could not
be decisive in shaping Soviet foreign and arms control policy.
On the other hand in 1963, when the strategic situation seemed
neither so threatening nor so promising as before Cuba, the same
economic reasons to reduce or stabilize defense spending could
reinforce the weight of the military and political factors in favor
of limited arms control agreements with the West. An end to
nuclear testing, a promise to keep bombs out of orbit, and a slow-
down of fissionable material production could all ease the drag
that defense--along with other economic problems--exerted upon
Soviet growth. Two additional political and economic goals could
also be served by the limited agreements of 1963-1964. First, if
a lengthy detente made it possible gradually to lower the Soviet
military budget, Moscow might be able to accelerate its economic
growth, strengthen its claim to be a model of scientific socialism,
and enhance its ability to influence the developing nations. An
upturn in Soviet growth would also mean a stronger capacity for
an intensified defense effort after the breathing space was over.
Second, the goal of greater growth and prosperity could also be
served by the long-term trade credits from the West which Moscow
might hope to obtain in the improved political climate that
followed the arms controls of 1963-1964.
Whether the Soviet economy would soon become stronger and,
if so, whether this strength would again be intensively applied
to surpassing the West militarily would of course depend upon many
variables,including the manner in which a new generation of Soviet
-218-
leaders assessed their problems to both East and West. But other
measures of arms control might be influenced by the economic
factor. Moscow has indicated an interest in some formal under-
taking to reduce military budgets. And the time may have been
developing for some understanding between Moscow and Washington
not to intensify the arms race by efforts to build anti-missile
defense systems.
4. Internal Political Factors
Our knowledge about the internal workings of Soviet policy
is limited like that of the shadow-watcher in Plato's cave.
But the available evidence suggests that domestic political factors
have been an important conditioner of Soviet interests and
policies in arms control. The way in which the men in the Kremlin
perceived arms controls was of course the primary determinant of
policy that might be adopted, and if the leadership were divided
in its assessment or under conflicting demands from the pressure
of other goals, powerful limitations would be set up. Furthermore
the peace and disarmament issues became entangled on occasion in
the political in-fighting within the Kremlin itself, serving as
weapons in the internal power struggle.
Nikita Khrushchev's own perception of the world must have been
shared by many of his colleagues since his power was by no means
so unlimited as Stalin's. The main opposition to a policy
favoring detente and arms control probably came from certain
military and party leaders and possibly managers in defense
production and heavy industry. Khrushchev's critics saw in
his policies threats to various of their interests, or in any
event used as a basis of their criticisms the alleged or threatened
inroad;s in defense spending, the preservation of military and
economic secrecy, defense against foreign intrusion, or the avoidance
of debilitating effects of prolonged detente on the international
movement. The loosening of Soviet influence upon China and Eastern
Europe as a result of ddtente with the West would also concern these
groups.
The fact that Khrushchev was almost ousted in 1957 and was in
fact removed in 1964 offers the most concrete demonstra+ion that
his power was not absolute and confirms that the reduction of
Soviet armed forces begun in 1960 and Khrushchev's radical
advocacy of reliance on nuclear-rocket forces was opposed by many
military leaders. There were some countervailing internal forces,but they were less coherent. Certain pressures arose out of Soviet
society for a relaxation of international and internal tensions
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and for peace and prosperity, desires that gained momentum with de-
Stalinization and were articulated increasingly by Soviet writers
and some scientists.
There is evidence that the peace and disarmament issue was
used in power struggles within the Kremlin, most clearly in 1955,
in 1957, and perhaps in 1962-1964. Thus Khrushchev gained power
in 1954 by accusing Malenkov of shortcutting defense requirements
but then used the issue of detente to isolate Molotov after Malenkov
was removed. This power-play coincided with a hard Soviet line on
disariament from September 1954 to February 1955 while Malenkov's
star was falling and Molotov's rising, and with renewed concessions
in the negotiations from March to May 1955 as Khrushchev edged
out his second rival. Again in 1957 Khrushchev accused his
heterogeneous opposition in the "antiparty group" of opposing
"peaceful coexistence."
It is likely that internal power struggles induced some of
the sharp zigs and zags in Soviet arms control policy in 1960-
1962 and may well have stimulated the desperate measures Soviet
foreign policy took to redress its waning power; we do not yet
have enough information about this period, however, to establish
a clear relationship between these moves and the rise and fall
of particular forces in the Kremlin. Following the Cuban fiasco
and the party reorganization of November 1962, internal opposition
to Khrushchev's policies seemed once more pronounced. Kozlov in
particular seem:d to be opposing a policy of conciliating the
West and diverting resources from heavy industry. Kozlov's
incapacitating illness in April 1963 coincided with a softer
line signaled by a change in the May Day slogans. The removal
of this critic may have been a key factor that allowed Khrushchev
to agree to the hot line and the nuclear test ban and to break
off negotiations with the Chinese.
By early 1964, however, Khrushchev seemed again to be under
pressure from the defense and heavy industries and from the
marshals not to make reductions in the defense budget or in number
of military personnel (and, we may speculate, to pursue the
development of an anti-missile defense). By this time Khrushchev
was also publicly indicating differences of opinion among party
members over foreign policy. Nonetheless he apparently preserved
sufficient freedom of action to enter into a commitment to cut back
the producbion of fissionable materials.
On balance it appears that Khrushchev generally enjoyed
sufficient power to carry out far-reaching innovations in foreign
and military affairs and arms control policy, overriding whatever
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internal opposition may have existed. Thus Khrushchev engineered
concessions to Austria, Finland, and Yugoslavia prior to the 1955
Summit Conference; he himself announced in June 1957 that Moscow
would accept limited on-site inspection over a test ban; his
power determined Soviet entry into a moratorium on nuclear testing
from 1958 to 1961. It was Khrushchev who pushed through the reduction
of conventional forces in 1955, 1956, and 1960 and the establishment
of the Strategic Rocket Forces; upon his initiative the Soviet
military budget was allegedly reduced in December 1963 and the
Soviet government stated in April 1964 its intention to slow
production of fissionable materials.
Most important perhaps, Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence
line, which had represented a central problem exacerbating Sino-
Soviet relations from 1956 to 1964, continued to prevail. In
each case Khrushchev had to overcome some domestic opposition
and persuade the members of the elite close to the seat of power
to go along with his policies. Although the record indicates that
he often succeeded, there may well have been occasions when domestic
opposition forced Khrushchev to take a harder stand than he
otherwise would have preferred--for instance, the refusal in 1961
to stand by the principle of limited on-site inspection and the
later insistence that there be no more than three such inspections.
At other times internal opposition may simply have prevented a
concession the First Secretary wanted in order to spur the arms
control negotiations. Such suggestions of "things that never
happened" obviously cannot be documented, but they seem inherently
possible. In general the domestic political situation seems to
have served as a key factor that could either open or close the
door to some alternative suggested by external considerations.
Usually the door seems to have been open to the policies favored by
Khrushchev, but perhaps not always so far as he may have liked.
Occasionally he himself was probably forced to slam it shut
in the face of internal dissension. And in Cuba he certainly
proved to be as hair-raising a gambler himself as any leader of
modern times.
The forces and problems confronting the Kremlin after Stalin's
death were in a sense larger than the individuals who succeeded him
to power. Certainly the high optimism and ebullient style of Soviet
foreign policy throughout most of the decade bore the personal stam)
of Khrushchev. That there was broad support for his policies was
due in large part to the necessity of coming to grips with the hard
realities of the nuclear age, economic scarcity, and the existence
of enormous problems on the eastern and western fronts. The
management of power in the Kremlin will always, until
constitutionalism comes, involve an inextricable combination of
-221-
high policy and base impulses and tactics of personal ambition and
power-seeking. We can guess the primary reasons for Khrushchev's
eventual removal in 1964 had more to do with his style and his
domestic policy plus his inability to cope with the problem created
for the international Communist movement by the Chinese than with
the orientation of his policy toward the West. But the squalid
and Byzantine style of succession in the Kremlin must leave as
"not proven" any attempts to correlate the internal power struggle
with rational policy choices.
C. 1965--A Postscript
We emerge with the impression that in the period under
review the Kremlin's interests called for at least some tangible
measures of arms control to be achieved. The first reason lay
in the complementarity between Soviet strategic theory, military
posture and strategic expectations, and the Kremlin's proposals
which would have preserved Soviet strengths while limiting those
of the West. Second, the conflicts of political and military
interests between Moscow and Peking gave the Soviet leadership
good cause to stabilize relations with the West ana to endeavor
to prevent nuclear spread. Third, the mounting burden of
defense expenditures reinforced the external military and
political reasons to seek arms controls, detente, and East-
West trade. Fourth, the Soviet leadership appeared at least
tentatively to believe that its economic system would allow it
to compete better in a disarming than in an arming world. None
of these four inducements to arms control could be fully gratified
by a mere relaxation of East-West tensions. Only specific arms
control agreements could secure the strategic, political, or
economic desiderata arising from these diverse factors.
As of early 1965 it was too early to say with assurance
whether Soviet policy during the past decade had found a new
orientation that might bring it into a generally less hostile
relationship with the West. Moscow continued to have strong
inducements to move toward the West. The latter could not be
readily defeated; an ally against China might be needed; there
were increasingly shared interests; and it was not clear that
either side was going to win the game with the developing nations.
Emphasis on collaboration rather than struggle might prove to be
the more useful approach in Moscow's relations with the West.
But how the successors to Khrushchev would view the
alternatives could not be predicted. The world of early 1965
still bnre family resemblances to that of 1955 in that the
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visage of peaceful coexistence could still from time to time be
dominated by the familiar earmarks of the older, harsher outlook.
The de-Stalinization process could still turn out, like the Sino-
Soviet schism, to be reversible in terms of some things that
count for the West. Soviet moves toward accommodation with the
West could still be interpreted as temporary steps backward to
prepare for a subsequent offensive. And comprehensive disarmament--
even if qualified by provision for a U.S. and Soviet minimum deterrent--
still seemed remote.
Yet other forces continued to work for sobriety regarding
the arms race. The implicit threat in the very existence of
nuclear arsenals remained. The potential dangers for Soviet
policy in the expansion of the nuclear club continued to threaten.
The traditional elements of Sino-Russian relations remained implicit
in state relations vis-a-vis China, fortified by the differential
in their respective stages of development as exemplars of
"scientific socialism." And the growth of expectations and habits
of modernity on the part of both people and leaders in the Soviet
Union could be expected to have at least some effect on policy.
In short, many of the same forces that militated for limited
arms controls in 1963 were still impinging upon Soviet decision-
makers at the beginning of 1965, and the new leaders appeared
perhaps even more pragmatic in their approach than the generation
that succeeded Stalin ten years before.
Soviet leaders at the start of 1965 thus lived within two
general representations of reality. They had to mediate between
them as part of the process of retaining power--which makes
internal conditions so potent a factor. They once again had to
calculate their futures, if only in contingency planning, in
terms of the chronic two-front nightmare. The prospects for
arms control and disarmament remained a secondary, derivative
feature of these sets of interactions, boundaries, and opportunities
as they changed and matured over time. That in 1963 several modest
agreements could be explicitly reached with the West--the hot line,
the limited test ban, the undertaking not to orbit nuclear weapons,
and the subsequent announced mutual cutbacks in production of
fissionable material for military purposes--described the limits
of the possible if not the desirable in Moscow's military-political
outlook toward the West.
To go beyond these statements to the realm of specific
prediction is hazardous in the extreme. There is no general rule
of thumb one can apply to historical prediction and, a fortiori,
to predicting the behavior of Soviet Communist leaders. Our
analysis convinces us that one must look at each event that
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arises in its full historical context to read sense and meaning
into it. We are thus much more confident of the usefulness of
our method of approach than we are about the applicability to
the future of our specific detailed findings.
At the same time, our analysis suggests the basic kinds of in-
formation a policy analyst or planner ought to have available to him
in order to make intelligent judgments about Soviet interests in
arms control and disarmament at any given time. We believe it
probable that the crucial factors we isolated and studied will
continue to operate, and moreover that their relative saliency to
Soviet arms control policy may also persist.
We have stressed throughout the study the difficulties
created by the highly ambiguous nature of the relationship between
the Soviet drive for some kind of detente on the one hand and
concrete measures to moderate the arms race on the other. One
plausible way to view the two, for instance, is as points on a
continuum that runs from relaxation of tensions to arms control
and perhaps disarmament. How far the Soviet leadership is prepared
to go from the atmospherics of detente to concrete arms control
measures depends on factors that no Westerner can exactly measure.
Perhaps we may even be not too far from the truth if we move into
the post-Khrushchev era with the operating assumption that to achieve
significant arms control will continue to depend on the optimum
configuration of our four factors--a high degree of saliency of
the measure to Soviet military-strategic imperatives; a high
degree of responsiveness on the part of the West and either a
submissive Peking or, conversely, a Peking sufficiently hostile
to force Moscow into serious entente with the United States;
a high degree of economic pressure; and collective backing in
the Kremlin for such a policy.
Nevertheless, nothing could be more treacherous than the
blind assumption that such an arrangement of factors will in
fact produce the predicted results. If history repeats itself,
it is usually in a particular way one could not have foretold.
Policy-makers may use with profit the tools analysts have
fashioned, supplemented however by that indispensable quality
that brings to policy the judgment and wisdom this subject so
urgently requires.
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